The EU\u27s Impact on Managing Levels of Corruption in the Post-Communist World by Pavlovska-Hilaiel, Sabina Gueorguieva
University of Denver 
Digital Commons @ DU 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations Graduate Studies 
1-1-2016 
The EU's Impact on Managing Levels of Corruption in the Post-
Communist World 
Sabina Gueorguieva Pavlovska-Hilaiel 
University of Denver 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd 
 Part of the Eastern European Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Pavlovska-Hilaiel, Sabina Gueorguieva, "The EU's Impact on Managing Levels of Corruption in the Post-
Communist World" (2016). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 1150. 
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/1150 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies at Digital Commons @ DU. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital 
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
 ii 
 
 
 
 
 
The EU’s Impact on Managing Levels of Corruption in the Post-Communist World 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
 
Presented to 
 
the Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies 
 
University of Denver 
 
 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment 
 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
Sabina Gueorguieva Pavlovska-Hilaiel 
 
June 2016 
 
Advisor: Dr. Rachel A. Epstein 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©Copyright by Sabina Gueorguieva Pavlovska-Hilaiel 2016 
All Rights Reserved 
 ii 
Author: Sabina Gueorguieva Pavlovska-Hilaiel 
Title: EU’s Impact on Managing Levels of Corruption in the Post-Communist World 
Advisor: Dr. Rachel A. Epstein  
Degree Date: June 2016 
 
Abstract 
 
This study examines the role of the European Union (EU) in the process of 
managing corruption in the post-communist world. Throughout the post-communist 
transitions, which began in 1989, the EU has been consistent in putting a strong emphasis 
on the problem of corruption. As part of the transitions, there were many attempts at 
abating corruption domestically, most of which were expressed in the creation of 
institutions and legislation. Yet such attempts had varying effectiveness, and outcomes 
were not always expected nor predicted by scholars and policy-makers. Internationally, 
the EU expected that conditionality, which offered EU membership in exchange for 
compliance with EU- promoted anti-corruption norms, to be an effective mechanism to 
address high levels of corruption in the post-communist world. Yet, evidence 
demonstrates that membership incentive did not always correlate with strong 
performance. Countries such as Georgia, without the prospect of membership, often 
outperformed countries that had a membership incentive in addition to strong sanctions 
and conditions. This study sets out to explain these puzzles and to identify the conditions 
under which the EU had the most leverage over domestic anti-corruption reforms.  
 
 iii 
Based on a comparison of EU’s efforts of three countries – Bulgaria, Georgia, and 
Montenegro – and employing a combination of qualitative and quantitative data gathering 
techniques, the study makes two arguments. First, anti-corruption institutions were more 
successful in managing corruption where civil society was included in the process of 
institution-building, and later in the process of monitoring and reforming these 
institutions.  
 
Second, the study argues that the EU had more leverage over domestic anti-
corruption reforms where it engaged non-state actors (non-governmental agencies) in a 
political dialogue and where a process of social learning started before membership 
conditionality.  When this condition was present, the EU created a like-minded domestic 
partner capable of championing EU-promoted norms and supplying the EU with 
feedback and knowledge necessary to adapt conditions, incentives, and sanction to the 
local context and better address domestic corruption.    
 
The study contributes to our broader knowledge of post-communist transitions, 
Europeanization, and the scope and limits of international organizations’ impact on 
domestic politics. In examining the development of civil society, it explains the role that 
civil society played in post-communist transitions. In examining the interaction of 
domestic civil society and international organizations, it contributes to the general 
understanding of the mechanisms and extent to which external actors can impact complex 
domestic issues.   
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 1 
Introduction 
 
Despite differing definitions and methodologies, governance indices report high 
levels of corruption in all post-communist countries. Why is corruption so prominent in 
this part of the world and why has it spread to all sectors of society, politics and 
economies?    
 
Many have convincingly shown the detrimental effects of corruption on economic 
development (Mauro 1995, 1997, Knack and Keefer 1996, Tanzi and Davoodi 1997, 
Rose-Ackerman 1998, Gupta et al. 2002). In the post-communist world, corruption has an 
even larger and more negative impact on democracy and democratization (Johnston 1997, 
Rose-Ackerman 1999). By providing privileged access to power and by decreasing 
accountability (Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000), it undermines two of the most fundamental 
principles of democracy - equality and the rule of law. Most importantly, in states such as 
the ones from the former Eastern Bloc, where democracy is new and fragile, and norms 
of transparency and accountability are not yet fully internalized by political elites and 
citizens, corruption creates distrust in office holders, institutions and consequently, in 
democracy itself. For reasons linked to development and democracy, the European Union 
and other international organizations have been eager to understand and root out 
corruption.  
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Corruption is not specific to the former communist countries, but it has a 
particularly pernicious character in this part of the world. Scholars and policy-makers 
agree that corruption in the post-communist world is systemic.1 According to Leiken “in 
most developed countries, corruption remains a violation of the rules of the game, in 
many developing and post-socialist countries it is the game itself.”2 Thus corruption in 
the former Eastern Bloc is worth studying not only because of its high levels but also 
because of the way in which, in select cases, it has encompassed all segments of society, 
politics, and economies. Corruption is something that guides the everyday actions of 
citizens and it often affects the level of political participation. In 2013 in Bulgaria, for 
example, corruption was the main grievance behind mass protests that lasted for a record 
period of 390 days. In 2003 in Georgia, high levels of corruption sparked the Rose 
Revolution. In the former communist countries, corruption control is often a component 
of politicians’ platforms and has a daily impact on business and politics.  
 
Scholars and policy-makers alike often discuss corruption in the post-communist 
world as a phenomenon with the same properties in all countries. Similarly, international 
entities, such as the EU, consistently employ a uniform approach to fighting corruption in 
these countries. However, corruption is not the same everywhere in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia and each country exhibits its own corruption particularities and 
                                                
1 Hellman et al. (2000) define state capture as “shaping the formation of the basic rules of 
the game (i.e. laws, rules, decrees and regulations) through illicit and non-transparent 
private payments to public officials”.  See also Stefes 2005 
2 Leiken, R. (1996), Controlling the Global Corruption Epidemic, Foreign Policy, No. 
105 p. 55-63 
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understanding the nature of corruption in each country is the first step to identifying its 
causes, to evaluating its consequences, and to creating a systematic approach to managing 
it. Georgia, for instance has indeed almost fully eradicated petty corruption. This 
certainly is not to say that high-level political corruption is not present. In fact, it may 
have been even worsened by the same reforms that allowed the radical prosecution of 
petty corruption. In contrast, in Bulgaria corruption continuous to be omnipresent and 
endemic even after numerous reforms by successive governments, with plenty of external 
support from the international organizations and foreign actors.  
 
The last twenty-five years saw a myriad of domestic anti-corruption reforms in the 
post-communist world, the majority of which were created under the guidance of 
international entities among which the European Union (EU). As some have suggested, 
while “domestic factors were important in regards to the way Eastern European countries 
developed in the post-1989 period, international actors are able to influence the 
transitions as well.”3 Indeed, the EU increased its engagement in the region prior to the 
collapse of the communist regimes in the late 1980s. In the beginning of the 1990s the 
EU fully realized that both political and economic factors demanded its presence in the 
new democracies from the East: From a political standpoint, the EU understood that 
being surrounded by a circle of non-democratic states could have a detrimental impact on 
its own functioning (Bini Smaghi and Gros 2001). Uncertain transitions, such as the one 
in Bulgaria, and the quick return to power of seemingly reformed communist successor 
                                                
3 Stoner, K. and M. McFaul (2013), Transitions to Democracy: A Comparative 
Perspective, John Hopkins University Press, p.14 
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parties, made the EU also aware of the real possibility that the new democracies could 
reverse their transitions to democracy and/or fall back into Russia’s sphere of influence. 
From an economic perspective, the EU saw an opportunity for new markets and an 
expanded labor force (Moravscik and Vachudova, 2003). In light of this newly created 
situation, the EU set out to engage post-communist countries in political and economic 
interdependence and thus became actively involved in their transitions from the very 
beginning.  
 
Ever since this moment, the EU has been consistent in putting a strong emphasis on 
the problem of corruption. It has stressed the necessity to address high levels of public 
office abuse, such as misappropriation of funds and bribery, both through membership 
conditionality and outside of it. To facilitate the process of achieving political and 
economic transparency, the EU offered post-communist states a deeper and broader 
relationship as a reward for speedy and effective anti-corruption actions. The EU 
embarked on the logic of conditionality and began rewarding those that performed well 
and sanctioning under-performers. This approach of the EU was based on the premise 
that a strong and credible incentive would persuade domestic actors to start complying 
with EU recommendations. In addition to this main approach, the EU also attempted to 
socialize domestic actors into norms of transparency, accountability, and political 
participation. Conferences, meetings, workshops, and mutual projects served as channels 
through which the EU transported different norms and attempted to change the status quo 
left from the almost half century long communist rule. Yet, the results in all areas, and 
especially in fighting corruption, vary drastically: while starting from the highest levels 
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of corruption among the Central Eastern European countries (CEEC), Estonia and 
Slovenia have had the most success in fighting corruption. Bulgaria and Romania, 
members of the EU since 2007, have been consistently singled out as slow to make 
progress in fighting corruption, and have been excluded from certain privileges normally 
associated with EU membership as a consequence. Georgia, which has no prospect of EU 
membership, has shown significant improvement in the last few years, at least according 
to sources such as Transparency International. Montenegro, despite statehood issues, is 
steadily reducing corruption and creating functional institutions, thus performing better in 
terms of corruption control than some of the new member states.  
 
Research Question 
In this study, I set out to shed light on the puzzling results that EU efforts to fight 
corruption produce. Despite all countries’ conditionality-based relationship with the EU4 
(Kelley 2006, Grabbe 2002) and the strong legacies left by former communist regimes, 
countries vary significantly in their anti-corruption progress.  
 
More specifically, I ask: Why have the EU’s efforts to fight corruption produced 
varying results across countries? Why has Bulgaria, with the most attention and 
conditionality from the EU and already an EU member, done worse in addressing 
                                                
4 The conditionality logic of the ENP is visible in the language of the ENP Strategy 
Paper: “The level of the EU’s ambition in developing links with each partner through the 
ENP will take into account the extent to which these values are effectively shared.” The 
paper continuous: “The ambition and the pace of development of the EU’s relationship 
with each partner country will depend on its degree of commitment to common values, as 
well as its will and capacity to implement agreed priorities.” 
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corruption than Georgia and Montenegro, which have a very distant, EU membership 
prospects or none? 
 
I make two arguments. First, the EU is most effective in introducing anti-corruption 
reforms when it engages in socializing civil society outside of the context of membership 
negotiations. In this case the EU’s leverage over national governments increases because 
the EU can establish a partnership with domestic civil society through cooperation. 
Where such partnerships took place, domestic civil society was equipped to provide the 
EU with feedback that was not influenced by the agenda of a particular political party. In 
turn, such feedback allowed the EU to alter its conditions, incentives, and sanctions to 
address specific domestic problems which sustained corruption and hindered its 
management. Additionally, a partnership between domestic civil society organizations 
(CSOs) and the EU allowed CSOs to better internalize the norms underpinning EU anti-
corruption regulations and champion them in the given society. Thus the ability of civil 
society to apply bottom – up pressure on governments was increased.   
 
Second, I argue that a process of socialization alters not only domestic actors’ 
interests and behavior but also the EU’s actions and preferences. Where such mutually – 
reinforcing processes took place, the EU became equipped with the necessary tools to 
provide adequate recommendations and to adjusts the sanctions and incentives to 
countries in order to elicit the intended effect - in this case the institutional advancement 
of control over corruption. Under conditions of mutual learning, the EU was also 
equipped to better assess domestic situations and progress toward democracy, thus 
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adjusting its strategy regarding if, when, and how it will deepen its relationship with a 
particular state.  
  
To test these arguments, I compare the experience and the results in the area of 
managing corruption in three countries - Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Georgia. The study is 
organized into six chapters. In the first chapter I present a comprehensive way of 
understanding the conditions under which the EU is most successful in introducing norms 
of transparency and accountability and seeing their implementation in enforced policies. 
The goal of chapter two is to compare the institutional anti-corruption arrangements of 
the three case studies. The chapter compares the anti-corruption institutions based on 
measures of independence, specialization, and capacity and determines how civil society 
aided or obstructed the creation and the functioning of these institutions. Chapter three 
discusses the response of governments, such as policy formulation, establishment of 
institutions, and introduction of new legislation in line with the EU’s conditionality. It 
shows, contrary to much of the existing literature, that conditionality by itself rarely has a 
meaningful effect and that in some countries conditionality’s impact is actually negative. 
In chapter four, I analyze whether and how the EU assisted the development of civil 
society, not only in the context of enlargement conditionality, but prior to it as well. 
Chapter five brings together the results of the preceding empirical chapters. Here I 
establish the causal relationship between the efforts of the EU to socialize civil society 
and civil society’s ability to actively and effectively participate in the decision-making 
process in the area of anti-corruption. Chapter six concludes. In it I discuss alternative 
 8 
explanations for the variable effects of the EU’s corruption control efforts and suggest 
questions for further research.  
 9 
Chapter One - Theory and Methodology 
 
In this chapter, I first present a theoretical framework for understanding the 
conditions under which the European Union (EU) is most effective in persuading national 
actors to introduce, implement, and enforce effective anti-corruption reforms. I then 
discuss the methodological challenges faced by most of the research on corruption and 
propose a way to overcome them. I also explain the rationale behind the three chosen 
cases. Finally, I evaluate my theory’s ability to explain variation in managing corruption 
in the post-communist world and the role of the EU in that management, vis-à-vis 
existing explanations.  
 
1.  Theory 
I begin by proposing a theoretical framework for understanding variation in anti-
corruption progress in the post-communist world and the role of the EU in assisting with 
that progress. My theory posits that the EU’s membership conditionality is a necessary 
but insufficient condition for successfully persuading governments to introduce and 
implement meaningful reforms in the area of corruption management. In countries where 
EU actions managed to secure domestic ownership of externally promoted anti-
corruption reforms, the EU was successful in increasing its leverage over national 
governments and in successfully persuading them to manage levels of corruption.    
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Such securing of domestic ownership required not only conditionality, but also 
socialization of domestic actors in norms of transparency, accountability, and political 
participation. In turn, socialization assisted domestic state and non-state actors in 
understanding and performing their role and in championing EU-promoted policies.  
 
I identify two conditions under which the EU’s attempts at socializing domestic 
actors in norms of transparency, accountability, and political participation have resulted in 
domestic ownership of anti-corruption reforms. The first condition occured when the EU 
engaged in a political dialogue with state and non-state actors outside of the context of 
membership conditionality. Over the years, the EU traditionally worked primarily with 
government institutions. It was slow to involve non-state actors, such as civil society and 
business organizations (Börzel and Buzogany 2010), partially because the acquis 
coumunautaire – the legislation and the guiding principles of the EU - lacked a chapter 
on civil society which to require the EU and domestic actors to include civil society in the 
decision-making process. In cases where the EU involved domestic non-state actors it 
used them as a channel to transfer ideas and socialized them into norms of transparency, 
accountability, and political participation. The second condition was the establishment of 
a functional relationship between the EU and domestic non-state actors. Where such 
relationship was present, it allowed the EU to receive unbiased and neutral feedback and, 
in turn, to adjust its conditions, incentives, and sanctions in order to more effectively 
persuade governments to engage in institutional reform to control corruption.  
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Taken together, where present, these two conditions contributed to domestic 
ownership of the reforms promoted by the EU. The presence of the two conditions 
increased the EU’s leverage over domestic policy makers and consequently the chances 
for the successful implementation and enforcement of meaningful anti-corruption 
reforms. In the absence of these two conditions, EU efforts were not only ineffective but 
in some cases had a negative impact in the longer term. For instance, in some countries, 
such as Georgia, the EU’s actions led to situations that allowed the government to select 
only some policies or parts of policies suggested by the EU in order to extract rents 
(Schuelnus 2009, Noutcheva and Duzgit 2012, Yilmaz 2011, Börzel and van Hullen 
2011). 
 
1.1  Domestic Ownership of Externally-Promoted Reforms: A Necessary 
Condition  
 
Domestic ownership of corruption control is a necessary condition for any reform 
to be successful, especially reforms that are guided by external actors. Domestic 
ownership has been analyzed in depth in the literature on foreign assistance to developing 
countries. Authors offer different definitions, ranging from ownership of resources 
(Edgren 2003), to ownership of outcomes, to ownership of ideas and strategies (Lopes 
and Theisohn 2003). The World Bank’s Comprehensive Development Network, for 
instance, defines ownership by placing a special emphasis on the participation of the top 
political leadership and representative institutions in the decision-making process (World 
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Bank 2001). Despite differences among scholars, there exists a general agreement that 
domestic ownership is crucial for the success of reforms.  
 
In the context of post-communist transitions and specifically in relation to anti-
corruption policies, I define domestic ownership as ownership of ideas and strategies. 
This definition is the most appropriate one because it allows for examination of the way 
in which the EU influences the preferences of domestic actors. As a result of the 
scholarly debate on capacity building, which moved from implementation in the 1960s 
and the 1970s, to political will and commitment in the 1980s, we now understand that the 
ownership of ideas is necessary in order to achieve change.  
 
With respect to anti-corruption reforms in the post-communist world, domestic 
ownership of ideas is crucial for two reasons. First, its presence presupposes that more 
actors, who are directly impacted by a particular policy or reform, are involved in its 
creation, and that the final product is not perceived as externally imposed. Indeed, when 
domestic ownership was present, actors were more willing to compromise and endure 
any negative effects of the newly created policies. Second, when a policy enjoys high 
levels of domestic ownership, it is more likely that people respect it because they are 
guided by a logic of appropriateness and follow the rules because they perceive these 
rules as “natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate.” 5  Compliance with international 
                                                
5 March J., J. Olsen (1998) The logic of appropriateness, ARENA Working Papers WP 
04/09, p.3 
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organizations’ prescriptions then becomes the result of identity-driven conceptions of 
appropriateness and the desire to fulfill a role acquired by the virtue of belonging to a 
community, instead of a product of conscious cost-benefit analysis (Scott 1976, Lefort 
1988). 
 
Furthermore, in contrast to other definitions of ownership, ownership of ideas 
presupposes a certain amount of specific knowledge. Simply put, in order to comply with 
EU-promoted anti-corruption policies, domestic actors need to know why and how ideas 
of transparency and accountability underpin such policies. Domestic actors also need to 
believe in the legitimacy and the appropriateness of such ideas.  
 
Knowledge, however, can rarely be simply transferred (Lopes and Theisohn 2003), 
and the way it is delivered to its recipient matters tremendously for whether it is indeed 
internalized. Thus, in the post-communist world domestic actors had to acquire, learn, 
and reinvent knowledge regarding transparency, accountability and anti-corruption 
mechanisms. After the collapse of the Berlin Wall, former communist countries were 
acquiring such knowledge from the Western European countries and the EU. How the EU 
and other international entities presented it determined the ability of domestic actors to 
internalize it. In countries where new knowledge built on existing local understandings 
and preserved patterns, it was well internalized and long lasting. In contrast, where 
knowledge was transferred through a rapid change in the social context and an abrupt 
break with the past, it was never embedded in domestic social practices and values 
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(Easton 1988). As Lopes et al. (2003) argued, knowledge determines ownership of ideas. 
Ownership 
. . . encompasses both the deep pool of local understanding 
that is the very foundation of learning, and the wealth of 
global information that can be reconceived to meet local 
needs. When adaptation fails to happen, however, there is no 
ownership and likely no lasting capacity development.6  
 
In the beginning of the 1990s, due to the legacies from the communist regimes, 
almost all post-communist countries lacked the necessary knowledge needed to establish 
the domestic ownership of anti-corruption policies. While corruption was well known to 
the communist regimes and almost all such regimes attempted to fight the phenomenon, 
these attempts were unsuccessful. The unsuccessful fight against corruption in the final 
years of the Eastern Bloc left legacies, such as a distrust in state institutions (Aslund 
1994). Coupled with weak civil society (Howard 2003) and persisting endemic corruption 
(Stefes 2006), these legacies hindered post-communist states in their attempts to fight 
corruption after 1989. Therefore, in the years following the transitions, corruption in 
post-communist societies had an endemic nature that needed to be considered when new 
anti-corruption mechanisms were established. In contrast to Western societies, corruption 
in transitioning countries was not only endemic (it had become the norm rather than the 
exception) but systemic as well (anti-corruption agencies had become corrupt 
themselves7).  
                                                
6 Lopes, C., T. Theisohn (2003), Ownership, Leadership, and Transformation: Can We 
Do Better for Development Capacity? EARTHSCAN Publishing; London, NY, p. 34 
7 For more on systemic corruption see Klitgaard 2004, Stefes 2005, Karklins 2005. 
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The necessity of domestic ownership of externally-promoted reforms was further 
increased by the strong cultural predisposition to corruption of post-communist societies. 
This predisposition to high levels of corruption was due to both cultural and structural 
legacies left by communist regimes which created opportunities for rent extraction during 
the transitions, to a various degrees in the different countries. Structural factors, such as 
centralized decision-making , lack of party competition, and a practically non-existent 
civil society during the communist regimes, created an environment characterized by 
bribes, practices of nepotism and clientelism (Schoenman 2014). Cultural factors, or the 
disposition to act in a corrupt way were also created during the communist regimes.  As 
Rose et al. argued in Democracy and its alternatives: understanding post-communist 
societies (1998), corruption “was normal in communist societies.”8 According to some 
authors, a combination of the above mentioned structural factors and “culturally 
embedded” 9  corrupt practices hampered development (Hutchcroft 1997, 657). For 
instance, immediately after the collapse of the communist regimes, centralization of 
power, the presence of a single authority that dictated rules, and a general lack of civil 
control over the government led to a lack of participation in the decision-making process 
and no expectation of political accountability.  
 
                                                
8 Rose, Richard, Mishler, Haerpfer (1998), Democracy and its alternatives: 
understanding post-communist societies. Cambridge: Polity Press, p.219. For more on 
this see Holmes 1993, Rose 2001. 
9 Sandholtz W, R. Taagepera (2005) Corruption, Culture, and Communism, International 
Review of Sociology Vol. 15, No. 1, p. 116 
 16 
The abrupt reforms that were undertaken at the beginning of the 1990s did not 
establish domestic ownership over corruption control and were not guided by the 
necessity of knowledge transfer and culture change. As a result, these reforms not only 
failed to begin a process of managing corruption, but in some cases they increased levels 
of corruption. The reason for this was that the reforms did not eliminate the structure of 
opportunities for corruption, but simply altered them and enabled new types of corrupt 
practices (Heywood 1997, 430). To be clear, culture is not static and it can change. 
According to Eckstein (1988) cultural change may occur in one of two ways: first, culture 
changes when there is a necessity to adapt to a new social environment. In this case, 
change is slow, and it aims at preserving and maintaining existing cultural patterns. 
Second, culture changes when contextual changes are so rapid that it is impossible to 
maintain existing patterns. In this case, cultural change takes the form of a discontinuity 
or abrupt break from the past, and changes are often “formless and incoherent in 
individuals and fragmented in aggregates.”10 The changes in the post-communist world in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s were indeed rapid, and they proved to be insufficient to 
promote cultural change that is well entrenched in domestic social practices (Keen 2000). 
Instead, the collapse of the regimes in the late 1980s and early 1990s, abruptly changed 
the political and economic order and did not automatically instill norms of participation, 
accountability, transparency, and respect for the rule of law. The lack of such norms made 
possible Hellman’s partial reform equilibrium (Hellman 1998, 204) in which some actors 
                                                
10 Eckstein, H., (1988) A Culturalist Theory of Political Change, American Political 
Science Review / Volume 82 / Issue 03 / September 1988, pp 789-804, p. 801 
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block the advances in the reform process that eliminate these actors’ opportunities for 
gains.  
 
The above-mentioned particularities of corruption in the post-communist world 
demanded a new conceptualization of corruption as well as new mechanisms for 
managing corruption. Thus, I argue, corruption in the former communist states is more 
fruitfully analyzed as a symptom of an underlying problem of an undemocratic culture 
and fighting it requires the creation of domestic ownership over ideas of transparency, 
accountability and popular participation in the decision-making  process. This 
conceptualization of corruption is consistent with the approach of Persson et al. (2013) 
and distinguishes corruption from its analogue in Western Europe, where corruption 
manifests itself as occasional deviations from established norms of transparency and 
accountability. In a similar manner, other scholars have made the argument that 
corruption in Eastern Europe is a problem of social organization (Stefes 2006, L. Miller 
et al. 2001, Karklins 2005, Mungiu-Pippidi 2006, William and Miller 2006). In a study of 
Romania and Bulgaria, Mungiu – Pippidi (2006) juxtaposed corruption in the Balkans 
and corruption in the West. She found that in the former case corruption was a form of 
distribution of goods, whereas in the latter it represented individual cases of breached 
integrity. Accordingly, corruption in the Balkans is driven by particularism and is defined 
as “a mode of social organization characterized by the regular distribution of public 
 18 
goods on a nonuniversalistic basis that mirrors the vicious distribution of power within 
such societies.”11  
 
In a study of corruption in Africa, Persson et al. (2013) determined that where 
corruption is endemic and where it is a problem of social organization, it is more fruitful 
to analyze it as a collective action problem rather than as a principle-agent problem. In a 
situation where corruption is the expected behavior, traditional instruments such as 
monitoring devices and punishment regimes, would be highly ineffective, simply because 
actors don’t have an incentive to enforce them (Persson et al. 2013). Instead, authors have 
suggested that managing corruption in transitioning countries requires the involvement of 
international actors such as the EU (Médard 2002, Mungiu-Pippidi 2006). More 
specifically, it requires international actors to distribute knowledge regarding a 
comprehensive social change, instead of merely dictating behavior through 
conditionality. In this sense, one of the main roles of the EU was to build domestic 
ownership for externally-promoted reforms through knowledge and norms diffusion. 
 
 
Table 1.1 shows the level of corruption and the progress made by all post-
communist countries in the period since the beginning of their transitions to democracy 
and market economy.   
 
                                                
11  Mungiu-Pippidi, A., (2006) Corruption: Diagnosis and Treatment, Journal of 
Democracy 17 (3), p.87 
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1.2   Domestic Ownership Through Socialization  
After establishing the necessity of domestic ownership for the success of anti-
corruption reforms in the post-communist world, I turn to discussing the role of the EU in 
the process of creating such ownership. As the literature on norm diffusion advises, the 
interaction between international actors on the one hand and domestic state and non-state 
actors on the other inevitably changes domestic preferences and alters the culture of 
domestic actors. Therefore, the extent and manner in which the EU focused on 
developing domestic actors in the period before membership conditionality proved to be 
essential for the future success of anti-corruption reforms. Domestic actors include 
political elites on which the EU focused, mostly through conditionality. However, they 
also include civil society actors which in some countries played a major role in applying 
bottom-up pressure on governments and made anti-corruption reforms sustainable in the 
absence of EU pressure. Therefore, the extent to which the EU socialized civil society 
was tremendously important for establishing domestic anti-corruption institutions with a 
sense of domestic ownership.  
 
I argue that the EU managed to create the necessary domestic ownership, only in 
countries where it supplemented its conditionality with normative pressure and 
persuasion to developing of civil society (Manners 2002). In these countries, it diffused 
norms of participation, shared responsibility, and transparency, and consequently it 
addressed the underlying cause of corruption. In contrast, where the EU addressed 
corruption directly through a conditionality approach, it achieved some institutional and 
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legislative change, but it did not achieve behavioral change. In those cases, the EU 
treated the symptom rather than the cause of corruption.  
 
Such persuasion and normative pressure took place only where the EU attempted to 
socialize domestic non-state actors (civil society) in norms of transparency, 
accountability, and participation in the decision-making  process. There are two 
characteristics of socialization that are fundamental to my theory. First, successful 
socialization has been discussed in the academic literature as an outcome (Sedelmeier 
2006, 2011, Checkel 2005). However, in order to encompass all possible implications of 
socialization, I propose to treat it as a process. For socialization efforts to imbue 
externally promoted reforms with domestic ownership, reforms must be the result of the 
mutual effort of external and domestic actors instead of being imposed by an external 
actor. Domestic and international organizations alike learn principles and practices from 
each other by participating in joint activities. Learning, in this sense, is a cognitive 
process by which actors find solutions and transfer information. Such transfer can occur 
through both direct and indirect network linkages (Graber 2003). It is important to stress 
that such learning processes cannot be successful when linkages are unidirectional. 
Shared meanings are only established when both actors learn from each other and thus 
consequent reforms are imbued with domestic ownership. In this sense, socialization is a 
process because it is iterative and knowledge is constantly altered and augmented. 
Second, In contrast to conditionality-based relationships, bidirectional learning processes 
require that the EU and domestic actors act as partners. Only where partnership between 
the EU and domestic non-state actors was present, did the EU received feedback that is 
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not biased to the agenda of a particular political party but one that furthers the anti-
corruption agenda.  
 
Partnership denotes a horizontal relationship among relative equals. The main idea 
behind partnership is that neither of the participants dictates the terms of the relationship, 
nor does it diffuse norms unidirectionally. Instead partnership means that actors, in this 
case the EU and domestic civil society, work on the basis of shared values and joint 
ownership of policies (European Commission 2004). In this, sense bidirectional learning 
processes are different from a conditionality-based relationship in that conditionality 
denotes a hierarchy. It represents a one-way process in which the EU is placed above 
domestic actors and through which EU values and policies are transferred to the domestic 
level.  
 
My emphasis on partnership is consistent with a general tendency toward the 
decentralization of modern governance in various national (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004) 
and international settings (Fowler 1998), as well as inside the EU itself (Sabel and Zeitlin 
2010). The EU itself adopted the principle of partnership as one of its fundamental 
principles. The logic was that with respect to corruption and anti-corruption, consultation 
and participation were to secure the fundamental conditions for the rule of law: on the 
one hand, citizens’ participation would lead to higher transparency, as citizens better 
understood how their government performed, and, on the other hand, the processes of 
decision-making were to be the subject of direct public control.  
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Furthermore, through the participation of domestic non-state actors, the EU 
received feedback that was unbiased vis-à-vis any political party’s agenda. The EU’s 
learning about the domestic context as part of the socialization process would not be 
successful unless the EU adopted principles and ideas from the countries with which it 
engaged, as much as those countries themselves accepted EU prescriptions.  
 
In sum, my theory posits that socialization leads to successful establishment of EU-
promoted policies only when socialization represents an iterative process and when it is 
based on partnership between the EU and domestic actors.  The next paragraphs detail the 
mechanism by which such socialization is more likely to lead to successful anti-
corruption efforts. 
 
1.3  Implications of Successful Socialization  
When a relationship was present in which the EU and civil society were partners, 
and when the EU received feedback that was not biased to the agenda of a particular 
political party from domestic Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), it was more likely that 
domestic ownership of reforms was established. There were three reasons for this. First, it 
was more likely that civil society became capable of monitoring anti-corruption 
endeavors, but also of cooperating with government in producing effective anti-
corruption policies. Second, civil society was better equipped to diffuse norms among 
citizens. And third, the EU possessed a channel through which it acquired the knowledge 
necessary for altering conditions, incentives and sanctions, in order to make them more 
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successful in directly addressing specific domestic problems which underpinned 
corruption.  
 
1.3.1  Civil Society – State relations 
By engaging in a political dialogue with both the state and civil society, the EU was 
more likely to move state-society relations away from their authoritarian character and 
toward productive cooperation and anti-corruption reforms that enjoy domestic 
ownership. This process was possible because in contrast to what Finnemore and Sikkik 
(1998) called unidirectional teaching of norms, a dialogue in which both actors were 
equal participants was more conducive to learning. In turn, civil society was capable of 
learning its domestic role for the functioning of democracy12 and was able to internalize 
its role as both an auditor of the state and as an entity that cooperates with the state by 
relating popular grievance. 
 
With respect to the nature of corruption and anti-corruption reforms in the post-
communist world, civil society’s role in auditing, monitoring, and pressuring the state 
was essential for the successful management of corruption. In addition to important 
vertical (electoral) and horizontal (intergovernmental) accountability, in some countries 
civil society participation contributed by making diagonal (societal) accountability 
possible. Diagonal accountability refers to the ability of society not only to demand 
answers but also to hold politicians accountable and to be able to enforce the law 
                                                
12 For the role of civil society in democracies see Bratton 1989, Diamond 1994, Garrison 
2000 
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(Schedler 1999, Goetz and Jerkins 2001, Bovens 2007). Diagonal accountability then is 
both similar to and different from vertical accountability:  It is similar in that it involves 
the population as a whole, and it is different because of its lack of regulation by electoral 
laws. More importantly, diagonal accountability is not restricted to regular elections. 
Instead, it is constant and thus when present, it has the ability to actively shape anti-
corruption measures, their implementation, and enforcement. Certainly, the existence and 
the effectiveness of diagonal accountability is subject to numerous contextual factors 
(Grimes 2013, Johnston 2005, Lee 2007, Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006), such as 
capacity, political regime, and economic status, and the ability to create and execute a 
strategy.  
 
In the post-communist world, to hold institutions accountable, civil society needed 
to be able to unite in an anti-corruption agenda and to create a unified strategy to apply 
bottom-up pressure on governments. Where civil society was united, it served to 
coordinate, collaborate with, and elaborate anti-corruption activities between state and 
citizens. The potential of civil society to effectively serve as citizens’ representative to 
the state was well depicted by the words of Marwell and Oliver (1993): “Olson’s ‘large 
group’ problem is often resolved by a ‘small group’ solution.”13  In other words, the 
involvement of civil society contributes to the establishment of domestic ownership by 
diversifying and expanding the actors that participate in the creation of a policy, who 
                                                
13 Marwell and Oliver (1993) The Critical Mass in Collective Action: A Micro-Social 
Theory, Cambridge University Press, p.54 
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perceive anti-corruption policies as being in their interest, and who are committed to their 
implementation.  
 
1.3.2  Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) as a Channel for norm diffusion  
To ensure that knowledge regarding the norms that underpin EU-promoted anti-
corruption policies is domestically re-invented and internalized, civil society needs to 
establish a relationship with the EU that is based on mutual trust.  Where the EU actively 
worked to prioritize the anti-corruption agenda in civil society, it also increased its 
leverage over domestic governments. The EU could in these cases employ civil society as 
a domestic actor with a shared understanding of anti-corruption endeavors. Where such 
shared understandings were present (Epstein 2008, Risse 2000), civil society was willing 
and able to apply bottom-up pressure on policy and lawmakers and to champion EU 
norms of transparency and accountability among citizens.  
 
The ability to use civil society as a channel for norm diffusion also allowed the EU 
to minimize the gap between the EU and citizens. The presence of such a gap was 
detrimental to the success of anti-corruption initiatives because it negatively impacted the 
establishment of domestic ownership over EU-promoted anti-corruption reforms. In cases 
where this gap was significant, it left space for incorrect interpretations of actions and 
messages. On the one hand, citizens’ misinterpretation of the EU’s actions and signals led 
to unwanted and unintended consequences of EU’s efforts. Chapter three will discuss in 
detail the way in which misinterpreted signals from the EU led to inappropriate 
legislation, dysfunctional institutions, and the inability to enforce anti-corruption laws in 
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two of the case studies (Bulgaria and Georgia). On the other hand, the EU’s 
misinterpretation of domestic actions also led to counterproductive recommendations and 
advice, which supported ineffective domestic anti-corruption policies. In this scenario, 
even if domestic elites were pressured by the power of sanctions and incentives to 
comply, EU-promoted policies were at best ineffective and at worst outright negative. 
Therefore, anti-corruption reforms enjoyed domestic ownership only where civil society 
organizations served as EU’s key vehicles for norm diffusion (Hadenius and Uggla 
1996).   
 
1.3.3  The EU’s Flexible Conditionality 
Finally, where the EU and domestic non-state actors were partners and where the 
EU received feedback that was not biased to the agenda of a particular political party or 
interest group, the ability of the EU to secure domestic ownership of anti-corruption 
reforms increased. The reason for this was that the EU had the opportunity to learn about 
domestic preferences and establish contextual knowledge with respect to the environment 
in which reforms were taking place. The EU had thus had sufficient information to alter 
its own preferences and to adjust its actions.  
 
Two important implications for securing domestic ownership of anti-corruption 
reforms stemmed from the ability of civil society to provide the EU with unbiased 
feedback (Wendt 1994, Joerges et al 2001, Jacoby 2006, Héritier et al 1996, Cowles, et al 
2001, Radaelli 2004). First, such feedback allowed the EU to adjust its recommendations, 
incentives, and sanctions so that they addressed specific problems. At the same time the 
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EU acquired the knowledge that was necessary to repetedly make adjustments based on a 
clearer understanding of what was possible in a particular country. For example, in 
Bulgaria, the EU was never able to establish the channels necessary to acquire such 
knowledge and its recommendations were consistently focused on the mere 
harmonization of domestic law with EU law. This hindered corruption control in 
Bulgaria. In contrast, in Montenegro, the EU consistently received unbiased feedback, 
and therefore it was able to establish clear implementation criteria which guided its 
consequent recommendations contributing to institutional reform.  
 
Second, where the ability of civil society to provide the EU with feedback was 
high, EU recommendations and the resulting policies became the product of mutual 
efforts between the EU and domestic actors. Thus, instead of being domestically 
perceived as imposed, often illogical, and even in someone else’s interest, the EU’s 
policy suggestions were perceived by domestic actors as their own.  
 
In sum, the theory presented here claims that a pre-existing process of socialization 
creates an environment which facilitates the EU’s shaping of the prevailing domestic 
norms and values of post-communist states. When the EU is deeply familiar with, or even 
participates in the creation of domestic norms it can support the implementation of 
policies and behaviors rather than just encouraging formal institutions and legislation. In 
this sense, it is not only the tools that the EU uses in order to persuade domestic actors to 
behave in a certain way that are important, but also the informal modes of 
communication and interaction. In addition, the fact that the EU changes its requirements 
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in an iterative process shows a change in EU’s interests. For instance, the EU granted 
Bulgaria membership based only on the harmonization of the country’s law with EU law. 
Later, in Montenegro, by contrast, the EU’s requirements included the implementation 
and enforcement of the law – not just legal harmonization.  
 
1.4   Propositions 
In order to test the theory that under conditions of EU engagement in a political 
dialogue with domestic civil society the EU is capable of influencing domestic actors to 
introduce, implement, and enforce effective reforms that lead to better management of 
corruption, I present one proposition. This proposition is anchored in the argument that 
successful reform in any area requires domestic ownership, especially in an area like anti-
corruption where a fundamental normative shift is required. This proposition is focused 
on the EU’s engagement with civil society prior to membership conditionality and on the 
EU’s engagement of multiple stakeholders in political dialogue concerning anti-
corruption policies. Variation in these factors determines variation in the institutional and 
legal framework of anti-corruption policies, as well as variation in the type of corruption 
that becomes predominant. 
 
I propose that the EU is most effective in persuading domestic elites to introduce, 
implement, and enforce meaningful anti-corruption reforms when it engages civil society 
in a process of social learning. I propose that this process is successful under the 
following conditions: 
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1.   When the EU and domestic civil society establish a relationship based on partnership 
rather than hierarchy; and 
2.   When the EU receives unbiased feedback from domestic civil society. 
 
Where these conditions are present the likelihood of the following results increases:  
 
(1)  It is more likely that domestic civil society and the EU establish shared 
understandings. 
(2)  It is more likely that civil society serves as a channel for diffusing the norms of 
transparency and accountability domestically. 
(3)  It is more likely that the EU alters the conditions, incentives, and sanctions that it 
presents to domestic governments and makes them more compatible with the 
domestic context. 
(4)  It is more likely that domestic civil society follows the EU’s principle of 
partnership and cooperates with the government instead of serving as an informal 
opposition. 
 
1.5  Theoretical Implications 
The first theoretical implication of this study furthers our understanding on 
socialization and social learning. While many studies are preoccupied with the outcome 
of socialization in terms of internalization of norms14 (Checkel 2001), I propose that 
                                                
14 For such studies see Hoogh 2005, Ghieciu 2005 
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focusing on the process of socialization is more fruitful. The reason for this is that the 
social learning process is slow, and results are generally seen only over a long term 
(Batori 2012). Considering the initial normative discrepancy between the EU and post-
communist countries and the countries’ focus on their collapsed economies, it is 
unreasonable to believe that in the short periods after the transitions began, socialization 
efforts would lead to actual observable changes (Gheciu 2005). In contrast, when 
discussing socialization as a process one is provided with the tools to capture the 
development of norms and values over time and to identify the specific factors that aid or 
impede the internalization of norms by domestic actors. 
 
Discussing socialization as a process also suggests that both post-communist 
countries and the EU are constantly being shaped with respect to their preferences and 
behavior. All of the EU’s relationships with post-communist countries were initially 
based on conditions, incentives, and sanctions. However the credibility and the size of 
these incentives and sanction, as well as the nature of conditions varied according to the 
relationship that the EU had with domestic actors. Therefore, the extent to which the EU 
involved domestic civil society in continuous political dialogue from the very beginning 
of the transitions created a different social context in each country. This variation limited 
the types of incentives and sanctions that the EU could use effectively. A pre-existing 
process of socialization allowed the EU to leverage strategies such as naming and 
shaming, because they were effective only under certain conditions. According to one 
author: 
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Shaming possibilities will thus vary with the difference in 
the levels of public opprobrium against the offending 
behaviour in question, ranging from ‘moral panic’ to there-
but-for-the-grace-of-god (e.g. speeding). We need to 
discover the prevailing norms and values operating around 
the social problem and how formidably they gather in 
support of shaming sanctions.15 
 
Second, in order for the process of social learning to be successful, it must take the 
form of a bidirectional political dialogue and constant interaction between domestic 
actors and the EU. This interaction is intended to provide an alternative interpretation and 
“affect[s] a person’s tendency to support or reject the system as a whole, [and] shape[s] 
his determination to engage in political activity” (Heater 1974). Social learning, 
therefore, occurs only when the parties in the process communicate ideological positions 
on the same issue in a continuous, iterative, and interactive manner (Heater 1974, 
Almond and Verba 1963, Dawson et al. 1977). Clearly, this process can target not only 
political parties and government officials but also civil society groups. In other words, 
socialization can occur either top-down (Kavalski 2004) or bottom-up (Warleigh 2001). 
Without rejecting the importance of elite socialization, I focus on the socialization of civil 
society and its ability to spread anti-corruption norms and apply pressure to governments 
from below. The reason for this is that a focus on civil society rather than political elites 
allows me to better understand how institutional transformation can occur without a 
corresponding behavioral change. The point here is that the EU often dealt solely with 
                                                
15 Pawson R. (2002) Evidence and Policy and Naming and Shaming, Policy Studies, 23 
(3), p.8 
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domestic political elites, which led to a normative discrepancy between elites and citizens 
(Kavalski 2004, Ganev 2001, Pridham 2000). 
 
2.  Methodology 
 
This research is a most similar systems design comparative study of three countries 
– Bulgaria, Georgia, and Montenegro. I use a triangulation approach, which combines 
interviews, analysis of institutions and documents, and a Social Network Analysis (SNA).  
 
2.1  Methodological Challenges 
Two sets of challenges face all research that aims to understand corruption and 
ways to fight it in the post-communist world. These challenges are related to defining 
corruption on the one hand and to measuring and observing corruption on the other.   
 
The first challenge of studying corruption is that definitions of corruption usually 
suffer from oversimplification:  narrowing the concept down to bribery or simply trading 
favors for money. However, this understanding excludes many forms of corruption such 
as nepotism and clientelism. The question of precisely which acts constitute corruption 
has engaged many scholars (Heidenheimer 1970, Philp 1997, 2002, Johnston 2005b, 
Holmes 2006) and many definitions have been produced. Over the years, scholars have 
made progress on the subject, and some consensus over what constitutes corruption has 
been reached. The operational definition of corruption today postulates that corruption is 
 34 
“the abuse of public office for private gain”.  This definition is made universal by the 
virtue of its inclusion in the United Nation Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)16. 
In the last 10 years the text of the convention has been ratified by all post-communist 
countries and has become a part of their legal definition of what constitutes an act of 
corruption17. Despite this theoretical success the definition remains vague and insufficient 
for understanding the phenomenon in question.  
 
A number of scholars have challenged the possibility and the effectiveness of 
having a universal definition because of perception discrepancies:  understandings of 
“abuse,” “public,” and “private” are often subject to cultural perceptions and therefore 
difficult to compare. For instance, analyzing corruption in Uzbekistan, Urinboyve and 
Svensson  (2013) come to the conclusion that what would seem as a clear instance of 
corruption to a western observer, for the local population is simply a matter of 
demonstrating social status or an act of genuine support to the other party. I conclude, 
that while, indeed, the understanding of corruption in general is a subject of cultural 
predispositions, culture is altered through interaction and so are understanding and 
definitions.  
 
                                                
16 The UNCAC was approved by an Ad Hoc Committee and was adopted by the General 
Assembly with resolution 58/4 of 31 October 2003. In accordance with article 68 (1) of 
resolution 58/4, the United Nations Convention against Corruption entered into force on 
14 December 2005. 
17 All post-communist countries have ratified UNCAC in the years following the 
disintegration of the authoritarian regimes there. 
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The abuse of public power for private gain can be also understood in a legalistic 
way. In this case corruption would be operationalized through a clear line of what actions 
the law forbids explicitly and what actions are allowed. While this reading seems to be 
more rigorous, it again has shortcomings. The most important of them is the narrowing of 
the concept to bribery and omission of some forms of corruption such as nepotism and 
clientelism.  
 
To account for problems of conceptual and operational definitions of corruption, 
scholars have created numerous typologies of corruption. Acknowledging the endemic 
character of corruption in the former communist countries, Karklins (2002) has created a 
typology of corruption that is specific to this region. Her typology is based on concrete 
acts and on the level of the administration on which they occur. Thus, Karklins (2005) 
suggests three main types of corruption – low level administrative corruption, assets 
stripping by officials, and state capture18 by corrupt officials who act to advance the 
interests of a specific group instead of the public interest. While this typology is indeed 
very descriptive and encompasses all types of corruption in the post-communist 
countries, it fails to address the extent to which corruption is managed. For instance, in 
the three countries subject to this study, all corruption types from Karklins’ typology 
existed to various extents. However, this is not to say that corruption manifested itself in 
the same way in all three of them:  In contrast to Bulgaria, in Montenegro instances of 
corruption were almost immediately identified and acted upon by different state and non-
                                                
18 For more on state capture see Helman et al, 2000. They define state capture as a 
situation in which firms shape and affect formulation of rules of the game through private 
payments to public officials and politicians. 
 36 
state actors. In Georgia, only some public officials but not non-state actors had access to 
sufficient resources to identify and address instances of corruption. This variation in the 
actors that had access to the process of anti-corruption policy-making created variation in 
the way in which corruption was managed. It also altered the way in which corruption 
affected public life: for instance in Georgia, because of the complete elimination of petty 
corruption, the topic has lost its salience, while in Bulgaria corruption is inevitably 
present in the electoral campaigns of each and every political party. 
 
Finally, Stefes (2006) offers a typology of corruption which is based on the nature 
of corrupt networks. He differentiates between non-systemic and systemic corruption and 
claims that corruption in the post-communist world is systemic. Systemic corruption, in 
turn, may be centralized or decentralized. Where corruption is centralized, government 
officials control the structures of corruption and limit corruption at the lowest levels of 
the bureaucracy. Where corruption is decentralized, the political leadership does not act 
as a unified actor and does not have control over the lower levels of bureaucracy. I 
employ Stefes’ typology because it best describes the differences between Bulgaria and 
Georgia – two of the case studies where corruption is indeed pervasive.  
 
Conceptual and operational challenges of corruption naturally lead to problems of 
measuring and observing corruption. Corruption is said to be a victimless crime, or a 
crime in which both sides are guilty. Indeed most of the former communist countries that 
criminalized corruption, defined the criminal act as offering, soliciting, and accepting 
bribes. This characteristic makes corruption not only more puzzling, but also more 
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challenging to study because it leaves acts of corruption often underreported. In the 1990s 
and the early 2000s, issues in measuring corruption led many to rely on perceptions. 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index is the index that has been 
consistently and overwhelmingly used by scholars and policy makers alike. However, it 
merely reports current perceptions of corruption (and often the perception of foreign 
instead of domestic actors), instead of actual levels of corruption. Perceptions are 
problematic because they are easily altered by recent events, including corruption-related 
scandals, media publications, election campaigns, or changes of political power (Stefes 
2011).  
 
In the beginning of the 2000s an increased interest in the causes and effects of 
corruption resulted in an increased number of indices as well as in their methodological 
improvement. Currently we can position the existing indices in three general categories: 
based on surveys, based on experts’ opinion, and mixed. There is no scope for a detailed 
discussion of these methodologies here, but a word about the effectiveness and usage of 
these indices is necessary. While they are all useful for comparing perceptions of 
corruption at a specific moment in time, they can rarely say much in a comparative 
manner and over time. The problem with over-time comparison is that perception often 
changes based on media coverage or a recent corruption scandal (Stefes 2011).  
 
Applied to post-communist societies, all these indices have one important 
characteristic in common: while they all encompass respective levels of corruption, they 
all fail to address types of corruption. For instance none of the indices specifies what the 
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predominant form of corruption is.  If Rasma Karklins is right about the importance of 
different types of corruption, then an index differentiating between state capture, low-
level administrative corruption, and assets stripping by officials should be more 
informative for understanding corruption and finding ways to manage it. The three case 
studies here demonstrate existing problems with corruption indices well:  Countries, such 
as Georgia, where centralization of institutions allows for high level political corruption, 
has been rated high on Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI), 
precisely because of the inability of corruption indices to break down corruption levels by 
type. Similarly, Bulgaria has been performing increasingly better according to CPI, yet 
high levels of corruption sparked national protests in 2013. It is difficult and often 
meaningless to claim that one country has made more or less progress than another. A 
more precise measuring of anti-corruption progress would speak not only to perceived 
levels of corruption, but would also show different types of corruption.  
 
2.2  Proposed Solutions 
To better account for which acts constitute corruption and how one can best 
measure corruption, I analyze the phenomenon by examining anti-corruption institutions. 
By focusing on the institutional environment and its propensity to aid or impede 
corruption, I use anti-corruption institutions as a proxy to levels of corruption. This 
approach also allows me to shed light not only on the levels of corruption but also on the 
type of corruption that is most prominent in each country. There are three main points 
with respect to this approach that need to be explained. 
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First, while I use the general definition of abuse of power for private gain, I do not 
narrow it down to financial rent extraction only, as most international institutions do. I 
operationalize the concept of private gain not only as extraction of financial rent, but also 
as trading of political influence. I also define power not only in terms of public office but 
as social capital as well. This means that a person who does not hold public office can 
manipulate their financial or social influence in order to benefit personally or on behalf of 
someone else. This benefit does not need to take the form of financial rents. I consider the 
increase of one’s political and social influence to be a benefit as well. In this sense, 
conflict of interest becomes a type of corruption. This understanding of corruption allows 
me to fully analyze not only instances of corruption where public office-holders benefit 
from their position, but also where private citizens with social capital at their disposal 
receive private gain.  
 
Second, the illicit character of corruption renders measuring levels and types of 
corruption difficult, and existing indices become insufficient to clearly identify which 
types of corruption lack control mechanisms. I propose that the institutional environment 
that aids or impedes corruption is more informative for understanding the nature of 
corruption in each country. While corruption remains my dependent variable, I use the 
institutional environment as a proxy to determine the level and the type of corruption. 
Bardhan (1997) for instance finds that corruption is almost always a direct consequence 
of the nature of government interventions. Similarly, Lederman et al. (2005) claim that 
opportunities for rent extraction and asymmetrical distribution of information, the two 
prerequisites for rising corruption, depend on the institutional design.  
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Finally, political accountability has been long established as central for the 
successful management of corruption (Fackler and Lin 1995, Linz and Stepan 1996, Nas 
et al. 1986, Bailey and Valenzuela 1997, Persson et al. 1997, Rose-Ackerman 1999, 
Djankov et al. 2001, Laffont and Meleu 2001). The degree of political accountability, in 
turn, depends on institutional arrangements and the extent to which they provide for 
transparency and a system of checks and balances.19 The assumption here is that if anti-
corruption institutions are not equipped to prevent and adequately react to instances of 
corruption, then abuse of power will take place. This is especially true for transitioning 
societies and in particular for post-communist countries where cultural predispositions to 
corruption (see previous section) make the creation of anti-corruption institutions a 
process that requires societal normative change. I emphasize the work and the interaction 
of different institutions engaged in corruption monitoring, punishment of corrupt acts, as 
well as the creation and distribution of anti-corruption policies. To evaluate the work and 
effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions, I compare the main anti-corruption bodies in 
each country.  
 
The study combines the comparative method with process tracing (DellaPorta et al. 
2009). I specifically trace the process by which the EU influenced the creation of 
particular anti-corruption institutions. Three types of data inform my study: First, I 
establish the current state of anti-corruption institutions with a specific focus on whether 
                                                
19 For more on checks and balances see McGovern (1997), Persson et al. (1997), Rose-
Ackerman (1999), and Laffont and Meleu (2001) 
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they aid or impede an environment in which corruption thrives. Second, I examine the 
influence of the EU on the creation of these institutions, through means informed by the 
logic of conditionality. Third, I analyze the EU’s attempts to socialize domestic actors by 
using civil society (defined as NGOs) as a means to transfer norms of transparency, 
accountability and political participation. 
 
2.2.1  Domestic Institutions and Their Functioning  
In order to identify variation on the dependent variable – an institutional 
environment which aids or impedes corruption – I rely heavily on an approach used by 
the OECD and compare anti-corruption institutions in the three countries based on their 
specialization, independence, and administrative capacity. I add to this approach the work 
of civil society in establishing and controlling anti-corruption institutions. 
 
In relationship to the specialization of anti-corruption institutions, the post-
communist world provides a spectrum of institutions. On one end of the spectrum are law 
enforcement institutions. In this model anti-corruption institutions are specialized in 
detection, investigation, and prosecution bodies. Specialized anti-corruption detection, 
investigation and prosecution may also be combined in a single body. On the other end of 
the spectrum are preventive, policy development, and coordinating institutions. In this 
type of specialization, institutions have predominantly corruption-prevention functions. 
They are responsible for research, risk assessment, and monitoring. They also coordinate 
the implementation of anti-corruption strategies and action plans and facilitate 
international cooperation and cooperation with civil society. None of the post-communist 
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countries’ models are to be found at the ends of the spectrum. They all opted for mixed 
models and created country-specific specialization of institutions. To compare them, I 
examine variation in the models.  
 
The second characteristic of an anti-corruption institutional framework is 
independence of institutions. Regardless of the model, the independence of anti-
corruption institutions is crucial especially for eradicating grand corruption. Prosecution 
of petty corruption may not always require an institution specifically shielded from undue 
political influence. However, managing the type of corruption that can destroy the proper 
functioning of the judicial system or systemic corruption in a country with a good 
governance deficit, demands special protection of the independence of anti-corruption 
institutions (OECD).  
 
As part of evaluating the independence of anti-corruption institutions I compare the 
three case studies’ institutional frameworks in terms of administrative capacity. Funding 
and trained personnel are necessities for the proper functioning of institutions. Based on 
interviews and actual budgets, I assess whether anti-corruption bodies in Bulgaria, 
Georgia, and Montenegro are funded sufficiently to execute their tasks.  I also examine 
whether their administration is trained and the level to which political appointments or 
mismanagement of the administration impedes the performance of the institution.  
 
Finally, in order to conclude whether anti-corruption institutions create or hinder an 
environment in which corruption thrives, I evaluate the role of civil society. In this part I 
 43 
am interested in whether civil society was provided with the opportunity to contribute to 
the policy-making and policy-implementation process by serving as a channel for 
transmitting citizens’ grievances to the government. For instance, where clear legal 
provisions for civil society participation in the work of different institutions were 
established, or where the law required policy-making institutions to accommodate 
suggestions and reports from civil society, I conclude that anti-corruption institutions 
have a high degree of independence.  
 
I interpret high levels of institutional independence, specializations, and civil 
society access and participation to create an environment for a high level of political 
accountability. In turn, where an institutional environment for strong political 
accountability is present, corruption is reduced because it allows for punishing politicians 
who make inappropriate policies (Faukler and Lin 1995, Linz and Stepan 1996, Nas et al. 
1996, Bailey and Valenzuela 1997, Laffont and Meleu 2001).  
 
Semi-structured interviews (George and Bennett 2005) with key officials 
responsible for the creation, implementation, and oversight of anti-corruption institutions 
shed light on the actual performance of the institutions, as well as on the motivation for 
their creation. Interviews with selected employees from government institution were 
conducted. The guiding principle for interviewee selection was employees’ involvement 
in all levels of government bureaucracy, either in the relevant institution in the periods of 
introducing a strategy or passing a law, or in a crucial period for the implementation of 
the strategy.  
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2.2.2  The Influence of the EU  
In this study, I aim to specify the role of the EU in the introduction of certain laws 
and institutions and the extent to which the EU can influence proper functioning of these 
institutions through socialization or material incentives and sanctions. Through document 
analysis and interviews, I establish the level at which the EU applies pressure and the 
mechanisms by which it does so. I use interviews to understand the motivation of the EU 
in choosing the bureaucratic levels and the tools for applying pressure. Interview 
questions are oriented toward establishing EU representatives’ perception of the domestic 
actors with whom they interact: do they see the domestic actors as willing to change their 
behavior for instrumental purposes, or were these actors seen as seeking to understand 
and implement the EU recommendations even when these recommendations do not 
benefit them immediately? Furthermore, through interviews I assess the level of trust 
between EU negotiators and domestic actors, as well as domestic actors’ perception of 
EU actions. This information is crucial for understanding the extent to which domestic 
actors and the EU operate based on shared understandings. In all interviews I inquired 
about the tools that the EU used. The questions that I address in the interviews include 
asking why in some instances the EU used shaming mechanisms and in others they did 
not, as well as inquiring about the expected and the actual reaction from the state, and 
why the state reacted in the way it did.  
 
In order to determine the actual influence of the EU, I also examined the political 
debate surrounding the creation of anti-corruption strategies. I emphasize the periods both 
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before and after EU conditionality peaked and focus on whether or not strategies were 
created in order to satisfy EU requirements. I also examine whether the need to fight 
corruption was a salient issue at the moment of creation of the relevant institutions, and 
what influence negative EU reports had on amending relevant legislation. I also search 
for political dialogue between the EU and government representatives regarding issues of 
corruption.  
 
2.2.3  The Influence of Civil Society 
The main argument of the study is that where the EU engaged in a process of social 
learning of civil society, its influence on domestic management of corruption is increased. 
In light of the systemic character of corruption in Eastern Europe, the proper functioning 
of institutions only shows part of the picture. Corruption is not only a result of 
dysfunctional institutions but also of cultural norms and predominant value systems. 
These norms and values are flexible and can be changed through a socialization process 
(Sedelmeier 2006, Checkel 2005). The attitudes and tendencies exhibited by civil society 
therefore become a major component of the story. For this, I rely on interviews with 
NGO representatives, in which they detail their understanding of major problems created 
by high levels of corruption and their perception of the role and ability of civil society to 
influence the status quo.  
 
Civil society is a broad concept that is often used to denote all actors in the public 
sphere that are different from the state. I build on Larry Diamond’s definition of civil 
society:  
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“the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-
supporting, autonomous from the state, and bounded by a legal order or set of shared 
rules.”20 
 
This definition presupposes that civil society is institutionalized, that is, its fate is 
not contingent upon a single organization; instead civil society represents a network of 
social organizations. This network, in turn ensures the existence of social capital which 
Putnam defines as “features of social organization, such as networks, norms and trust, 
that facilitate coordination and cooperation or mutual benefit.”21  
 
This definition of civil society naturally includes business organizations, media 
outlets, faith-based organizations, churches, NGOs, trade unions and even political 
parties. However, I use a narrower operational definition of civil society. While the 
diversity of civil society actors is important for the functioning of democracy, when the 
discussion is focused on a specific issue, such as the EU’s influence on managing 
corruption in the post-communist countries, a narrower definition of civil society is better 
suited for three reasons: First, NGOs are by definition not supposed to be related to 
political parties, in the sense that they do not directly seek political power. Second, NGOs 
are non-profit –oriented – they do not attempt to gain profit for their members. Third, 
                                                
20 Diamond, L. (1994) Toward Democratic Consolidation, Journal of Democracy, 
Volume 5, Number 3, July 1994, p.5 
21 Putnam, R. (1995) Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, Journal of 
Democracy, 6, p. 67 
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NGOs strive to achieve public benefit. A narrower definition of civil society is crucial in 
post-communist societies because as previously discussed corruption there is endemic 
and part of every citizens’ life. 
 
In order to shed light on whether and how the EU has been socializing civil society 
actors, I use a triangulation approach. I first perform an analysis of the EU’s efforts to 
develop civil society and to ensure the ability to use it as a channel for diffusing norms of 
transparency and good governance domestically. Here, I study the mechanism by which 
the EU distributes funds to non-governmental organizations (NGOs). While funding is 
not a mechanism by which socialization takes place, it could be seen as a form of 
manipulative persuasion, because it often sets the agenda of non-state actors. Thus by 
discussing the mechanism by which the EU provided funding for civil society, I address 
the possibility that social learning through agenda-setting took place. Where I find that 
the majority of funds was distributed directly from the EU to NGOs, I conclude that a 
direct relationship existed and see this relationship as a sign of dialogue and therefore 
socialization. In contrast, where the EU funded civil society development projects 
primarily indirectly – through various governmental institutions − I conclude that the 
relationship and dialogue between the EU and NGOs was nonexistent and thus 
socialization did not occur. However, socialization does not take place only through 
funding. Therefore, I also look at the specificity of various civil society development 
programs – whether or not they were specifically targeting the role of civil society in 
managing corruption and whether they are sector specific. Lastly I attempt to determine 
whether civil society development programs emphasized civil society in the capacity of a 
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service provider, an advocacy-based organization, or something else.  The analysis is 
supplemented by semi-structured interviews (George and Bennett 2005) with NGO 
representatives, which establish the NGOs understanding of their function in society.  
 
Finally, in two of the countries (Georgia and Bulgaria), I perform a Social Network 
Analysis (SNA) (Scott 1987, 2005) at three critical junctures (2003, 2007, and 2013). 
This analysis is based on three disciplines: from psychology it takes sociometric analysis, 
from sociology it borrows interpersonal relations, and from anthropology it builds on 
structures of 'community' relations.  Applied to civil society in the post-communist world 
and its interaction with the EU, this allows me to determine whether political dialogue in 
which both sides are learning occurs, or whether the relationship is unidirectional – from 
the EU to domestic civil society only.22  Where I find a high density of relations, I 
conclude that the EU and domestic civil society organizations are partners, which 
exchange knowledge, and thus learn from each other. In contrast, determining 
centralization around the EU is interpreted as conditionality-based relationship, in which 
the EU diffuses norms but does not receive feedback.  I focus on the period of 2001 to 
2003. In Bulgaria, this period is important because this is when the EU was most active in 
sponsoring and working with civil society. In Georgia, this period is very significant 
because it came right before the Rose Revolution, which resulted in Saakashvili’s 
government, otherwise known as the “NGO government.”23   
                                                
22 For more on networking versus conditionality see Cardwell 2011, Kochenov 2011, 
Korosteleva 2011 
23 Author’s interview with Gia Nodia, CIPDD 
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Unfortunately, data limitations do not allow a SNA analysis to be performed in 
Montenegro for 2003 and 2007. Therefore, I use it as a supplemental tool for two of the 
case studies.  
 
2.3  Case Selection 
The choice of the case-studies – Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Georgia − is based on 
the independent variables – EU's relationship with domestic state and non-state actors. In 
regards to anti-corruption activities, the three countries exhibited variation in the process 
of interaction between the EU, domestic civil society, and state institutions in the period 
before official membership conditionality began and, more specifically, variation in the 
extent to which the EU attempted to socialize civil society. As discussed above, in some 
places this process was the one where the EU served as a teacher of norms (Finnemore 
1993, see also Sasse 2008, Batory 2012, Lavenex 2008, Tyler 1990, Sedelmeier 2006, 
Checkel 2005), while in others the EU emphasized material conditionality.  
 
From the new member states, Bulgaria was the country that received the most 
conditionality:  EU froze funds on three occasions, it postponed membership, and 
introduced the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism after accession. Based on the 
literature on conditionality, Bulgaria is expected to comply the most with EU anti-
corruption norms because its membership depended on compliance. However, in 
comparison to other EU members, the country remains the most corrupt one. Similarly in 
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comparison to Montenegro and Georgia, Bulgaria’s progress is the slowest and the most 
difficult to identify (see table 1.1).  
 
The countries varied with respect to EU’s engagement with civil society as well. 
From the very beginning of the involvement of the EU in Bulgaria, the EU embarked on 
an interaction with state officials rather than with civil society. Specifically, in the area of 
anti-corruption, it did not fully engage non-state actors before 2001. However, strong and 
credible sanctioning as well as receiving the ultimate reward – EU membership – should 
have meant, according to some scholars, that the country has at least shown stable 
progress in the fight against corruption. Yet, Bulgaria remains the EU member with the 
most consistently high levels of corruption. On the other hand, the EU has not sanctioned 
Montenegro nearly as much as Bulgaria, but it has been consistently engaging its civil 
society since before the country received independence. Thus, one might not expect high 
levels of compliance in Montenegro, and relative to Bulgaria, one should see fewer 
results in the fight against corruption. Yet, I find higher levels of compliance in 
Montenegro in comparison to Bulgaria.  
 
Finally, the case of Georgia is no less puzzling: the country had no membership 
perspective, and thus the EU’s leverage in terms of offering rewards and sanctioning was 
not as strong as in the other two cases. Georgia was also torn by civil war in the early 
1990s. On two occasions the country was involved in an armed conflict with powerful 
Russia. The conflicts from the early 1990s (Abhazia) and 2008 (South Osetia) both 
effectively shrank Georgia’s territory and reduced the priority of fighting corruption. In 
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terms of engaging civil society, the EU did not do so until the Rose revolution in 2003. 
After Saakashvili took power and formed what is known as the NGO government, the EU 
gave him its almost unconditional support.  
 
Based on the strength of conditionality that was applied in each, the EU expected 
that relative to Bulgaria and Montenegro, Georgia would make rather slow progress in 
the fight against corruption. Yet, in 2003, high levels of endemic corruption sparked the 
Rose Revolution and, according to all existing indices from 2005 to 2011, Georgia  
consistently performed unexpectedly well in managing corruption. In 2010 Transparency 
International’s Global Corruption Barometer ranked Georgia first in the world with 
respect to relative reduction in the levels of corruption. 24  Some have claimed that 
Georgia’s progress is solely a function of domestic factors: Saakashvili introduced harsh 
reforms from the very beginning in his term in office. However, in 2008, immediately 
prior to his second term in office, mass protests triggered by the often undemocratic 
methods that he used shook the country. At this point threatened with a loss of power, 
Saakashvili resorted to the EU’s positive feedback in order to legitimize his approach to 
fighting corruption.    
 
The three countries also show variation in the manner in which civil society is 
involved in the decision-making  process with regards to anti-corruption policies. In the 
period before 2001, there did not exist in Bulgaria an institutionalized way for civil 
                                                
24 Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer 2010, available at 
https://www.transparency.org/gcb201011/results 
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society to provide active input into the process of decision-making. To be fair, in 2001 
Bulgaria’s first National Anti-Corruption Strategy was the result of a document produced 
by a think-tank, called Coalition 2000 which represented a coalition of NGOs. This raised 
the hopes of many that civil society would be allowed to actively participate in the fight 
against corruption. However, these hopes did not materialize until 2009 when a law 
establishing civic councils was introduced. In Georgia, as a result of the Rose Revolution, 
civil society was left out of the decision-making process. Though technically involved, its 
relationship with state institutions resembles an hourglass relationship in which the gap 
between civil society and state institutions is large and hinders the ability of civil society 
to influence policy-making (Muskhlelishvili 2009, 2011). In contrast, Montenegrin civil 
society enjoys participation in most anti-corruption decisions made in the country. 
Despite the discontent that this arrangement often brings to government officials, civil 
society participates in all working groups during EU negotiations and also has a 
representative in each anti-corruption institution. 
 
The final variation, exhibited by the three countries, is in the relationship between 
civil society and the EU. While in all three countries the EU uses the feedback that civil 
society provides, this feedback comes in different forms. In Bulgaria this feedback comes 
from individual experts more often than from organized civil society. Thus while the EU 
certainly enjoys a relationship with individual representatives of civil society, it hardly 
has well-established cooperation with Bulgaria’s civil society as a whole. In Georgia, the 
EU engages with some NGOs but not others. In addition to the problem of this method, 
creating an artificial divide in the third sector, the EU also received biased feedback. 
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Finally, in Montenegro civil society enjoys a strong relationship with the EU delegation 
(though this is sometimes denied by the Commission in Brussels). While political divides 
have weakened the opposition and one party (in different coalitions) has been in power 
for the last twenty-three years, the EU sees civil society in Montenegro as a stable and 
trustworthy partner.  
 
To be clear, the selected countries also exhibit variation on the dependent variable – 
the institutional configuration that encourages or hinders particular types of corruption. 
Georgia shows high levels of grand corruption and very low levels of petty corruption. 
High levels of both petty and grand corruption characterize Bulgaria. Finally, in 
Montenegro corruption is indeed high but also managed. What is more important, though, 
is that the three case studies are also similar on the dependent variable. All types of 
corruption are underpinned by the original state capture which took place in all three 
countries. Selecting on the independent variable allows me to show why a particular type 
of interaction of civil society, the EU, and domestic state actors addresses state capture. 
  
In this study I focus on domestic anti-corruption institutions (including the 
judiciary) which were designed to prevent and investigate corruption and in some cases 
punish public officials accused of abusing public office. With few exceptions these 
institutions are not sector specific, instead they operate across economic and social areas. 
Therefore they exemplify the specific issues that permit corruption. Furthermore, 
identifying the problems of anti-corruption institutional frameworks allows me to shed 
light on what types of corruption are predominant in each of the case studies. In 
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discussing anti-corruption institutions I also show their interaction with domestic and 
international non-state actors. I can thus draw conclusions  about the impact of  such 
interaction in the area of anti-corruption reforms.  
 
Though I don’t focus on specific policy areas, I provide examples from the areas of 
healthcare and education because they are policy realms that have an immediate impact 
on citizens’ everyday lives and exhibit high levels of public involvement.  
 
3.  Alternative Explanations 
The theory presented here builds on the argument that certain types of interaction 
between international institutions and domestic actors are necessary in order to make 
externally promoted policies appear appropriate and desirable (Epstein 2008). Where 
present these interactions alter the domestic context and allow for the country in question 
to introduce institutions that are capable of managing corruption. I also extend the 
argument claiming that a process of socialization changes domestic actors. The degree to 
which such process is present alters not only the preferences of domestic actors, but also 
the mode of conditionality applied by the EU. In turn, the mode of conditionality affects 
the EU’s capabilities to control corruption in the post-communist world. In contrast to the 
majority of literature on democratization, post-communist transition, and 
Europeanization, the emphasis is not on the role of different actors but on the process of 
interaction between these actors. In the following pages I identify and position my study 
vis-a-vis three major debates in existing scholarship.  
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3.1  Domestic versus International Drivers of Anti-corruption Reforms 
This debate positions domestic factors against international ones in the search for 
the true drivers of democratic transitions and more specifically the creation of meaningful 
anti-corruption policies. While I borrow from both camps, I also distinguish my study 
from claims that only international or only domestic factors drive the variation in anti-
corruption policies across countries from the post-communist bloc. Those skeptical of the 
ability of international institutions to alter domestic politics argue that the EU has very 
limited influence to control corruption in Eastern Europe and claim that the impact of the 
EU depends more on domestic factors. Specifically, the argument is that the EU’s ability 
to effectively control corruption depends on the presence of pro-western political parties 
which the EU can use as a platform to further its agenda (Vachudova 2005). Where these 
political parties are not present, it is argued, the EU is not capable of producing effective 
change. Variation in compliance vis-à-vis anti-corruption prescriptions is then explained 
by domestic elites’ presence or lack of political will. Some have extended this line of 
thinking not only to political elites but to non-state actors as well (Levin & Satarov 2000, 
Fritzen 2005, Mungiu-Pippidi 2006). Accordingly, in places where those domestic state 
and non-state actors who benefit the most from corruption are not willing to take steps 
toward eradicating the phenomenon, no substantial domestic efforts are made. Thus, 
according to these findings, the EU is not in a position to fight corruption.  
 
While I agree that domestic actors affect the impact the EU has, I claim that the 
role of the EU is underestimated and misunderstood: existing literature consistently 
overlooks how EU actions in the early years of the transitions shaped domestic actors. 
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The point here is that the influence of the EU in the early stages of post-communist 
transitions informed the way in which domestic actors were shaped and were shaping the 
EU policies toward them.  
 
Scholars often focus on the period after the EU officially commenced its 
conditionality approach in post-communist states. They fail to consider the fact that the 
EU was involved, albeit in an often informal way, in the transitions that began at the 
collapse of the Berlin Wall. Vachudova (2005) differentiates between passive and active 
leverage of the EU. In her view, in some countries the EU indeed applied “passive 
leverage” in the early 1990s, and it was beneficial. However it was the “active leverage” 
(conditionality) that served as a decisive factor for the level of success in introducing 
democratic institutions. While Vachudova (2005) does claim that passive leverage was 
important in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, she misses the fact that, during 
the communist regimes, civil society was significantly stronger in these countries when 
compared to Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Georgia.  
 
For instance, it is unclear how influential passive leverage would have been in 
Poland if Solidarity were not a well-established movement even before the collapse of the 
Berlin Wall (Ost 2005) or if the Prague Spring had not taken place in 1968 (Kieran 
Williams 1997). Nonetheless, I agree that active leverage is crucial, but my proposition 
remains different: I argue that the presence or absence and the type of passive leverage 
determined the chances of success of the active leverage as well as the shape the active 
leverage took. EU influence, or in Vachudova’s terms “passive leverage,” was different in 
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different countries: in some, the EU was engaged in socializing political parties and non-
state actors in democratic norms (Montenegro), while in others it was concerned 
primarily with stopping the violence (the collapse of former Yugoslavia and Georgia). 
Nonetheless, the mere presence of the EU was shaping the domestic political landscape 
and the type of domestic actors that were present before the beginning of conditionality.  
 
This influence is evident from the fact that virtually every post-communist state 
declared an ever-deeper relationship with the EU to be one of their major foreign policy 
goals. Domestic political parties and civil society representatives alike have been using 
the EU as a point of legitimization since the collapse of communist governments and 
continue to do so. The influence is also logical because after the end of the Cold War, the 
EU quickly understood the potentially detrimental effect on its own functioning 
politically and economically unstable neighbors could have. Thus, in 1990 the EU 
declared: “Peace and security in Europe depend on the success of [the Eastern European] 
effort.”25  Despite my strong acknowledgement of the important role of the EU, I disagree 
with claims that the EU is solely responsible for the success (or lack thereof) of the fight 
against corruption and that domestic actors are completely malleable. Instead, I argue that 
the interaction between the EU and domestic state and non-state actors determines how 
successful anti-corruption efforts are.  
 
3.2  Socialization versus Conditionality 
                                                
25 Press Release of the European Council in Copenhagen, 1993 available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-93-3_en.htm 
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It is evident that both socialization and conditionality occur during post-communist 
transitions. The question is whether these processes are parallel or if they influence each 
other and, if they do, how this influence manifests itself. My emphasis on the interaction, 
rather than simply the actions of different players, challenges literature which argues that 
only post-communist countries are being transformed in the process. International 
relations scholars operating from a constructivist perspective rightfully claim that 
interaction between two actors changes the interests and the behavior of both (Wendt 
1999). Thus the processes by which the behavior of both the EU and the individual post-
communist countries was shaped cannot be overlooked. The proposed study places a 
special emphasis on the way interaction that preceded conditionality influenced not only 
domestic actors but also the EU. Based on this interaction, the EU chose to employ 
certain incentives and sanctions and not others and chose to emphasize certain conditions, 
thus altering the level of influence it could exert on the post-communist countries’ fight 
against corruption.  
 
I argue that both socialization and conditionality affect the influence the EU has in 
a particular case and perhaps more importantly, that both processes influence each other. 
On the one hand how EU conditions, incentives, and sanctions are perceived domestically 
depends on the presence (or the lack thereof) of social learning which creates shared 
meanings. On the other, the type of incentives, sanctions, and conditions the EU chooses 
to employ is a function of the domestic reaction to previous EU’s actions. My argument 
differs from the claim that conditionality has been successful when a parallel process of 
socialization existed (Kelley 2004) or that determining the type of motivation that is 
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stronger in each country should be seen as an empirical question (Batori 2012). My 
assumption here is in line with constructivist thinking and I suggest that two 
simultaneously occurring processes, whose final goal is the same, influence and alter 
each other (Epstein 2008). Therefore when a process of social learning is present, it 
inevitably changes the way incentives and sanctions are perceived and acted upon 
domestically. It also changes the pool of incentives and sanctions the EU can effectively 
use and the type of conditions the EU can impose. This argument relies heavily on 
constructivist assumptions. It insists that in order for a domestic cost-benefit analysis that 
leads to successful anti-corruption efforts to exist, states need to learn to place higher 
value on political and economic transparency (Tyler 1990, Sedelmeier 2006, Checkel 
2005).  
 
Thus the theory presented here builds on the conjecture that compliance with EU 
anti-corruption regulation occurs when citizens believe that “the law is just” 26 or that 
“the authority enforcing the law has the right to dictate behavior.”27 Social trust in the 
fairness of the law on the part of the citizens would indicate such a process of 
socialization (Levi 1997, Feldman 2011). Achieving this level of social trust can happen 
through a process of interaction between domestic actors and EU representatives in which 
the former learn to choose the right thing to do even when this will bring them fewer 
material rewards (March and Olsen 1975, 1989, Checkel 2005, Sedelmeier 2006, Levin 
and Satarov 2000). However, the EU’s extensive reliance on conditionality renders the 
                                                
26 Tyler, T. (1990) Why People Obey the Law, Yale University Press, p. 4 
27 ibid 
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influence of material incentives and sanctions important. When discussing the various 
outcomes of the EU’s actions, overlooking this significant aspect of EU’s contribution to 
combating corruption in the post-communist world would provide us with a partial 
account. Thus I consider the effects of conditionality, but more importantly I consider the 
mode of conditionality.  
 
Accordingly, my argument is in direct opposition to scholars who claim that no 
matter what political actors are present domestically, the economic and political 
incentives offered by the EU will alter the domestic cost-benefit analysis leading to 
compliance and that "a state adopts EU rules if the benefits of EU rewards exceed the 
domestic adoption costs."28 Thus these scholars make the adoption of rules contingent 
upon the determinacy of conditions, the size and speed of rewards, the credibility of 
threats and promises, and the size of adoption costs, but not on the type of domestic 
actors and their level of socialization in EU norms. As explained above, the failure of 
rationalist thinking has been exemplified not only by the failure of EU members to 
comply (Bulgaria and Romania), but also by the fact that more compliance and more 
aggressive lowering of levels of corruption are observed in countries where membership 
is not a possibility (Georgia, Montenegro).  
 
3.3  Civil Society 
                                                
28 Schimmelfennig, F., U. Sedelmeier, (2005) Europeanization of Central and Eastern 
Europe, Cornell University Press, p. 671 
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In its attempt to promote democratic norms in the post-communist world, the EU 
has traditionally worked with national governments and has left civil society cooperation 
behind. In turn this situation has left the scholarly debate on relations between civil 
society and the EU lagging behind as well. It is only recently that scholars have truly 
engaged in analyzing the results of the interaction between the EU and domestic non-
state actors. Some authors have argued that while the EU declares its commitment to 
domestic multi-level governance, as accession approaches its position usually shifts to 
ensuring that the funds are absorbed on time, even in cases where this requires central 
management through national ministries (Leonardi 2005). For instance, a study by Bailey 
and De Propris (2002) demonstrates this in five CEE countries and identifies national 
government to be ‘gatekeepers’ that are ‘firmly in control’ of subnational actors. A 
similar point was made by Hooghe (1996). In this case civil society was still able to 
participate but its chances of influencing the policy-making process were severely 
decreased.  
 
In contrast, a range of studies claims that domestic civil society often uses the EU 
in order to legitimize itself locally and to further its agenda. In research examining how 
social practices determine the logic of European integration, Woll and Jacquot (2010) 
show how NGOs use the EU in cognitive, strategic and legitimizing ways in order to 
strengthen their positions in the policy-making process.29  
 
                                                
29 For EU usage see also Greenwood and Ronit (1994) and Reising (1998) 
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In my view, all scenarios are plausible. However, I examine the interaction of the 
EU with civil society as a process instead of an outcome. I claim that which scenario will 
materialize depends on an early interaction between state, civil society and the EU. This 
interaction is constantly evolving and though it may start as an instrumental usage of 
resources, with time it equally alters political actors and the environment they operate in:  
In some cases norms of transparency, accountability, and participation in the decision-
making  process are being instilled in the society and levels of corruption are decreasing. 
In others, long lasting legacies from the previous regimes, such as the centralization of 
power, remain. Coupled with quick structural changes demanded by the EU, these 
legacies often lead to increasing levels of corruption. Therefore, whether the EU’s social, 
cultural and political ideas will be transmitted not only by formal institutions but 
increasingly by civil society groups through processes of decentralized political 
socialization (O’Dowd and Dimitrovova 2011), or whether civil society’s participation 
will be strictly regulated by governments, depends on the relationship civil society has 
with the EU. I build here on what Romain Pasquier et al. (2002, 2004, 2007) have called 
a bottom-up perspective on European studies. This approach emphasizes local actors and 
the ways in which they use and interpret European rules and opportunities. Many in this 
tradition have concentrated on collective action and the constitution of transnational 
networks between domestic and European NGOs (Chabanet 2001, Guiraudon 2001, 
Weisbein 2001, 2003, Balme et al 2002) or citizenship and the identification of citizens 
with European ideals (Duchesne and Frognier 2002, Strudel 2002, Sauger et al 2007). In 
contrast, I focus on the interaction between EU institutions, such as the Commission, and 
domestic non-state actors. The main concern is to understand how civil society actors 
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interpret the EU as a political actor and how the EU affects their activities and their self-
perception of their role.    
 64 
Chapter Two – Different Types and Levels of Corruption 
 
In this chapter, I examine the variation in levels and types of corruption among 
Eastern European countries. I show that types and levels of corruption in the post-
communist world contradicted the EU’s assumption that strong conditionality would 
produce compliance with EU suggested anti-corruption policies and consequently would 
lower levels of corruption. The three cases analyzed in this study evidence the failure of 
conditionality. My claim is that because of the clandestine nature of corruption, indices 
data on corruption is not reliable. Instead, it is more fruitful to analyze the institutional 
environment and the extent to which it is conducive to corruption. Before I do this 
though, I take some time to depict the progress of anti-corruption efforts in the three 
countries.  
 
Bulgaria enjoyed the most conditionality and the most attention from the EU and it 
should be expected that the country complies the most with EU suggested reforms and is 
effective and efficient in managing corruption. Yet Bulgaria shows little progress over 
time, especially before and after EU’s involvement.  
 
In Bulgaria in the period between 1993 and 2013 both administrative (petty) and 
political (grand) corruption was high. Petty corruption affected the everyday lives of 
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citizens, especially in areas that saw significant levels of interaction between citizens and 
administrative providers. One such area was healthcare, where sociological surveys 
showed that corruption had been consistently increasing. For instance, a study by Vitosha 
Research found that between 2002 and 2008 the percentage of respondents that identified 
corruption in the healthcare sector as being the most widespread relative to other 
economic sectors. Corruption in healthcare increased from 20.6% in 2002 to 39.6% in 
2008.30  
 
The most corrupt practices in healthcare involved payments beyond official fees or 
receiving services that are otherwise provided by healthcare plans, such as referrals to a 
specialist, obtaining referral for tests by a specialty doctor, having a surgery performed, 
and birth delivery assisted by a physician. In addition, the required payments were large 
relative to the living standards of patients. According to a 2006 report by Transparency 
International31, unofficial payments ranged between $50 and $1100. The same report 
showed that these numbers saw a tremendous increase from 9% of an average yearly 
salary in 1991 to 21% in 199732. These numbers continued to grow over the next ten 
years. By 2006, the average amount requested for a surgery was about 80% of an average 
salary. Therefore, much needed care was directed not toward those with need, but rather 
toward those with the means of paying.   
                                                
30 Data  from Vitosha Research. Available at: http://www.vitosha-
research.com/index.php?id=677 
31 Corruption in health: Global corruption report 2006 www.transparency.org 
32 ibid 
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Extraction of funds by physicians took place through the prescription of 
unnecessary procedures and treatments. In this case, physicians extracted funds not 
directly from the patient, but indirectly through the National Health Insurance Fund 
(NHIF), a government agency funded through the national budget. According to the 
Fund, the period 2010-2013 saw a trend in which doctors submitted reports and received 
reimbursement for treatments that never took place. The problem in these cases was the 
lack of a system that was accessible to both patients and the NHIF, which could show 
discrepancies in the received treatment and charges made to the NHIF 33 . Corrupt 
practices in the healthcare sector that fall under petty corruption were also observed in the 
trade of medicines. One such practice was when distributors give commissions (i.e. 
bribes) to physicians in order to have them prescribe their medicines.  
 
Such practices made the system increasingly less effective. Most importantly, since 
healthcare was an area where people are more willing to give bribes, such practices led to 
the gradual impoverishment of the population. Finally, bribes created a lack of trust in the 
healthcare system, and the last years saw an increasing search for foreign healthcare 
services by citizens that had the means to pay for them.  
 
Grand corruption in the country also remained high, and the state was traditionally 
captured by networks that spread across business and politics (Konstadinova 2012). Such 
circles of firms surrounding the political elite of the country and using the process of 
                                                
33 Author’s interview with the Head of the NHIF, Bulgaria 
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policy-making and state agencies for narrow corporate ends dated as far back as the late 
1980s when Zhivkov (the then President and the General Secretary of the Communist 
Party) introduced changes in the banking sector. The first example of such a group was 
Multigroup. The organization was believed to be guided by Andrei Lukanov (a Prime 
Minister of Bulgaria in the period between 1990-1991) and Ognian Doinov (a former 
member of the Politbureau of the Communist Party) (Barnes 2007). According to some 
investigators, immediately prior to the collapse of the regime, Lukanov and Doinov were 
both very active in introducing a degree of liberalization, which would allow the 
channeling of profits into the hands of party leadership. Consequently, they used 
Multigroup in order to transfer money out of the country and to later invest them as 
private capital (Roth 2008, p. 251). As a result, Multigroup became extremely powerful 
in the period when Lukanov was a Prime Minister, and, according to Ganev (2007), the 
holding managed to take advantage of various sources of enrichment in the public sector, 
such as their entry into the market of natural gas. This engagement drove Bulgarian gas 
prices higher than anywhere else in Europe, and was extremely profitable for Multigroup 
(Ganev 2007, Kostadinova 2012).  
 
This trend of business groups and political elites being intertwined continued until 
the time of this research between 2013-2014. After the collapse of Zhan Videnov’s 
government in 1997 and the victory of the United Democratic Forces (UDF) in the 
following elections, Multigroup lost their political protections and a group surrounding 
the new party in power took hold. Olymp was created as a result of a meeting of 
businesses supporting UDF and leaders of the party, which took place in 1996 (Zlatkov 
 68 
2008). One of the companies associated with Olymp was Balkanstroi Engineering, who 
won one of the most profitable public contracts for reconstruction of Sofia Airport, 
despite well documented conflict of interest described by Peev (2000) and Zlatkov 
(2008). Slavcho Hristov, one of the leaders of Olymp, was also involved in the crash of 
the banking sector in Bulgaria in 1997 through the payment of 80 million levs to the 
creditors of Commercial Bank (Kostadinova 2012, Ganev 2006).  
 
The UDF loss in the 2001 election led to the formation of yet another powerful 
economic formation, this time associated with the new party in power – the National 
Movement Simeon Saxkoburggotski. The new group was registered as a non-profit 
organization and included prominent bankers, a chairman of a strong insurance company, 
the founder of the largest Press Group in Bulgaria, as well as Ilya Pavlov, the former 
President of Multigroup (Kostadinova 2012). Through Dimitar Kalchev, then a minister 
of the state administration and a member of Multigroup, the non-profit organization 
managed to create the Council for Economic Growth, which became a consultative body 
to the Prime Minister of Economic Affairs (Peeva 2002). 
 
In a very similar manner, both of GERB’s governments (2009 and 2013) were 
linked to the media mogul and former director of the lottery Irena Krusteva and her son 
Delian Peevski. In fact, the longest mass protest in Bulgaria after the country’s post-
communist transition began, was as a result of Delian Peevski assuming the position of a 
head of the National Security Agency in June 2013. In sum, despite strong EU 
conditionality, both petty and grand corruption remained high in Bulgaria. 
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In contrast to Bulgaria, Georgia did not have a membership perspective and 
therefore the country should have not be expected to comply with EU suggested anti-
corruption policies. Yet, after the Rose Revolution in 2004, Georgia has performed 
tremendously well on lowering petty corruption.  
 
Corruption in Georgia underwent a significant transformation in the period since 
the country’s post-communist transition. This transformation of corruption was often 
mistaken for progress and was often praised by politicians, scholars, and policy-makers 
alike. Instead, corruption in Georgia transformed from endemic to grand.  
 
During the Shevarnadze’s regime, corruption was present at every level of the 
administration, as well as in the policy-making institutions. While party pluralism and 
somewhat free media were present in Georgia, the interests of Shevardnadze’s clans were 
met by ratified laws in their favor, nontransparent political institutions, the absence of the 
rule of law, manipulated courts, and the imposition of state control (Christophe 2004). 
The proclaimed attempts of Shevarnadze to move the country from autocracy to 
democracy were superficial and worked in favor of the political elite and business groups 
that were associated with the elite. The executive and judicial branches of power were 
interdependent with politics and conducive to bribery (Stefes 2006). Informal institutions, 
or clans, remained a source of illegal income for politicians, while benefiting from a 
krisha (roof or patron) provided by these same politicians. Therefore, by influencing 
policy-making, certain individuals and business groups captured the state and acquired 
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astonishing wealth, while the state budget suffered from a constantly increasing deficit 
(Theisen 2000).  
 
Corruption was also present in public services, most of which were captured by 
crony networks with poor provision (Antadze et al. 2005). While corruption in education 
and healthcare surpassed its soviet manifestations (Rostiashvili 2004), the truly 
unbearable corruption was in the police forces and more specifically in the traffic police. 
In an interview with the National Public Radio (NPR) in 2005, Saakashvili summarized 
the manner in which traffic police in Georgia operated as follows:  
Basically, we had one of the most corrupt police forces. And 
the way it functioned was very simple. Government told the 
policemen, ‘You are supposed to be out there, keep order. 
You need to have some kind of cars, but we are not going to 
buy for you any cars. We are not going to put in any 
gasoline in that car, so you have to get money for it 
yourselves. You need to wear some kind of uniforms. We 
don't care where you get them from. And you also should 
sustain yourself, I mean, of course, because we are not even 
going to pay you because the payment was pretty symbolic. 
And not only do you have to take bribes from the people but 
you also have to share part of your corrupt income with your 
superiors - I mean, with the government that appointed 
you.34 
 
After the Rose Revolution, as Stefes (2006) predicted, Saakashvili could go two 
ways:  He could indeed work to make institutions transparent and accountable, or he 
could transform corruption from systemic and decentralized, to systemic and centralized. 
Saakashvili chose the latter. Immediately after assuming the office of the President, 
                                                
34 Interview given by Saakashvili to the National Public Radio, US, September15, 2005, 
available at: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4849472 
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Saakashvili signaled his approach to corruption clearly: centralization of power in the 
hands of the President was secured through the Constitutional amendments from 2004. 
These amendments provided the President with authority in making legislative initiatives, 
dismissing Parliament, and appointing and dismissing PM and government members, 
thus giving him practically unbounded power.  
 
Such power was to be secured with a police reform, which made the police 
practically dependent on the President. The police reform indeed strengthened the police 
force in Georgia and reduced petty corruption, but it also made the police dependent on 
the President and allowed him to misuse police forces in order to protect his own power.  
Aleko Kupatadze documented numerous abuses against government critics and 
opposition politicians, which included the use of intimidation, improper surveillance and 
arrests.  This type of enforcing anti-corruptions measures was not democratic and reforms 
were introduced solely for the purpose of increasing the incumbent’s power and to 
counteract his opposition.  
 
The protection of government officials by the police was clearly shown in many 
cases. One of these cases was the murder of Girgvliani. In 2006, top banker Sandro 
Girgvliani was found dead near Tbilisi. Four low level officers of the Department of 
Constitutional Security in the MoI were arrested, convicted, and sentenced to prison. 
However, the officers’ claim was that they were acting under the directions of high level 
political officials in MoI. Despite the general public’s discontent with the court decision, 
no investigation was conducted in order to determine the validity of such accusations. 
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Furthermore, police forces and police violence was used during the opposition 
demonstration in November 2007. This signaled that the police and MoI protect the 
governing party rather than citizens and that the police was used to pressure the 
opposition (Kubny 2009, Whitmore 2009).  
 
Finally, some scholars have suggested that countries comply the most with EU-
promoted policies immediately prior to their accession to the EU. Indeed, this hypothesis 
could explain the high levels of compliance in Montenegro when the country began 
membership negotiations in 2012. However, Montenegro was making a slow but steady 
progress in the area of anti-corruption since the beginning of its transition immediately 
after the Yugoslav Wars in the 1990s.  
 
Just as with Bulgaria and Georgia, Montenegro began its post-communist transition 
with corruption that was equally present on administrative and political levels. Corruption 
became exceptionally problematic in the area of border control. In the context of the 
Yugoslav embargo in the early 1990s, Montenegro turned into the premier source of 
cigarette smuggling in the region. Traffickers capitalized on an ineffective justice system, 
public sector corruption, and the lack of specialized equipment and training.  
 
Tobacco trafficking was not specific to citizens from border regions only, but 
involved high level officials, including Prime Minister Djukanovic. In fact, Italian 
prosecutors placed the prime minister at the center of a conspiracy by Montenegrin 
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officials and the Italian Mafia that allegedly smuggled huge quantities of cigarettes for 
about 10 years, starting in the 1990s. 
 
Djukanovic and his circle of friends and family benefited from the privatization of 
coastal properties as well. As late as July 2008, Parliament, controlled by Djukanović’s 
party, passed a law declaring five-star hotels to be in the national interest of Montenegro. 
The law allowed private companies to confiscate surrounding land using eminent domain. 
The new law also loosened the rules for larger developments which could force small 
landowners to give up land to neighbors with larger lots and houses. 
 
The increased cooperation between the EU and domestic NGOs that intensified 
after 2000 began a gradual reversal of the situation. This is not to say that Montenegro 
completely eliminated corruption, but arrests of public officials after 2008 showed steady 
progress. The Zavallia case was originally brought to the anti-corruption officials’ 
attention by a group of NGOs in 2007. The case was related to the illegal construction of 
tourist complexes, and NGOs’ investigation revealed a complex network of related 
persons and companies that comprised a construction cartel with the ability to eliminate 
competition, and to pressure institutions into ignoring violations of the law. In 2013, 
Podgorica’s High Court jailed eleven indictees, including Rajko Kuljaca, former mayor 
of the coastal resort, and Dragan Marovic, his deputy. These individuals were found 
guilty of abuse of office for the benefit of a private company, Zavala Invest, and for the 
abuse of the municipal budget, of more than 800,000 euros.  
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Later in 2013, the Montenegrin state prosecutor charged ex-mayor Lazar 
Radjenovic and several other officials from the resort town of Budva with abuse of office. 
They were accused of committing fraud during the construction of installations for the 
purification of wastewater, in a deal between the municipality of Budva and the 
Montenegrin branch of the German-based company WTE Wassertechnik GmbH. 
 
Finally, in 2015 another arrest was made in relation to the case in Budva. This time 
the arrested was none other than the chairman of the political council of the ruling 
Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) – Svetozar Marovic.  This was the highest ranking 
Montenegrin official to be arrested in connection to corruption claims. According to the 
special prosecutor for organized crime, Milivoje Katnic, Marovic identified key 
participants of the organized crime group in Budva and the prosecution had enough 
evidence necessary to expand their investigation.  
 
Such arrests of public officials in Montenegro revealed the progress that the 
country was making in the fight against corruption. This progress was in contrast to 
Georgia, where arrest of the representatives of the opposition served as a political 
strategy for Saakashvili. It was also in contrast to Bulgaria, where Prime Minister 
Borisov’s alleged attempts at curbing corruption amounted to the dismissal of office of 
three magistrates, and disciplinary sanctions for fifteen others (European Commission 
2010a, 5). The only significant sentencing was received by a businessman (Mario 
Nikolov) and was driven by Borisov’s political ambitions. Nikolov had previously 
supported Prime Minister Sergey Stanishev (a fierce rival of then Sofia’s mayor Borisov) 
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by contributing more than 200,000 leva to Stanishev's Socialist Party. After Borisov’s 
victory in the 2009 election, Nikolov was charged of fraud and embezzling 7.5m of EU 
funding and sentenced in May 2010 to 12 years in prison.  
 
As it was mentioned above, existing corruption indices, indeed, confirm variations 
in type and levels of corruption and serve as a starting point for this research. However, I 
am skeptical about their applicability to understanding corruption in the post-communist 
world. My main skepticism of corruption indices is that the data provided by them is 
misused by academics. Academic research and various reports of international 
organizations build on corruption indices data and suggest ways to improve and augment 
the corruption and anti-corruption knowledge pool. However, indices merely supply 
information regarding perception of corruption, which proves insufficient for a complete 
understanding of the phenomenon. For instance, corruption indices are not a sufficient 
basis for understanding variation across countries in the types of corruption nor do they 
provide the information necessary to establish which type of corruption is prevalent in 
each country (see chapter one). In order to account for this insufficiency, I examine 
corruption in the three case studies by analyzing the institutional environment and the 
extent to which it aids or impedes corruption. 
 
By 2013, all countries in the former Eastern Bloc had revised their institutional 
structure to be in line with the democratic principles of transparency, accountability, and 
the rule of law, yet in some countries corruption levels remained high. The desire for an 
ever-closer relationship with the West and a radical separation from practices typical for 
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the communist regime led post-communist countries to drastically change their 
institutional and legal systems. The rule of law and anti-corruption reforms remained a 
high priority from the beginning of the transitions. By 2006, post-communist states had 
ratified almost all major international anti-corruption documents and had become 
members of various international and regional anti-corruption initiatives (see table 2.1). 
In addition, participation in international conventions and domestic pressure persuaded 
national policy makers to introduce new institutional mechanisms for securing the rule of 
law.  
 
By the time of this research, there existed a spectrum of institutional frameworks 
designed to combat corruption in the post-communist world. On one end of the spectrum 
were the Lithuanian 35  and Latvian 36  model of law enforcement institutions. They 
combined prosecutorial, investigative, preventive and educational functions. Modeled 
after Hong Kong’s and New South Wales’ anti-corruption bodies, these institutions were 
fairly independent from the government and had significant power to address levels of 
corruption (Smilov 2010). At the other end of the spectrum were preventive and 
coordinative powers. These institutions had less power in terms of investigating and 
penalizing corruption (Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Bosnia). No countries (with the 
exception of the
                                                
35 Lithuanian Special Investigative Service (STT) 
36 Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau (KNAB) 
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Table 2.1 Ratification of International Conventions by year by country 
  UN 
Convention 
against 
Corruption 
(UNCAC) 
OECD 
Bribery 
Convention  
UN 
Convention 
against 
Transnational 
Organized 
Crime 
Council of 
Europe 
Criminal Law 
Convention 
on Corruption 
Council of 
Europe 
 Civil Law  
Convention 
on 
Corruption  
Adopted 31-Oct-2003 17-Dec-1997 15-Nov-2000 27-Jan-1999 4-Nov-1999 
In force 14-Dec-2005 15-Dec-1999 29-Sep-2003 2000 2003 
Bulgaria 20-Sep-2006 29-Jan-1999 5-Dec-2001 1-Jul-2002 8-Jun-2000 
Georgia 4-Nov-2008  5-Sep-2006 1-May-2008 22-May-2003 
Montenegro 23-Oct-2006  23-Oct-2006  28-Jan-2008 
Albania 25-May-2006  21-Aug-2002 19-Sep-2001 21-Sep-2000 
Armenia 8-Mar-2007  1-Jul-2003 9-Jan-2006 7-Jan-2005 
Azerbaijan 1-Nov-2005  30-Oct-2003 11-Feb-2004 11-Feb-2004 
Belarus 17-Feb-2005  25-Jun-2003  15-Mar-2006 
BiH 26-Oct-2006  24-Apr-2002 30-Jan-2002 30-Jan-2002 
Croatia 24-Apr-2005  24-Jan-2003 8-Nov-2000 5-Jun-2003 
Czech 
Republic 
29-Nov-2013 9-Jun-1999 24-Sep-2013 8-Sep-2000 24-Sep-2003 
Estonia 12-Apr-2010 1-Jul-2004 10-Feb-2003 6-Dec-2001 8-Dec-2000 
Hungary 19-Apr-2005 1-Mar-1999 22-Dec-2006 22-Nov-2000 4-Dec-2003 
Kazakhstan 18-Jun-2008  31-Jul-2008    
Kyrgystan 16-Sep-2005  2-Oct-2003    
Latvia 4-Jan-2006 21-Mar-2014 7-Dec-2001 9-Feb-2001 12-Apr-2005 
Lithuania 21-Dec-2006  9-May-2002 8-Mar-2002 17-Jan-2003 
Moldova 1-Oct-2007   14-Jan-2004 17-Mar-2004 
Poland 15-Sep-2006 4-Feb-2001 12-Nov-2001 11-Dec-2002 11-Sep-2002 
Romania 2-Nov-2004  4-Dec-2002 11-Jul-2002 23-Apr-2002 
Serbia 20-Dec-2005  6-Sep-2001 18-Dec-2002 9-Jan-2008 
Slovakia 1-Jun-2006 1-Nov-1999 3-Dec-2003 9-Jun-2000 21-May-2003 
Slovenia 1-Apr-2008 23-Jan-1999 21-May-2004 12-May-2000 17-Mar-2003 
Tajikistan 25-Sep-2006  8-Jul-2002    
Turkmenistan 28-Mar-2005  28-Mar-2005    
Macedonia 13-Apr-2007  12-Jan-2005 28-Jul-1999 29-Nov-2002 
Ukraine 2-Dec-2009  21-May-2004 27-Nov-2009 19-Sep-2005 
Uzbekistan 29-Jul-2008   12-Sep-2003     
Source: OECD International Convention against Corruption 
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Baltic states) were to be found at the extremes of the spectrum. For the most part, 
countries borrowed from both models and created their own institutional structure. 
However, the vast majority of post-communist states opted out of law enforcement 
institutions. This was partially due to the fear of placing too much power in one agency, 
and thus returning to the highly centralized power structures that were typical of their 
communist past. It was also due to the political nature of corruption. As Smilov (2010) 
argued, preventive and coordinative models allowed governments to use the mobilizing 
force of the discourse on corruption without great risks of finding themselves at the 
receiving end of investigations and trials. 
 
Despite cross-country variation in anti-corruption institutional frameworks, all 
institutions have two prerequisites in order to function as intended: first, the models 
required political independence of anti-corruption institutions to be secured (Tisne and 
Smilov 2004) and second a clearly defined and stable relationship between institutions 
was necessary. Therefore, in order to evaluate the potential for corruption to thrive in 
Bulgaria, Montenegro and Georgia, I compare the legal framework that regulates anti-
corruption institutions in the three countries. 
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Table 2.2: Anti-corruption institutions by country 
Bulgaria Georgia Montenegro 
BORKOR   DACI  
CPACI  CPCI  
SANS Investigative Division of 
the Prosecution Service 
of Georgia 
Police Directorate (special 
section for combating 
Corruption, organized crime 
and terrorism 
Parliamentary committee  Anti-Corruption Committee 
CPCC (Ministry 
Inspectorate) 
Anti-Corruption 
Interagency Council – 
policy making 
 
National Audit Office State Audit Office of 
Georgia 
State Audit institution 
Prosecutor General   Department for the 
Procedural Supervision 
of Investigations (Office 
of the Chief Prosecutor) 
Prosecution - Special 
Department for suppression 
of organized crime, 
corruption, terrorism and war 
crime 
 
A comparative analysis of anti-corruption institutions allows me to gain an 
understanding of the overall ability of anti-corruption policies to create an environment 
that is not conducive to corruption. The approach does not directly speak to levels of 
corruption, since the nature of the phenomenon makes direct measurement unreliable. 
Instead, I draw conclusions about the independence, specialization, and the potential for 
cooperation within each anti-corruption model, and focus on gaps within the institutional 
contexts of each country. This approach allows me to not only discuss levels of 
corruption, but also types of corruption. In this chapter, I show that cross-country 
variation in the institutional gaps created variation in how corruption was managed, and 
thus variation in the manner in which corruption manifested. For instance, where 
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mechanisms for cooperation between institutions were vaguely defined and 
responsibilities were unclear and often overlapping, corruption could thrive on all societal 
and bureaucratic levels. Where there was a clear hierarchy of institutions and a well-
defined system of checks and balances, I concluded that the anti-corruption system was 
prepared to cope with instances of corruption.  
 
In addition to legal provisions for horizontal cooperation between state institutions 
and political independence, the functioning of anti-corruption models in the post-
communist world also required accountable institutions. Accountability can be 
horizontal, vertical (Diamond and Morlino 2005), or societal (Grimes 2012). In societies 
where democracy was weak and corruption was endemic, societal accountability was 
essential because it had the potential to prevent a gap between citizens and political elites. 
In order to assess whether societal accountability was present, I examine the 
opportunities that civil society organizations (CSOs) had for participation in the decision-
making  process and whether and how CSOs used these opportunities.  
 
CSO participation is a key factor in the extent to which anti-corruption institutions 
aid or impede corruption. In all three cases examined in this study, CSOs were included 
in the institutional design of various anti-corruption institutions. Theoretically, the 
inclusion of CSOs was motivated by the necessity of domestic actors to relate citizens’ 
grievances to the state and by the ability of CSOs to monitor the work of anti-corruption 
institutions. Though civil society organizations alone could not affect corruption, they 
were an essential element of successful reforms. Indeed, in this chapter, I show that the 
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effects that CSOs had varied by country. In some countries, such as Montenegro, CSOs 
managed to establish the high level of domestic ownership necessary to increase political 
accountability and to strengthen institutional restraints (see chapter one).  
 
1.  Bulgaria 
1.1  Overlapping Responsibilities of Anti-corruption Institutions 
In the period between 1993-2013, the system of anti-corruption institutions in 
Bulgaria was characterized by unclear and often overlapping responsibility of anti-
corruption bodies. For instance, the State Agency for National Security (SANS) was one 
of the main anti-corruption institutions in Bulgaria and its responsibility overlapped with 
the responsibilities of the Ministry of Interior Affairs. SANS was tasked with, among 
other things, the investigation and monitoring of high-level political corruption.37 Its 
establishment in 2008 moved the anti-corruption model in Bulgaria away from preventive 
and coordinative institutions, toward law enforcement institutions (Smilov 2010), thus 
more closely resembling the models of Lithuania and Latvia.  
 
Shortly after its creation, Bulgaria’s Parliament introduced changes in order to 
secure the independence of SANS. Until 2009, the head of SANS was elected by 
Parliament upon a suggestion by the Council of Ministers.38 To secure the independence 
                                                
37 Закон за Държавна Агенция "Национална Сигурност" член 4, точка 4 (Law on the 
State Agency for National Security, article 4 (4) Author’s Translation  
38 An amendment in the law from March 2015 shifted power over the head of SANS 
appointment to the President. 
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of SANS, the law prescribed that SANS was responsible to both the executive and the 
legislator: it was sending reports simultaneously to the Prime Minister, the President, and 
Parliament. The activities of SANS were then discussed in a Parliamentary Committee 
created specifically for exercising control over SANS.   
 
The initial excitement from the creation of SANS was shortly after clouded by its 
reduced focus on corruption and frequent shifting of responsibilities. In 2009, only a year 
after its creation, SANS underwent structural reforms, which included a reorganization of 
the Agency's priorities. The reform limited the work of the agency to national security, 
and to respond to threats to critical infrastructure. In terms of anti-corruption and 
combating organized crime, one of the main original priorities, was transferred back to 
the Ministry of Interior and a new unit (Chief Directorate Combating Organized Crime) 
was established. This Directorate was again moved to SANS in 2013,39 which effectively 
restored SANS’ powers to conduct investigations. Therefore, for the majority of the time 
the agency existed, its responsibilities were unclear and there was an overlap of 
responsibilities with the Ministry of Interior. As a result, a number of high profile 
investigations were delayed. Due to this confusion, instead of fighting corruption in the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
39 Предходни и заключители разпоредби в Закона за ДАНС § 13 (1) Служебните 
правоотношения на държавните служители от Главна дирекция "Борба с 
организираната престъпност" в Министерството на вътрешните работи преминават 
в служебни правоотношения с Държавна агенция "Национална сигурност", когато 
отговарят на изискванията за работа в нея. Transitional and final provisions of the 
Law on the SANS Article 13 (1): The responsibilities of the state employees in the 
Directorate “Fight against organized crime” in the Ministry of Interior Affairs shall be 
moved to the responsibilities of the state employees of SANS when they are compliant 
with the requirements for the work of the agency (Author’s translation) 
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high echelons of power, SANS has sustained an institutional environment in which 
corruption thrives. The shifting of responsibilities, coupled with a widely publicized 
scandal that surrounded the appointment of a controversial MP for head of SANS in 
2013, confirmed initial fears that the changes have been carried out to appease specific 
political interests and in turn its perceived legitimacy suffered.  
 
A similar fate met the Commission for Prevention and Ascertainment of Conflict of 
Interest (CPACI). CPACI’s goal was to identify instances of conflict of interests and to 
prevent it. In the case of CPACI, the challenges were bureaucratic in nature. The legal 
framework regulating CPACI’s operations required the consensus of four distinct courts 
in order to close a single case. In an environment where courts were highly corrupt, this 
rendered the agency dysfunctional and left many instances unaddressed.40  
 
Just as with SANS, CPACI was also the subject of political scandal. According to 
the Law on Conflict of Interest, CPACI consisted of five members:  three (among which 
is the head of the Commission) elected by Parliament, one appointed by the President, 
and one appointed by the Council of Ministers.41 Only six months after the establishment 
of CPACI, its head - Philip Zlatanov - was accused of a conflict of interest when his 
notebook was made public and revealed his manipulation of documents for purposes of 
political racketeering and the discrediting of public figures. In April 2014, Zlatanov was 
                                                
40 As of July 2014, CPACI had closed only two cases and had another twenty in progress 
41 Закон за Предотвратяване и Установяване на Конфликта на Интереси Law on 
Prevention and Ascertainment of the Conflict of Interest article 22(a), 2 
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effectively sentenced on two counts - one of which was the cover-up of a complaint 
against the current president Pnevneliev. Zlatanov was removed from his position 
immediately after his notebook became public. Shortly after, another member of CPACI 
was removed and given the office of a deputy minister of Justice in the controversial 
government of Plamen Oresharski. This left CPACI with three members only, which was 
simultaneously the quorum for a meeting and the minimum for decision-making. Since 
Zlatanov and Sapundjieva were both elected by Parliament, the three members left 
represented the Council of Ministers, Parliament, and the President. This damaged the 
CPACI’s ability to make decisions and required that one of the main tasks of Parliament 
to be the election of two more members, including a head of CPACI. As of October 2015, 
Parliament had not yet done so, despite the fact that the law provided a month for this 
replacement to take place.42  
 
Bulgaria’s main policy making institution in the area of anti-corruption was the 
Commission for Prevention and Counteracting of Corruption (CPCC) and it lacked 
clearly defined responsibilities as well. CPCC was created in 2006 and operated under the 
auspices of the Council of Ministers. Upon its creation, it was tasked with developing 
priorities for national anti-corruption policies, proposing legislative changes with respect 
to anti-corruption, and organizing the monitoring of the implementation of anti-
                                                
42 Закон за предотвратяване и установяване на конфликт на интереси Чл. 22в (2) 
При смърт или предсрочно прекратяване на пълномощията на председателя или на 
член на комисията в едномесечен срок се избира, съответно назначава нов член, 
който довършва мандата.The Law on Prevention and Ascertainment of Conflict of 
Interest article 22c (2). (In case of death or early termination of power of the head or 
member of the commission, there shall be elected a substitute within a month.  The 
substitute shall finish the term.) 
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corruption reforms. Similarly to Georgia’s Interagency Council for Anti-corruption, the 
Commission did not have its own administration. Instead, its activities were supported by 
the General Inspectorate within the Council of Ministers. In contrast to Georgia, the 
General inspectorate in Bulgaria was directly responsible to the Prime Minister and it was 
fully dedicated to assisting the Commission. One of the main functions of the General 
Inspectorate was to investigate instances of corruption and other violations of executive 
power among state employees in leading positions.43 To the extent that such violations 
were considered high level political corruption, this function overlapped with the 
responsibilities of SANS and created another gap in the anti-corruption institutional 
framework. Furthermore, the law postulates that the Inspectorate assumes these 
responsibilities “when necessary,” but further clarification of when this was the case were 
not provided.  
 
Finally, the General Inspectorate coordinated the activities of anti-corruption 
inspectorates located in each ministry, but it was unclear to who the individual 
inspectorates were accountable. Individual inspectorates had their own methodological 
guidelines, which were coordinated with the General Inspectorate and were very specific 
to the ministry in which they operate. The main function of the inspectorates was to 
elaborate a report on the evaluation of the risk of corruption. This report was subject to 
approval by the Minister, who also prescribed actions for minimizing the risk and the 
Inspectorate was responsible for the implementation of the measures. In this sense, the 
individual inspectorates were subordinated to the respected Ministry. The relationship of 
                                                
43 Rules of Conduct of the General Inspectorate Section II, article 92b (4) 
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the individual inspectorates with the General inspectorate was specified in their bi-laws 
as “cooperation,” 44  but it remained unclear whether individual inspectorates were 
accountable to the Minister or the General Inspectorate. 
 
Interviews with employees of the Inspectorate in the Ministry of Education and in 
the Ministry of Health suggested that inspectorates rarely had a functional relationship 
with other institutions such as CPACI. One interviewee insisted on mentioning that in the 
last months the inspectorate’s communication with the CPACI had been very productive 
and attributed this to a new liaison in CPACI that “goes out of her way in order to make 
sure that we [the inspectorate and CPACI] communicate”45 When asked to elaborate on 
this situation, she pointed to two factors: First, the law did not require the inspectorate 
and CPACI to coordinate efforts, and second, with respect to insufficiency in 
administrative capacity, it is abnormal for employees to volunteer additional efforts. 
Therefore, the productive relationship that she referred to was not a product of the 
institutional set up, but rather of significant efforts of one particular bureaucrat.  
 
In sum, the incapacitation of anti-corruption institutions in Bulgaria came in two 
forms which were often combined. The first source of friction was a legal framework 
                                                
44 See Вътрешни правила за дейността на Инспектората на Министерството на 
образованието и науката, утвърдени със заповед РД 09-1075 от 18.07.2014 г. на 
министъра на образованието и науката (Internal Rules for the Work of the Inspectorate 
in the Ministry of Education and Science, established with a decree RD 09-1075 from 
18.07.2014 from the Minister of Education and Science  
45 Author’s interview with a representative of the Anti-corruption Inspectorate in the 
Ministry of Education, Bulgaria 
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which muddled institutional responsibilities or created administrative obstacles. The 
second source were political scandals which often accompanied the establishment of 
institutions. The two sources combined had a detrimental effect on anti-corruption efforts 
in Bulgaria: first it was unclear who did what and how, and second institutions rarely 
enjoyed high perceived legitimacy because of political scandals, which became an 
inevitable part of institutional history.  
 
In addition to the lack of clarity with respect to anti-corruption institutions’ 
responsibility and the political scandals that seem to be characteristic of each institution, 
the management of corruption in Bulgaria was hindered by problems in the judiciary. The 
independence of the Bulgarian judiciary was guaranteed by the Constitution of Bulgaria: 
Article 177 (2) states, “The judiciary shall be independent. In the performance of their 
functions, all judges, court assessors, prosecutors and investigating magistrates shall be 
subservient only to the law.”46  Indeed, the judiciary possessed all necessary mechanisms 
to be independent: SJC controls the appointments, promotions, dismissals and transfers of 
judges47 (Shetreet 1985, Domingo 2000, Chavez 2004). Judges had life tenure guarantees 
and the judiciary drafted and controlled its own budget. 
 
Despite all the existing mechanisms to establish an institutionally independent 
judiciary, the possibility of political influence due to informal relationships between the 
executive and the judiciary was not addressed (Popova 2012). For instance, though the 
                                                
46 Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, Article 177 (2) 
47 Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria Article 129 (1) 
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Prosecutor- General was appointed by the President, it was always upon a nomination by 
the SJC. This arrangement placed the power of election completely in the hands of the 
judiciary and removed all incentives for accountability on the part of this institution. The 
lack of clear mechanisms for accountability and control, such as election by Parliament, 
was also one of the reasons why judges often perceived their independence as complete 
impunity. Statements from different Prosecutor-Generals supported this perception. The 
first post-communist Bulgarian Prosecutor-General Tatarchev became famous with his 
statement in 1992 that “Only God is above me.”48 The fact that this situation had not 
improved much by 2013 was evident in a statement of the current Prosecutor-General 
Tsatsarov who declared: “The Prosecutor does not owe an explanation to anyone.”49 
These statements spoke to the self-perception of Prosecutor-Generals in Bulgaria. 
Perhaps more importantly, the similarity of these statements separated by twenty years, 
confirmed, as Leiken suggested, that a lack of accountability was still very much the 
norm in Bulgaria.  
  
This lack of accountability left the judiciary vulnerable to informal influences, such 
as personal connections and social networks of judges. Evidence of these types of 
relationships were abundant in Bulgaria, the most striking being the response of then 
Minister of Interior Tzvetanov to a question regarding his close relationship with the 
                                                
48 Главният прокурор: шест месеца по-късно (The Prosecutor General: six months 
latter) CSD, July 2013, Author’s translation 
49 ibid 
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newly appointed chair of Sofia City Court, Vladimira Kaneva. Tzvetanov said: “I do not 
see anything wrong with this; this is my milieu.”50  
 
Therefore, in an environment where corruption was endemic, formal institutional 
improvements aiming to secure independence of the judiciary had unintended 
consequences (Popova 2014). Such consequences deepened the very problem reforms set 
out to resolve. A telling example of such consequences is the Special Criminal Court 
(SCC). The SCC began its operations in 2012 with jurisdiction over the entire territory of 
the country. 51  The intent was a new court that specialized in organized crime and 
corruption. It was scoped by the set of crimes it may try, rather than the set of persons 
that may be tried before it,52 thus targeting one particular problem. In March 2013, the 
first annual report on the functioning of the SCC was issued.53 The report compiled the 
numbers of cases opened, dismissed, and closed by the SCC. The total number of cases 
that were introduced or transferred was 2294.54 In comparison, the Sofia Regional Court 
                                                
50 “Цветанов не се притеснява от отношенията си с Янева – такава му била средата” 
Дневник (June 1, 2011), Tsvetanov Is Not Worried About His Relationship with 
Yaneva—“This Is His Milieu”,  Author’s translation 
51 Закон за съдебната власт, Раздел VIa и VIIa, обн. ДВ, бр. 1 от 2011 г., в сила от 
4.01.2011 г. Law on Judiciary, Sections VIa and VIIa, State Gazette No1, 2011,  
Author’s translation 
52 Art. 411a(4) of the Criminal Procedural Code 
53 Georgi Ushev, Доклад за Дейносттс на Специализирания Наказателен Съд През 
202 Година, Report on the Activity of the Specialized Criminal Court in 2012, March 22, 
2013, Author’s translation. Available at  
http://spcc.bg/news/%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B0-36/. 
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heard over 15,000 cases falling within similar sections of the Criminal Code in 2012.55 
The report stated that 125 out of 185 cases (69.19%) opened under the “common” 
procedure were closed during 2012, and the court issued 22 sentences (15 convictions, 
and 7 acquittals). Perhaps more importantly the remaining 2109 cases were transferred or 
opened under the “individual” procedure.56  
 
These results of the courts’ first year of operations sparked a debate regarding its 
ability to address major shortcomings in the Bulgarian judicial system. Defendants of the 
court justified its existence in its present shape under the pretext that it was efficient. 
However, approximately (70%) of the total cases heard by the Court had been transferred 
to the Court in January 2012 after their lengthy pre-trial phase had already been 
completed. In 2013, though, smaller than in 2012, the percent of transferred cases is still 
significant (57%). 57  Therefore, despite the court’s specialization, it was not able to 
overcome one of the overwhelming delays in trial and pre-trial procedures. 
 
1.2  Unclear Channels of Civil Society Participation  
With respect to participation of civil society in the anti-corruption policy 
formulation, implementation, and enforcement, the rules in Bulgaria in the period 
                                                                                                                                            
54 Ibid 
55 Metodi Lalov, Report on the Activity of the Sofia Regional Court in 2012, 2013, 
available at http://www.srs.justice.bg/srs/images/DOKLAD2012final.pdf. 
56 Ibid 
57 ibid 
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between 1993-2013 were unclear and demotivating for CSOs. In an attempt to make both 
the judiciary and various anti-corruption agencies accountable to the citizens, Bulgaria 
attempted to embed civil society participation in the agencies’ institutional design. After 
Bulgaria’s accession to the EU, a few legal changes with respect to participation and 
partnership were introduced. The goal of these changes was to move Bulgaria away from 
a communist style centralized decision-making process toward a Western-style 
democracy. However, the changes were often superficial and their effects almost non-
existent.  
 
The legal framework that regulated the participation of NGOs in the process of 
policy making in Bulgaria was often superficial and laws were often contradictory. Two 
laws secured the inclusion of civil society in the creation and implementation of anti-
corruption strategy. The Law on Legislative Act (LLA) stipulated that a public debate 
needed to take place before new legislation or an amendment to an existing law was 
introduced. As of 2007, the same law also introduced mandatory publication of proposed 
legal bills and amendments to legislation on the websites of the respective institutions. 
Similar provisions for citizens’ participation were also provided in the Administrative-
procedural codex (APC). Combined, these two laws provided the basis for citizens’ 
participation in the decision-making process.  
 
What was problematic with these laws was that they also contradicted each other. 
These contradictions demonstrated the lack of attention given to civil society 
participation and left many CSOs demotivated. According to the LLA, parties interested 
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in contributing were given fourteen days in order to familiarize themselves with the 
proposed legislation and to comment on it, while the APC granted a month58 for the same 
activities. Seemingly unimportant, this contradiction spoke to the rigor with which 
participation was addressed in Bulgaria. It demonstrated that the issue of public 
participation was addressed superficially and the EU norm of participation effectively 
remained an “empty shell.” 59  Interviews with NGOs representatives confirm these 
findings.60  
 
The unclear language used in the legal framework that regulated civic participation 
also hindered CSOs in their attempts to assist government institutions in creating and 
implementing anti-corruption policies. The Law on the Administration provided for two 
types of citizens participation - a public debate, including a meeting with the officials 
proposing the bill, and sending of opinions. The two forms of participation were, 
however, vague and the document did not contain further specification as of the content 
of participation. Instead, these specifications were distributed into different primary or 
secondary legislation, and sometimes they were only specified at the level of rules of 
operation for each individual institution.  
 
                                                
58 Administrative Procedural Code of Bulgaria Article 69 (2) 
59 Dimitrova A (2010) The new member states of the EU in the aftermath of enlargement: 
do new European rules remain empty shells? Journal of European Public Policy 17(1) 
p.139 
60 Author’s interviews with various NGOs 
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The Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) and its civic council represented a telling 
example of why the vagueness of rules regulating the cooperation between the judiciary 
and CSOs created room for interpretations that could further corruption instead of 
addressing it. A civic council consisting of fifteen NGOs supported the work of the SJC. 
The role of the civic council as well as the mechanism for electing NGOs were supposed 
to be specified in a document entitled “Regulation on the Organization of the Work of the 
Supreme Judicial Council and its Administration”. It read:  
The Civic Council to the SJC is formed to guarantee the 
transparent and effective participation of civic and 
professional organizations in the formulation of strategies 
for reforming of the judiciary as well as for securing 
objectivity in the monitoring of these reforms.61  
 
With respect to transparency and accountability of the SJC, this unclear formulation 
creates two problems related to selection of NGOs and to their precise role. First, the 
method of selecting participating NGOs is unclear. In an attempt at transparency, the SJC 
announced an open invitation and consequently accepted everyone that was willing to 
participate. This arrangement prevented any censoring of the NGOs participating in the 
civic council and made possible the participation of illegitimate NGOs, or even NGOs 
created to further political agendas. Second, the regulations were extremely unclear on 
the role of the council. Article 4 of the rules of operation of the civic council details the 
                                                
61 Правила За Дейcтвие На Гражданския Съвет От Професионални И 
Неправителствени Организации Към Висшия Съдебен Съвет Rules of Conduct for 
the Civic Council to the Supreme Judicial Council Available at: 
http://Www.Vss.Justice.Bg/Bg/Decisions/2013-Pril/Pravila_Gr_Savet.Pdf  (Author’s 
Translation) 
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responsibilities of the council: responsibilities ranged from “supporting the SJC in 
creating and implementing policies” to “producing opinions for discussion of legislation 
changes.”62 However, this left important questions, such as the definition of support and 
weight given to opinions, open. The SJC and its civic council were not an exception, and 
the situation in other agencies responsible for anti-corruption and the rule of law and their 
cooperation with civil society, was similar.  
 
The combination of unclear selection procedures and the vaguely defined role of 
civic councils prevented the establishment of uniform minimal standards for information 
distribution, consulting, and joint decision-making. It also left institutions legally entitled 
to completely ignore the work of civic councils, or any other input they may have 
received from citizens or NGOs. None of the general laws explicitly required institutions 
to consider the opinions of civic councils, nor did they specify the way in which 
institutions should respond to suggestions and comments from the civic councils. For 
instance, the LNA did not stipulate discussion of the opinions, and publishing of the 
changes in legal bills resulting from the civic council’s opinions and proposals.  
 
In sum, the legal framework had a twofold negative impact on the participation of 
civil society. First, it left institutions at liberty to proceed as they choose with regards to 
participation of civil society, and discouraged civil society representatives to seek 
participation. In such an environment, the “illusion of inclusion” of various stakeholders 
became obvious (Center for the Study of Democracy 2009, 2010, Harvey 2004, Hristova-
                                                
62 Ibid, Article 4. 
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Kurzydlowski 2013). Second, this framework significantly diminished civil society’s 
ability to participate in the decision-making process not only morally but legally as well.  
 
To be fair, one anti-corruption institution made an attempt to incorporate civil 
society in its work yet this cooperation was not fruitful. The agency that was created in 
order to establish the Centre for Prevention and Countering Corruption and Organized 
Crime (CPCCOC) - known under the Bulgarian acronym BORKOR - followed the 
concept of project partnership and collaborated with non-governmental and industry 
organizations. In 2013, following the "Solution Model in the Field of Public 
Procurement” 63  assigned by the Consultative Council, BORKOR reached out to a 
selected group of non-state actors.64 In April 2013, the leadership of CPCCOC met with 
representatives of NGOs.65 The goal of the meeting was for BORKOR to present the 
decisions made by the Interdepartmental Working group regarding a schedule of urgent 
measures and actions of government and judicial bodies to meet the benchmarks of 
progress in the area of a judicial reform, combating corruption and organized crime. The 
same year, the new management of CPCCOC announced that it was prioritizing the 
                                                
63 Report of BORKOR March 2013 - March 2014 available at: 
http://borkor.government.bg/bg/page/427 
64 This collaboration included Representatives of the Construction Chamber in Bulgaria, 
Institute for Legal Analysis and Research, Chamber of Commerce were included in the 
interdepartmental group to prepare a plan for the implementation of measures of the 
CPCCOC in public procurement. Participants from the German-Bulgarian Chamber of 
Industry and Commerce were attracted as well as Austrian and Swiss businessmen. 
65 The NGOs were The Centre for the Study of Democracy, the Institute for Public 
Environment Development, Risk Monitor, the Institute for Legal Analysis and Research, 
the Association Transparency International 
 96 
development of non-governmental and branch organizations. The partnership was 
institutionalized through the signing of bilateral cooperation agreements for joint actions 
to reduce corruption practices. Indeed, BORKOR followed up and in the beginning of 
2014 it signed memoranda of cooperation with a number of NGOs and professional 
organizations.66 However, BORKOR was an analytical unit with no power to investigate 
or penalize instances of corruption, and thus its cooperation with NGOs resembles 
cooperation between think-tanks more than an effort to develop a functional state-society 
relationship.  
 
In summary, the institutional arrangement in Bulgaria was characterized by unclear 
responsibilities of institutions and often overlapping priorities of different agencies. In 
turn, such institutional arrangement hindered horizontal accountability and delayed 
adequate reactions to instances of corruption, conflict of interest, nepotism and 
clientelism. In terms of societal accountability, the participation of NGOs was not well 
regulated and NGOs involvement in the decision-making process was consistently 
superficial. While reports by some think tanks exposed specific problems related to abuse 
of power, these organizations did not have the necessary legal framework, nor did they 
have the internal capacity to effectively apply pressure to the government. This consistent 
lack of participation not only hindered good governance, but also sustained an 
environment conducive to the abuse of power because for a long time citizens and civil 
society alike were passive in resisting certain acts of the ruling elites. As Ganev (2014) 
                                                
66 Some of the professional organizations were the Institute for Legal Analysis and 
Research (ILAR), Construction Chamber in Bulgaria (CCB) 
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puts it with respect to Peevski’s long rise to power, “if no one resists when the hooligans 
start to make forays beyond the stadium, they will openly try to take over the city.”67  
 
2.  Georgia  
2.1  Political Influence on Regulatory and Policy-making Institutions 
 
In the years between 2010 and 2013, many reports produced by the EU and some 
international NGOs praised the success of anti-corruption reforms in Georgia. Yet a 
closer look at the country’s anti-corruption arrangements showed that while service 
agencies were indeed transparent, policy-making institutions were consistently the 
subject of political and parties’ interests. In this section, I evaluate the independence of 
anti-corruption institutions and show that the system in which Georgian policy-making 
anti-corruption institutions operated, as well as the legal framework directing their 
activities, rendered these institutions susceptible to influence from a small elite group. 
More specifically, I show that the executive had strong control over all key institutions, 
which created an environment where high level political corruption could thrive.  
 
It is indeed undeniable that with respect to service institutions that dealt with low-
level petty corruption, Georgia did outstandingly well. The creation of the Public Service 
Hall eliminated almost completely petty corruption. Many domestic and international 
reports attested to this. According to the Global Corruption Barometer in 2013, only 4% 
                                                
67 Ganev, V. (2014) Bulgaria’s Year of Civic Anger, The Journal of Democracy, Vol.25, 
No.1, p.40 
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of Georgians were asked for a bribe68, and the World Bank declared Georgia the post-
communist country that fought against corruption most effectively and made the most 
progress in a short period of time.  
 
However, in creating the Public Service Hall, Georgia’s President Michail 
Saakashvili took one specific path to fighting corruption, which addressed petty 
corruption and took the public’s attention away from grand corruption. To be fair, 
Saakashvili made moves to address grand (political) corruption as well, however the 
arrest of allegedly corrupt officials seemed to be primarily politically motivated. The only 
officials that were arrested were opposing Saakashvili, and the ones that were supporting 
him remained in office (Shelley et. al 2007). Televised arrests of public officials by 
masked and heavily armed police officers appeared almost daily and were meant to show 
Saakashvili’s commitment to fighting corruption. However, true reforms required 
structural changes which would prevent slipping back into the old corrupt system. I now 
proceed to show that such structural changes in the period between 2004-2013 only 
increased the centralization of power in the hands of the president and transformed 
corruption from endemic into grand.    
 
The reforms that addressed petty corruption then allowed Saakashvili to completely 
capture the creation and implementation of anti-corruption policies and to concentrate in 
his hands authority over anti-corruption institutions which are responsible for high level 
political corruption. The main anti-corruption agencies in Georgia were the Interagency 
                                                
68 Global Corruption Barometer, 2013 
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Coordination Council for Combating Corruption (the Council), the State Audit of 
Georgia, the Civic Service Bureau, and the Public Service Hall. The Office of the Chief 
Prosecutor was also equipped with a Department for the Procedural Supervision of 
Investigations and an Investigative Division of the Prosecution Services of Georgia.  
 
The institution that merited the most attention was the primary anti-corruption body 
of Georgia - the Interagency Coordinating Council for Combating Corruption – the 
Council. It was established in 200869 and as the name suggested its purpose was to 
coordinate the efforts of Georgian anti-corruption bodies. The Council's activities were 
stated in Article 12.1 of the Law on Conflict of Interest and Corruption in Public Service. 
Its responsibilities included formulating the general state policy for combating 
corruption; developing and updating the national anti-corruption strategy and the relevant 
action plan and monitoring their implementation; coordinating interagency activities in 
order to facilitate the implementation of the strategy and the action plan; ensuring 
implementation of recommendations by international organizations regarding the fight 
against corruption, and producing relevant reports. The Council consisted of thirty-eight 
members70 that were representative of the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary 
                                                
69 Order #622 of the President of Georgia on the Approval of the Composition and the 
Charter of the Interagency Coordinating Council for Combating Corruption, 26 
December 2008. 
70 Members were Minister of Justice, Deputy Minister of Justice, Head of the Analytical 
Department, Head of Investigation Unit, Head of Chancellery of the Government, Deputy 
of Minister of Internal Affairs, Deputy Minister of Defense, Deputy Minister of Finance, 
Head of the Investigation Unit of the Ministry of Finance, Head of Revenue Service, 
Deputy Minister of Economy and Sustainable Development, First Deputy Minister of 
Regional Development and Infrastructure, representative of the State Audit Office, 
President of the National Bank, Had of Civil Service Bureau, Head of Financial 
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powers of Georgia. It also included several representatives of international bodies and to 
ensure even wider participation in the creation and implementation of anti-corruption 
policies, representatives from several NGOs71 were also members of the Council.  
 
Despite mechanisms that should have secured the good standing of the Council, its 
status was poorly established in the law that regulated the Council’s activities. This poor 
regulation created a lack of administrative capacity, as well as decreased political 
independence. In fact, the Council was chaired by the Minister of Justice, and its 
members were determined by the President of Georgia72. The Council was not a full-
fledged institution but rather served as a forum for discussions of anti-corruption policies 
of Georgia. It was also not equipped with its own administration. Instead, a subdivision 
of the Ministry of Justice - Analytical Unit - served as its Secretariat. This arrangement 
compromised both the capacity and the independence of the Council. The Analytical 
Department consisted of six employees and, in addition to coordinating and ensuring the 
organizational issues of the Council, the Analytical Unit was tasked with many other 
unrelated responsibilities. Naturally, this impeded the work not only of the Analytical 
Unit but also of the Council. After the 2010 Anti-Corruption Strategy was deemed 
                                                                                                                                            
Monitoring Agency, two MPs, Deputy Chair of Supreme Court, nine representatives of 
civil society organizations, and eight representatives of external organizations including 
the EU delegation in Georgia. 
71 The NGOs represented in the Council are TI, GYLA, Open Society, Business 
Association, IDFI, Peace, Democracy, and Development Institute, Research Center of 
Election and Political Technologies, Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International 
Studies and the Economy Policy Research Center. 
72 The Law of Georgia on Conflict of Interest and Corruption in the Public Service, Art 
12.1 (3) 
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inappropriate, the Analytical Unit was delegated to create a new strategy in 2013. At the 
time when this research was performed in March 2014, the new anti-corruption strategy 
was not yet a reality, however a general seven page action plan was put together. The 
head of the Unit justified the delay by the fact that the Analytical Unit had been tasked 
with too many responsibilities and time was an issue: “we need the support of all 
members and Analytical Unit has been tasked with too many responsibilities.”73 
 
More importantly, the compromise of the independence of the Council is 
entrenched in the law. Article 12.1 (4) from the Law of Georgia on Conflict of Interest 
and Corruption in the Public Service postulated that “authority and other organizational 
issues are determined by the Council Statute, which is approved by the President of 
Georgia,”74 thus giving additional power to the president. Furthermore, the employees of 
the Analytical Unit were subordinated to the Minister, and the members of the Council 
were directly appointed by the President and could be dismissed by him at any point. This 
organizational arrangement hindered the productivity of the agency and predisposed it to 
political influence from the President of Georgia. The complete dependence of the 
Council on the President made the Council simply a subdivision of the Ministry of 
Justice, rather than an independent anti-corruption agency. Even more, the agency was 
                                                
73 Author’s Interview with Rusudan Mikhalidze, Head of the Analytical Unit of the 
Ministry of Justice, Georgia, March 7th, 2014 
74 The Law of Georgia on Conflict of Interest and Corruption in the Public Service, Art 
12.1 (4) 
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practically dysfunctional because it took orders from the executive. In this sense, it was 
predisposed to be used by the executive to sustain or increase power.75  
 
Managing grand political corruption in Georgia was also in the scope of the Civic 
Service bureau’s (hereafter the Bureau) work. According to the Law of Georgia on Civil 
Service, some of its responsibilities included facilitating the elaboration of a unified state 
policy in the field of civil service, the coordination of relevant actions, and to provide 
organizational, material, and technical assistance for the activities of the Civil Service 
Council and its members. The Bureau consisted of three departments and one of them 
was dedicated entirely to managing public officials’ asset declarations. The role of the 
department for assets declarations was established in Article 129 of the Law of Georgia 
on Civil Service. It stated: “The Civil Service Bureau is a legal entity of public law 
established in order [...] to receive asset declarations of officials, to ensure publicity and 
to control timely submission of asset declarations of officials.”76  The powers of the 
Bureau were established in its Statute. It postulated that the “Bureau shall not be 
responsible for the completeness and accuracy of the information provided in the 
submitted Asset Declaration of public officials.”77 In other words, the Bureau served to 
merely gather assets declarations, but it did not have the authority nor the capacity to 
                                                
75 Author’s interview with Erekle Urushadze Transparency International Georgia, March 
2014 
76 Law of Georgia on Civil Service, Art 129 (1) 
77 Statute of the Civil Service Bureau, Article 3 (2) 
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investigate and penalize those who failed to submit declarations or submitted misleading 
information.  
 
The independence of the Civil Service Bureau was also questionable. The Bureau 
by-laws, structure, and staff were approved by the Government of Georgia78, and the 
Minister of Finance had exclusive authority over the activities of the Bureau79. As a 
result, public officials indeed submitted their asset declarations to the Civil Service 
Bureau and the Bureau made them available to the public within 24 hours of submission. 
However, a mechanism to verify the asset declarations did not exist and no routine checks 
were carried out by a designated agency. In this sense, both the capacity and the 
independence of the Civil Service Bureau were compromised and similarly to the Council 
and the Chamber, the Bureau was practically under the control of the executive. 
Furthermore, some scholars suggested that the ruling party had blocked investigations 
brought before Parliament by the Bureau on more than one occasion. What enabled such 
blocking of investigations was the fact that the Bureau’s chairperson lacked an 
independent power base and was therefore finding it hard to push forward any 
investigations that were unpopular with the ruling party.80 
                                                
78 Article 129 (2) Law on Civil Service of Georgia 
79 The activities of the Civil Service Bureau shall be controlled only by the Ministry of 
Finance pursuant to subparagraphs “b” and “c” of paragraph 1 and paragraph 2 of article 
12 of the Law of Georgia on Legal Entities of Public Law Article 129 (3) 
80 George Welton, "The Role of the International Community in Facilitating Financial 
Reform in Georgia: Budgetary Planning and Audit", an unpublished report written for 
International Budget Partnership and Transparency International Georgia, March 2009, p. 
22 
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The last Georgian institution engaged in anti-corruption policy-making was the 
Chamber of Control. This agency was responsible for supervising the use of state funds 
and resources, and its activities were managed under the Constitution as well as under the 
Law on the Chamber of Control of Georgia (adopted in 2008). According to it, the 
Chamber was the supreme body of state financial and economic control, which conducts 
audits81 and was responsible forexamin[ing] the activity of other state bodies of fiscal and 
economic control, submit[ing] proposals on improving tax legislation to the 
Parliament.”82  
 
Similarly to the Bureau and the Council, the Chamber of Control was also the 
subject of political influence. In general, such institutions are usually designed to play a 
major role in preventing and penalizing high level corruption and they require complete 
political independence. In Georgia, however, this was not the case. The independence of 
the Chamber was established by the Constitution of Georgia. Article 97 (2) stated that:  
The Chamber of Control shall be independent in its activity. 
It shall be accountable to the Parliament. The President of 
the Chamber of Control shall be elected for a term of five 
years by the Parliament of Georgia by the majority of the 
number of the members of the Parliament on the current 
nominal list upon the submission of the President of 
                                                
81 Constitution of the Republic of Georgia Article 97 (1) 
82 ibid 
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Georgia. The grounds and a procedure of his/her dismissal 
shall be prescribed by the Constitution and law.83  
 
However, at the same time, the law did not provide the Chamber’s staff with 
sufficient protection against arbitrary dismissal. For instance, potential reasons for 
dismissal were not specified in the law, which left decisions for dismissal entirely in the 
hands of the President of the Chamber of Control. In turn, this created an environment in 
which political pressure over auditors was possible, and auditors were self-conscious with 
respect to auditing powerful political players.  
 
In 2004, Parliament adopted a measure which increased the accountability of the 
Chamber of Control before the Parliament. This move theoretically represented a step in 
the right direction with respect to the independence of the Chamber, but the political 
reality of Georgia in this period rendered it instead a change which strengthened the 
legitimacy of the incumbent. When the measure was adopted in 2004, one party 
controlled all branches of the government and Georgia was a presidential republic. The 
power of the President over Parliament extended to veto power over all decisions made 
by Parliament in the rare cases where Parliament was not promoting Saakashvili’s 
agenda. Thus, adopting the measure served simply as a mechanism to further centralize 
power in the hands of the President. Indeed, in 2012 Saakashavili’s party unexpectedly 
lost the Parliamentary elections and only time will show what the new government will 
                                                
83 Constitution of the republic of Georgia, Article 97 (2) 
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do. However, as of 2013 it had not amended the law regulating the SAO, signaling that 
the status quo will be preserved.    
 
2.2  Civil Society’s Weak Leverage on Policy-Makers  
In addition to a strong executive, Georgia’s anti-corruption institutions were 
hindered in their independence by a weak civil society. In the following paragraphs, I 
show the level of cooperation between civil society and state institutions in the area of 
anti-corruption and the inability of civil society to effectively serve as a watchdog or to 
cooperate with the government in the anti-corruption decision-making process.  
 
In general, there exist many mechanisms by which civil society can aid the fight 
against corruption, and the ones adopted in Georgia proved insufficient and unclear. In 
some countries NGOs were incorporated in the structure of anti-corruption bodies, in 
others they serve as watchdogs, and in third occasions they cooperate with the 
government in the establishment of anti-corruption institutions and legislations to ensure 
public debate and approval of the institution in question. In contrast to Bulgaria and 
Montenegro, Georgia did not have special legislation establishing the participation of 
civil society in the decision-making process. Instead, such activities were regulated by ad 
hoc presidential decrees or occasional memoranda of cooperation between individual 
state bodies and NGOs. The most recent example of such a memorandum was signed in 
January 2015 between the Civil Society Institute - one of the oldest Georgian NGOs - and 
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Saburtalo District Local Administration. Its purpose was to create three public councils 
which will facilitate citizens’ participation in local self-governance.84  
 
The low degree of CSO participation in anti-corruption institution-building and 
implementation, and the manner in which they did so, also showed the low level of 
independence of the institutions themselves. NGOs in Georgia were incorporated in the 
most essential anti-corruption body - the Council. The Council had on its board 
representatives from most of the leading anti-corruption NGOs in Georgia, but the result 
of their work remained superficial and unproductive. This superficiality seemed to be of 
concern to both the Council and the participating NGOs. On the one hand, the Council 
was not satisfied with the participation of NGOs in the meetings. In an interview, the 
head of the Council’s Analytical Unit emphasized the lack of willingness of NGOs to 
attend meetings and propose policies. In her words, “NGOs need to stop being so critical 
to everything we do and start cooperating with us.”85 On the other hand, NGOs felt 
deprived of timely information that was required for them to make valuable contributions 
to anti-corruption policies that were being shaped by the Council. Said an expert at 
GYLA: “We are unable to read a 3000 page document in four hours, let alone form an 
opinion on it and provide constructive criticism.”86 An interviewee from Transparency 
International (TI) agreed that the civil society representatives of the Council were rarely 
                                                
84 Civil Society Institute report available at: 
http://www.civilin.org/Eng/viewtopic.php?id=147 
85 Authors interview with Rusudan Mikhalidze head of the Council, March 2014 
86 ibid. 
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notified on time about the Council’s plans. One of the representatives of TI in the Council 
explained that “a draft of the 2010 Action Plan was presented without warning or 
participation by CSOs, and CSOs were not provided adequate time for comment.”87 
 
The way NGOs explained their cooperation with government agencies was that 
their participation was on paper only, and thus highly demotivating. A clear measurement 
of NGOs participation did not exist and none of the interviewed NGOs had a record of 
the number of their propositions that had been accepted and included in a law bill or anti-
corruption strategy. However, all fifteen interviewed NGOs reported no more than one or 
two of their proposals being considered. This situation served as a highly demotivating 
factor for civil society organizations to participate in the decision-making process. As a 
result, NGOs participated in less than one third of the meetings of the Council in 2013, 
and rarely were all of the NGOs that were part of the Council present at a meeting at the 
same time.  
 
Two major problems erode the ability of CSOs to participate constructively in the 
work of strategy making and implementing bodies: a lack of a culture of cooperation 
between state and civil society, and an inability of civil society to form a united anti-
corruption agenda and strategy. On the one hand, a culture of cooperation between the 
government and the NGO sector was not established after the collapse of the communist 
regime in 1990. This remnant of Soviet style governance by which power was centralized 
                                                
87 Author’s interview Erekele Urushadze, Transparency International Georgia, October 
2014 
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in the ruling party and civil society was weak, was still strong in Georgia in 2013, and 
institutional arrangements were not designed to alter it. On the other hand, NGOs were 
incapable of forming a united agenda regarding the fight against corruption. While 
Georgia had many NGOs that have declared anti-corruption, transparency, and 
accountability as part of their agenda, their cooperation on projects was minimal. Even 
more - NGOs were rarely aware of each other’s work. With the exception of TI and the 
Institute for Development of the Freedom of Information (IDFI), which were two of the 
leading NGOs since 2009, cooperation between non-governmental bodies was rare. 
Again with the exception of TI, IDFI, and Georgian Young Lawyers Association 
(GYLA), NGOs were not able to name a productive meeting between CSOs in which a 
strategy for applying pressure to the state for securing more transparency, and 
independence of anti-corruption institutions, was discussed.  
 
To be fair, out of their cooperation with state institutions, such as the Council, 
NGOs served as watchdogs. Many of them conducted research regularly, monitored the 
work of institutions, and were publicly critical about particular anti-corruption policies. 
They also advocated for better freedom of information laws and practices (for instance 
see the work of IDFI) and generally made transparency, accountability, and good 
governance a priority of their work (GYLA is an example). In this aspect, most NGOs 
could be identified as think-tanks and educational institutions, which produced reports 
and analysis, but had little ability to use them in order to make positive change in the area 
of anti-corruption. In other words, NGOs were indeed almost all critical of the 
government and were almost always perceived by policy-makers as opposition, rather 
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than as an actor whose cooperation could potentially improve transparency and 
accountability. This state of civil society had its roots in the Soviet system, which left 
Georgia lacking a culture of association, a general skepticism toward unions, and very 
low citizen participation.88 A study commissioned by USAID and performed by East-
West in 2012 confirmed this.  
 
In summary, Georgia had a weak Parliament and Judiciary, which caused disruption 
of the horizontal accountability of anti-corruption institutions in the country. The 
Prosecutor’s Office, National Audit Office, and the Central Election Committee were not 
independent and were subject to political influence by a strong executive. Coupled with 
weak societal accountability, this created an environment in which a small group of 
people in the upper echelons of power could easily capture the state.  
 
It is important to mention that in 2013 Georgia attempted to reduce the strength of 
the executive. In order to break what Fish (2001) called “superexecutivism” 89 , the 
country introduced constitutional changes, which began the transitioning of Georgia from 
a presidential to a parliamentary republic. According to the new amendments, more 
                                                
88 Centre for Training and Consultancy, An Assessment of Georgian Civil Society (2005), 
CIVICUS Civil Society Index Shortened Assessment Tool Report for Georgia, 62; 
Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2010, Available 
at:http://www.freedomhouse.eu/images/Reports/NIT-2010-Georgia-final.pdf (accessed 
on 2 May 2010). 
89 M. Steven Fish, “When More is Less: Superexecutive Power and Political 
Underdevelopment in Russia,” in Russia in the New Century: Stability or Disorder? eds. 
Bonnell & Breslauer (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001), p. 15 
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power was concentrated in the hands of the Prime Minister, and the President’s role was 
reduced to a neutral arbiter between Parliament and Government. However, according to 
the Venice Commission, the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional matters, 
the interrelation between parliament and government envisaged by the draft of the 
constitution needed to be revisited. More specifically, the Venice Commission requested a 
change in the article that postulates that if the President refuses the dismissal of PM, the 
consent of 60% of parliament members is needed.90 
 
In contrast, the legislature remained weak. Functions, such as scrutiny of state 
expenditures, holding individual ministers accountable, and the setting up of temporary 
investigative commissions were not introduced, thus Parliament remained still very weak 
in comparison to the Presidential institution. Additionally, speculations arose that 
amending the constitution was in fact a political move on the part of Saakashvili. At the 
time of the amendments, he had been in office for two consequent terms and could not 
run for the presidential office again. However, he could be elected Prime Minister. Thus, 
Saakashvili, convinced in the victory of his party in the following parliamentary 
elections, decided to empower the office of the Prime Minister. This move represented 
centralization of power and effectively stalled the process of democratization of Georgia. 
Thus, instead of transitioning to democracy, Georgia remained in a hybrid regime 
(Diamond 2002, Carothers 2002, Levitsky and Way 2005). Such regimes lack vital 
components of democratic quality, such as checks and balances and government 
                                                
90 Thomas Markert (Venice Commission) before the magazine Resonance, as quoted by 
Open Democracy. Availbale at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/nino-
tsagareishvili/georgias-politicians 
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accountability, and therefore they create an environment susceptible to high levels of 
corruption (Ekman 2009).   
 
Indeed, Saakashvili’s loss in the elections of 2012 was a surprise for everybody. 
Said a representative of the winning Georgian Dream Coalition: “even we were surprised 
from the outcome of the elections.” 91  Only time will show which course the new 
government takes. It is possible that it decentralizes power and opens up cooperation with 
civil society. At the moment this research was conducted in 2013- 2014, the new 
government had refrained from making major changes in the area of anti-corruption. 
More importantly, if the Georgian Dream Coalition’s government oriented toward 
inclusion of civil society, it would face a NGO sector that was divided and unable to 
organize around a common anti-corruption agenda.  
 
3.  Montenegro 
3.1  The Independence of Anti-corruption Institutions 
In contrast to Bulgaria and Georgia, in 2013 Montenegro was in the process of 
developing an anti-corruption system that was not characterized by centralization of 
power and in which institutions had clear responsibilities. Perhaps more importantly, the 
developing anti-corruption system was more compatible with the domestic particularities, 
such as cultural traditions of gift giving, in that it specified very clearly what constitutes 
corruption and conflict of interest.   
                                                
91 Authors interview with a mid-level leader of Georgian Dream, who wished to remain 
anonymous. October 5th, 2014. 
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To be clear, my argument is not that Montenegro has completely eliminated 
corruption. Instead, I suggest that the reforms in Montenegro were occurring at a slower 
pace than in Georgia and Bulgaria, while at the same time they had more potential to 
create institutions and legislation that is complied with because these institutions enjoyed 
a high level of domestic ownership. The slower pace of the reforms was in part a function 
of the fact that the opposition in Montenegro had been traditionally weak (Grzymala-
Busse 2005), and Djukanovic’s Social Democratic Party (SDP) had been in power for the 
last twenty-three years. Many necessary reforms would weaken the SDP’s power and the 
party naturally lacked political will to introduce reforms. For instance, newly established 
democratic institutions, such as the Commission for Prevention of Conflict of Interest, 
were constantly lacking administrative capacity and suffering from insufficiencies in their 
budget.92  
 
Similarly, there were many instances of poorly addressed cases of corrupt 
government officials and business people. For instance, in 2012 two thirds of the cases 
made available by courts referred to evasion of taxes. According to representatives of the 
Network for the Affirmation of NGOs, known under the Montenegrin acronym MANS,93 
it was in such cases that business people were most often convicted, and thus statistics on 
                                                
92 Author’s interview with Slobodan Lekovic, head of the Commission for Prevention of 
Conflict of Interest, March 2014 
93 MANS (Mreža za afirmaciju nevladinog sektora) is one of the largest NGOs in 
Montenegro.  Its goal is to expose corrupt public officials and to inform international 
entities such as the EU about the implementation and the functioning of anti-corruption 
policies. 
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court performance were being embellished.94 Additionally, instances of fining of public 
officials proportional to their convictions were too little and thus showed political 
influence over courts’ decisions.95 In the period of 2006-2010, almost half of corruption 
cases concerning government officials (47%) ended in dismissal, and only 42% in 
conviction.96 
 
At the same time, the slow pace with which reforms were taking place in 
Montenegro was used by both domestic and international non-state actors to apply 
pressure to the government and to raise awareness among citizens. As a result, 
Montenegro’s institutions were being transformed into democratic entities.  
 
In 2012, an amendment to the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure implemented a 
parliamentary investigation mechanism and effectively strengthened the role of the 
legislature in fighting corruption. This control mechanism was also established in the 
Constitution of Montenegro.97 In 2013, Montenegro introduced further regulations by 
                                                
94 Author’s interview with Dejan Pejovic, MANS, November 2013  
95 ibid 
96 V. Radulovic, Calovic, V. and Maras, V. (2012) Behind the Statistics, MANS 
97 Constitution of the Republic of Montenegro Article 109 
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adopting the Law on Parliamentary investigation. 98  By this time Parliament had 
conducted two investigations - one on Telecome (2012) and one on the infamous 
Recordings scandal (2013), both of which were under high media scrutiny. These 
investigations provided additional power to the Parliament’s Anti-corruption Committee 
and also power that was missing in the Bulgarian and Georgian Parliaments.  Perhaps 
most promising was the fact that the bi-laws of the National Anti-corruption Commission 
specified that the Parliament elected the Commission’s President, thus sacrificing some 
power in order to acquire a higher level of legitimacy. Though some problems were still 
present, in comparison to Georgia and Bulgaria, by 2013 Montenegro had vested 
significantly more power in the Parliament with respect to fighting corruption. This 
mechanism prevented the centralization of power, despite the fact that Montenegro had 
had the same party in power for the last 23 years and some centralization was to be 
expected (Grzymala-Busse 2007).  
 
With respect to managing conflicts of interest, Montenegro’s law covered a broader 
set of public officials than the Bulgarian and Georgian laws.  In 2013, upon an 
advisement by the Commission for Prevention of Conflict of Interest, this definition was 
expanded to include a total of 3,541 officials. It also introduced a maximum monetary 
value of all gifts that a public official is allowed to receive. While Georgia and Bulgaria 
                                                
98 Law on Parliamentary investigation foresees that Inquiry Committee is made out of 
equal number of MPs of parliamentary majority and opposition, while President of the 
Board is from the opposition and his deputy from parliamentary majority. Decision is 
made by majority of votes. Law has authorized Inquiry Committee to “ask of all state 
bodies, bodies of self-administration, institutions and legal entities to provide insight into 
all necessary documentation“ needed for investigations. 
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had also incorporated this standard in their legal framework, Montenegro went one step 
further and included in the law a provision that postulated that the evaluation of gifts be 
done by an independent expert and not by the Commission itself. This arrangement 
prevented the Commission from abusing its own power and made the process of 
controlling public officials’ assets more transparent than in Bulgaria and Georgia.  
 
The Montenegrin Commission for Prevention of the Conflict of Interest (CPCI) 
also had a significantly broad scope of responsibilities, which allowed for cooperation 
between various institutions. In comparison with Georgia, the rights and the jurisdiction 
of the CPCI were significantly larger, especially in the area of investigation. The CPCI 
had the duty to verify data from reports on income and property, in coordination with 
other relevant institutions (Tax administration, Central Registry of Economic Entities, 
Real Estate Administration, Directorate for Public Procurement, Securities and Exchange 
Commission, etc.). This provision created a network between different institutions and 
the law clearly defined the process of investigation and required relevant institutions to 
cooperate with the Commission. Therefore, the law was specific enough to avoid 
potential misinterpretation or overlapping of responsibilities.  
 
The superior functioning of Montenegro’s Commission for Prevention of Conflict 
of Interest in comparison to its Bulgarian and Georgian analogues was evident in the data 
from the Commission’s report.99 In 2013, 14,5% (519) of the public officials did not file 
                                                
99 Commission for Prevention of Conflict of Interest Montenegro, 2012 report available 
at: konfliktinteresa.me 
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assets declarations and for all of them the Commission issued decisions stating that they 
violated the Law on Prevention of Conflict of Interest. Further, the CPCI submitted 
demands for initiation of misdemeanor procedures to relevant authorities and according 
to the head of the CPCI was regularly demanding updates about the progress of each 
case. 100  In Contrast to Bulgaria, where the rules of conduct guiding the national 
Commission for Ascertainment and Prevention of Conflict of Interest created additional 
opportunities for corruption, the process that followed after such demands were made by 
the Commission in Montenegro was significantly more transparent (see the section on 
Bulgaria in this chapter). Depending on the nature of the offense in Montenegro, the case 
was transferred either to the Administrative Court or to the Misdemeanor Court, both of 
which had clear procedures for appealing.  
 
The main preventive anti-corruption institution of Montenegro was the Directorate 
for Anti-Corruption Initiative (DACI) which, though not a policy-making institution, 
actively partook in the process of policy-making. In 2013, it reported directly to the 
Council of Ministers, but a procedure to move the supervision of its work to Parliament 
was underway. By design, DACI’s responsibilities were primarily in the area of 
preventing corruption. Article 4 of the Montenegrin Regulation of the Organization and 
Operations of the State Administration identified “advertising-preventive action, such as 
raising the level of public awareness about the problem of corruption and conducting 
                                                
100 Author’s interview with Slobodan Leković, Head of CPCI  
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research on the extent, manifestations, causes and mechanism of corruption 
occurrences”101 as the main responsibility of DACI.  
 
Similar to BORKOR - the Bulgarian analogue of DACI - DACI was not a policy-
making institution. In contrast to BOROR though, it did partake in the process of policy 
making:  technically it was entitled to “cooperation with competent authorities for the 
purpose of developing and implementing legislative and program documents of 
importance for the prevention and suppression of corruption.”102 More importantly, in 
practice DACI took part in the process of drafting legislation through several channels, 
the most prominent of which being its representatives in the teams on Chapters 23 and 24 
from the EU membership negotiations structure. Finally, DACI was a part of the Action 
Plan on Chapters 23 and 24, which increased the visibility of the agency and forced it to 
be accountable and transparent. DACI had used this power to push for the criminalization 
of illicit enrichment. Though unsuccessful, this effort, combined with the efforts of a 
group of NGOs, allowed DACI to negotiate assets declarations to be an official 
document, which in turn made false information on them a criminal offense.  
 
Furthermore, though DACI was in essence a preventive agency, its employees 
believed that the agency should take on additional responsibility. The Head of DACI put 
it simply: “Preventive work (campaigning, education) is done. Now we need 
                                                
101 Decree on Organisation and Manner of Operation of the State Administration (Official 
Gazette of Montenegro 5/12 as of 23 January 2012, and 25/12 of 11 may 2012) Article 4 
102 ibid, Article 2 
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Prosecution.” 103  For this purpose DACI was indeed not limiting itself to raising 
awareness. Instead, it served as a mediator between people and the prosecution. In 2013, 
DACI had five times more complaints of corruption than the Prosecutor104 and all of 
them were sent to the investigative authorities within the Prosecutor’s office. 
Consequently, DACI in its role of complainer had the right to request information and 
monitor the Prosecution on each case it filled. DACI was empowered to mediate the 
interaction between citizens and the prosecution in this way because of a Memorandum 
signed in 2012, which allowed them to inquire for the progress of a corruption instances 
that they had sent. In contrast, Bulgaria and Georgia did not have such agreements.  
 
In terms of the judiciary, the Montenegrin institutional set up differed from the ones 
in Georgia and Bulgaria in one fundamental point, namely the existence within the 
Supreme Prosecutor’s Office of a newly established Department for Prosecution in Cases 
of Organized Crime, War Crimes, Corruption and Terrorism. However, the draft of the 
Law on Special State Prosecutor’s Office which regulated the appointment of the Chief 
Special Prosecutor and her relationship with other State Authorities, was prepared by the 
Ministry of Justice with little contribution from other agencies and NGOs. One NGO 
explained that despite its attempts to influence the creation of this law, its comments were 
not heard and included in the final version of the bill.105 While further measures were 
                                                
103 Author’s interview with Grozdana Lacovic, DACI 
104Data from DACI, available at 
http://antikorupcija.me/en/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=category&id=
22&Itemid=279&limitstart=5 
105 Author’s interview  
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needed in order for the independence of this institution to be secured, it is worth noting 
that the mere fact that such an institution existed and data on its operations was readily 
available to the public showed an actual attempt to combat corruption. In comparison to a 
very strong prosecutor without meaningful accountability in Bulgaria, and a weak and 
politically influenced prosecution in Georgia, Montenegro performance was stronger.  
 
Furthermore, the rules for the election of the Chief Prosecutor of Montenegro were 
consistent with principles of transparency and accountability, and were in line with the 
domestic political context that lacked political competition. In 2012, the Parliament of 
Montenegro introduced an amendment in the Law on Public Prosecutor, which postulated 
that the Chief Prosecutor of Montenegro was to be elected by Parliament by a qualified 
majority. In light of the traditional lack of political competition in Montenegro, this 
measure represented an attempt to legitimize the Chief Prosecutor and to imbue 
transparency and accountability in his office. The new rules of electing the Chief 
Prosecutor required the consent of a large part of parliamentary opposition and ensured 
that both ruling elites and opposition support the nomination.106 Because the opposition 
was consistently underrepresented in the Parliament since the beginning of the post-
communist transition of the country, this amendment represented a significant step 
toward the political independence of the judiciary, and, more specifically, independence 
of the Chief Prosecutor.  
 
                                                
106 Elections of the Prosecutor requires 3/5 majority of Parliament. Law on Public 
Prosecutor (Chapter VII, Art. 83-90) 
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Finally, in contrast to Bulgaria, where with respect to law enforcement the 
functions of the ministry of interior and those of SANS overlapped, Montenegro had 
established a special unit within the police directorate. The unit’s (Section for Combating 
Organized Crime and Corruption) main task was to prevent and repress corruptive 
criminal offenses. The Section for Combating Organized Crime and Corruption was also 
connected with other operating structures of the Police Directorate and competent state 
bodies, institutions, and the civil society.  
 
3.2  Civil Society Participation  
With respect to participation of civil society in the decision-making  process, the 
situation in Montenegro significantly differed from Bulgaria and Georgia in the ability of 
NGOs to use the EU in order to diffuse norms of transparency and to effectively monitor 
state institutions.  
 
The adoption of two important regulations in 2012 provided the legal framework 
for CSO participation in the decision and policy-making processes. The Decree on 
manner and procedures for cooperation between state bodies and NGOs legislated 
information sharing, consultation, and participation in working groups and bodies as the 
key forms of cooperation between the public and civil sectors. The Decree on Procedures 
for Conducting Public Discussions prescribed procedures for organizing public 
discussion, thus involving civil society in the creation of public policies, and was 
obligatory for each ministry. In addition, a new Law on Free Access to Information (July 
2012), was one of the measures from Innovated Action Plan for the Fight against 
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Corruption and Organized Crime (2013-2014). According to this law, each authority was 
obliged to provide clearer insight into the data that may be of public interest, and to 
facilitate the process of obtaining the necessary information.107 More importantly, CSOs 
had often used the availability of information not only to monitor different state bodies, 
but also to cooperate with them. For instance, in cooperation with the Union of 
Employers of Montenegro, the DACI designed a brochure entitled: “The participation of 
the private sector in combating corruption,” which contains a definition of corruption, an 
overview of criminal acts of corruption, important provisions of the Law on Liability of 
Legal Persons for Criminal Offenses, consequences of corruption, as well as suggestions 
regarding how entrepreneurs could join the fight against corruption and to report 
instances of corruption.108 
 
A significant difference between Montenegro on the one hand and Georgia and 
Bulgaria on the other was the existence of a document detailing the mechanisms of 
cooperation between NGOs and state institutions - The Strategy of Cooperation of the 
Government of Montenegro and NGOs.109 The document resulted in the exaction in 2012 
                                                
107 Law on Free Access to Information Article 51 available at 
http://www.skupstina.me/index.php/en/gradjani/slobodan-pristup-informacijama 
108 DACI webpage: antikorupcija.me/en/ 
109 The Strategy of Cooperation of the Government of Montenegro and Non-
governmental Organizations , January 2009. Available at 
http://www.gov.me/biblioteka/1254148245.pdf 
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of the Law on NGOs110which proved to be an example of successful cooperation between 
the Government and CSOs.  
 
As a result domestically, NGOs were included in the working groups on each 
chapter of the negotiations. This decision was made by the government, but under mutual 
pressure from NGOs and the EU. The proposition to include NGOs in the working 
groups on different chapters came from domestic NGOs activists. NGO representatives 
and representatives of the EU delegation agreed on the cause of this proposition – the 
NGO sector truly understood the gravity of its role not only in the fight against 
corruption, but also in the holistic process of democratization. Interestingly, when asked 
to explain the process by which they came up with the idea, NGOs pointed out their 
extended communication and cooperation with the EU.  
 
Indeed, it is worth noting that a careful analysis of proposals submitted to the 
working groups on Chapter 23 and 24 by NGOs showed that these proposals have rarely 
been included in actual legislation. From this standpoint, it seemed that NGOs’ inclusion 
represented a pseudo-democratic move on the part of the government (Ghandi 2008). 
While this was a source of frustration and disappointment, NGOs found a way to 
leverage their inclusion in the negotiation process. The participation of NGOs in working 
groups created potential for increasing the contributions of NGOs because it provided 
civil society with a real ability to monitor the process of negotiations from within.  
                                                
110 Law on Non-Governmental Organizations  “Official Gazette of the RoM No. 27/99, 
09/02, 30/02, Official Gazette of Montenegro No. 11/07 
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Nonetheless, NGOs in Montenegro faced similar issues to those of their Georgian 
analogues. The reality of civil society in Montenegro, similar to Georgia and Bulgaria, 
had been clouded by poor political responsiveness and financial constraints. The major 
problem facing Montenegrin civil society organizations was their limited impact in the 
law-making and policy-making process. There were two key reasons for this. First, 
governments were traditionally reluctant to cooperate with civil society organizations on 
key social grievances. In particular, various segments of Montenegrin public 
administration saw civil society as an impediment, rather than a motor of positive societal 
change. An official in the Ministry of Healthcare voiced this concern by pointing out the 
constant discontent coming from one particular NGO (MANS) and the lack of 
constructive criticism.111 Second, despite the well-defined strategy mentioned above, the 
platform for the participation of civil society in a domestic policy dialogue was rather 
weak. The attempts of civil society organizations to clearly define the terms of their 
participation in policy dialogue found little resonance with public administration.  
 
However, the aforementioned challenges were significantly abated through 
mediation from international actors, particularly the EU. While channels of cooperation 
were slow to emerge (as of 2013 it was primarily the office of the Premier of Montenegro 
that engaged civil society), they were steadily developing.  
 
                                                
111 Author’s interview with an official at the Ministry of Healthcare, Montenegro 
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Another major challenge that Montenegrin civil society organizations faced was 
related to the scarcity of domestic financial resources. The major source of funding for 
Montenegrin CSOs was a governmental commission that supported projects in the fields 
of social protection and humanitarian activities, the needs of disabled people, the 
development of sports, non-institutional education, and the education of children and 
youth, culture and technical culture, and combating drugs and other types of addiction. 
However, the number of non-profit organizations applying to the commission was three 
times higher than those who actually received funding for their projects. Additionally, 
there was an issue with a lack of transparency in the allocation of funding. One NGO 
representative explained that they observed the work of the commission responsible for 
the allocation of funds and discovered a number of procedural violations.112  
 
Despite these difficulties, and in contrast to Georgia, the NGO sector in 
Montenegro established a strong mechanism to counteract the gap between civil society 
and state institutions by leveraging international organizations, and more specifically the 
EU. In order to become a strong emancipatory and transformative power, especially in 
introducing European values in Montenegro, the NGO sector established strong 
connections with the EU. For instance, one of the most prominent anti-corruption NGOs 
(MANS) investigated corruption complaints, and frequently sent elaborate reports to the 
EU Delegation in Podgorica. 113  It also made sure to follow up with the Delegation 
                                                
112 Author’s interview with Delibroka Uljiaevic, Centre for Civic Education, Podgorica, 
MNE  
113 Authors interview with Dejan Pejovic , MANS, Podgorica, MNE 
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regarding developments in each particular case. This approach paid off and earned the 
NGO sector the EU Delegation’s trust. As a result, cornerstone legislation was credited to 
NGOs’ efforts. For instance, the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Committee in 
2012, which enhanced the role of the Parliament in the fight against corruption, was 
intensively advocated by two civil society organizations: MANS and CeMI. This 
significantly differentiated Montenegro from the other two case studies:  The legislation 
created through civil society projects was seen as a success chiefly by the civil society 
groups that had pushed for it. Their achievement was in having successfully lobbied 
government to adopt the law, rather than in the implementation of the law itself.  
 
It is important to note that in comparison to Bulgaria and Georgia, NGOs in 
Montenegro differed in the tools that they used to achieve transparency and 
accountability because they were unified in the anti-corruption agenda. Some NGOs, like 
MANS, took the approach of exposing where the governments effort were insufficient to 
effectively combat corruption. Others, like CeMI, sought cooperation with the 
government. In coalition with thirteen other NGOs, CeMI managed to provide reports 
and studies to the government, and had its recommendations incorporated in legislation 
on five occasions in the period between 2012-2013. For instance, based on a report 
provided by CeMI and on a strong cooperation between CeMI and the Ministry of 
Health, significant changes were made to the National Insurance Fund.114  
 
                                                
114 Author’s interview with an official at the Ministry of Health of Montenegro 
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Another example of how cooperation between the civil society sector and the EU 
delegation in Podgorica resulted in effective governmental pressure was the work of the 
Center for Civic Education (CCE). CCE was one of the oldest NGOs in Montenegro. In 
2012, it signed a Memorandum with the Supreme Court of Montenegro, the Ministry of 
Justice, and the Supreme State Prosecutor in order to implement a project for the 
"Monitoring of court cases related to corruption offenses.”115 The purpose as stated in the 
Memorandum was to  
assess judicial efficiency in processing anti-corruption cases 
and raise awareness among the general public as well as 
legal and media professionals of the problem of corruption 
and the existing anti-corruption mechanisms.116  
 
The Memorandum underlined that “for the purpose of establishing the rule of law, 
an active participation, more direct cooperation and coordination of all segments of 
society in the fight against corruption is needed.”117 The Project also resulted in a detailed 
report, which was sent to the EU delegation. The head of the project asserted that sending 
this report to the EU delegation was the way to achieve maximal impact.118 
 
In summary, the picture presented by the institutional framework in Montenegro 
did not suggest that institutions were impeccable in their management of corruption. 
                                                
115 Cooperation against Corruption Center for Civic Education, January 24th, 2013 
116 ibid 
117 ibid 
118 Author’s interview with Deliborka Uljarevic, Center for Civic Education, Podgorica, 
MNE  
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Certain problems impeding the work of anti-corruption bodies still existed in the time this 
study was carried out between 2013 and 2014. For instance, all interviewed agencies 
voiced complaints of insufficient administrative and financial capacity. This problem was 
most prominent in the case of the CPCI: understaffing caused the CPCI to examine only 
60% of the assets declarations that it received in 2013. However, in contrast to Bulgaria 
and Georgia, this institution possessed the legal provisions to make checks and had 
established a viable network with other agencies, thus satisfying most of the conditions 
for an agency to effectively perform its function. Perhaps more interesting, anti-
corruption institutions in Montenegro were subjected to constant scrutiny from civil 
society, and civil society systematically used the EU as a back channel to apply pressure 
to the government and make its voice heard.  
 
4.  Conclusion 
This chapter focused on variation in the levels and types of corruption in the three 
case studies which resulted from variation in anti-corruption institutional frameworks. 
Including the extent to which they resulted from the mutual efforts of international and 
domestic actors, and the extent to which these institutions enjoyed domestic ownership. I 
examined and compared levels and types of corruption in Georgia, Montenegro, and 
Bulgaria in terms of two dimensions - the institutional ability to resist political influence 
and the participation of civil society in the decision-making  process and in holding 
institutions accountable. The chapter made two main arguments.  
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First, I argued that while corruption and good governance indices shed some light 
on perceptions of corruption, they remain insufficient to provide enough data for 
understanding variation in levels of corruption because they lack the ability to 
differentiate between types of corruption. I argued that an understanding of the 
institutional environment provides such ability and allows for a precise understanding of 
the nature of corruption as well as directing attention to the social, political, and 
economic factors that created a context conducive to corruption.  
 
Second, employing this approach I found that indeed the three countries had very 
different types of corruption. The combination of levels of independence of anti-
corruption institutions and the level and style of political participation of civil society 
determines the context in which particular types of corruption thrive. For instance, in 
Georgia, centralization of power and a gap in state-society relationships nearly eliminated 
petty corruption. At the same time, it created an environment in which a small group of 
government and political officials concentrate political power and social and financial 
resources. In Bulgaria, according to various indices, while corruption is at roughly the 
same level as in Georgia (see table 1.1), the situation is significantly different. Despite 
Bulgaria’s long standing membership in the EU, which according to some observers 
created an expectation of low levels of corruption, I found a lack of networking and 
unclear and overlapping responsibilities between institutions, coupled with a disunited 
civil society whose participation was legally and institutionally impeded. As a result, 
corruption in Bulgaria remained decentralized (Stefes 2006) and present on every level of 
the bureaucracy. Montenegro, though having political issues such as weak opposition and 
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a party (in different coalitions) in power for the last twenty-three years, which lacked the 
political will to introduce viable anti-corruption reforms, was showing better progress 
than Bulgaria and Georgia.  
 
Finally, a large body of literature provided numerous explanations of why levels 
and types of corruption vary across the countries from the former Eastern Bloc. Some of 
this literature claimed that it is entirely domestic factors that account for this variation, 
and I address these propositions in chapter six of this study. For now, I am interested in 
whether the EU played any role in managing levels of corruption and if it did what this 
role was. In the following two chapters, I proceed to explain why EU’s approach aided in 
some places and impeded in others the creation of functional anti-corruption institutions.  
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Chapter Three – The Effects of Conditionality 
 
 
The EU has been guiding anti-corruption efforts in all countries from the former 
Eastern Bloc since the very beginning of these countries’ transitions. In most of them, it 
put anti-corruption efforts on the agenda immediately after the collapse of the communist 
regime. Even in places where it did not - in Bulgaria the first appearance of anti-
corruption discourse was in 1997 - the EU actively defined democracy through concepts 
such as transparency, the rule of law, and accountability. In 1993, the EU established the 
Copenhagen criteria and specified the requirements that transitioning countries need to 
satisfy in order to become EU members. Through the Copenhagen criteria, the EU 
actively made the rule of law one of the major prerequisites for membership. The 
document defined democracy in terms of the rule of law. The political aspect of the 
Copenhagen criteria required “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of 
law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities.”119 This served as a 
starting point for understanding democracy by former communist societies, and placed 
anti-corruption efforts, political and economic transparency, and accountability at the top 
of the transitioning agenda.   
 
                                                
119 European Council In Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993, Conclusions Of The Presidency, 
p.13 
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In order to persuade countries to effectively imbue their institutions with and base 
their behavior on democratic principles of transparency, accountability, and political 
participation, the EU employed conditionality logic (Vachudova and Spendzharova 2011, 
Schimelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008). Conditionality 
is generally defined in the literature as an approach, in which actors are being provided 
with requirements, and rewarded or sanctioned based on their compliance, or the lack 
thereof. In order to be effective, conditionality relies on the assumption that actors make 
decisions through a rational cost-benefit analysis. Therefore, in the case of post-
communist countries and the EU, the EU needed to make domestic actors’ benefit of 
complying with EU-promoted policies higher than the cost of not complying.  Naturally, 
this could happen under particular conditions, such as severe sanctions for non-
compliance, and large rewards for compliance (such as membership in the EU).  
 
I agree with this conceptualization of conditionality. However, I claim that in order 
to be successful, conditionality requires mutual understanding between the EU and 
individual post-communist countries of what constitutes high cost and high benefit 
(Epstein 2008).  In this chapter, I show that conditionality indeed had its intended effect, 
only in countries where such mutual understanding was present. In contrast, in places 
where domestic actors’ rationality was bounded by the context in which they operated, 
and the meaning they imbued in conditions, sanctions, and rewards was not compatible 
with this of the EU, conditionality did not have an effect or in some cases had a negative 
impact.  
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More importantly, the domestic context that bounded the rationality of domestic 
actors was malleable. It is true that the fall of the Berlin Wall found former communist 
countries in different conditions, and some of them were clearly more liberal than others 
(Vachudova 2005). However, the domestic context was never static. Instead, it was 
constantly evolving, and I show in this and the next chapters that its development was to 
a large extent a function of the EU involvement with different domestic actors. More 
specifically, the malleability of the domestic context made it susceptible to the 
establishment of mutual understandings of international and domestic actors. In places 
where the EU was highly engaged in understanding the precise conditions underpinning 
corruption, such as Montenegro, shared understandings were established, and 
conditionality had its intended effect. In contrast, in Bulgaria and Georgia, where neither 
domestic actors, nor the EU managed to fully comprehend each other’s understandings of 
notions of corruption, transparency, accountability, and conditionality often had a 
negative effect.  
 
I argue that the effects of conditionality varied by country, and that this variation 
was due to both domestic and international factors. More specifically, I argue that 
variation in the outcomes of EU conditionality is explained by differences in domestic 
perceptions and interpretations of EU’s actions, and by the level of flexibility of EU 
conditions, incentives, and sanctions. First, once recommendations, conditions, 
incentives, and sanctions were produced by the EU, it was domestic actors that 
interpreted them and decided whether, and more importantly how, to act on them 
(Vachudova 2005, Schimmelfennig 2005, Levin & Satarov 2000, Fritzen 2005, Mungiu-
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Pippidi 2006). In some cases, the meaning imbued in EU suggestions for reforms was 
understood by domestic actors in the way intended by the EU. In others, it was not. For 
instance, Bulgarian policy makers consistently believed that the creation of more 
institutions would address EU’s suggestions, while the EU actually desired a 
comprehensive judicial reform,120 leading to the coordination between anti-corruption 
institutions. In contrast, Montenegrin authorities correctly understood EU requirements as 
guidance to embedding transparency and accountability into domestic institutional 
structures.121  
 
The second factor that determined the success of conditionality was the level of 
state specific knowledge that motivated EU’s conditions, incentives, and sanctions. In 
some countries, such as Montenegro, the EU received politically unbiased feedback and 
was capable of iteratively adjusting its recommendations in a way that they addressed 
specific problems. In other countries, such as Bulgaria and Georgia, the EU did not 
manage to grasp the full picture, or to understand the underlying causes of corruption. 
This made its recommendations unclear and general, and recommendations were often 
perceived as externally imposed.  
 
Finally, I claim that while the EU used conditionality in all post-communist 
countries, conditions, incentives, and sanctions varied across countries. I build upon 
                                                
120 Author’s interview with S. Diez, EU Commission, Brussels 
121 Author’s interview with S. Lakovic Head of the Commission for Conflict of Interest 
of Montenegro 
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academic literature, which suggests that the EU applied the same logic of conditionality 
to both candidate members, and countries that did not have membership potential. For 
instance, Kelley (2006, 2011) argued that the raison d’être of the European Neighborhood 
Policy (ENP) was enlargement. She showed that the movement of people from DG 
Enlargement to DG External Service led to “some direct mechanical borrowing from 
enlargement experiences.”122 In 2002, the former President of the European Commission, 
Romano Prodi (2002) even suggested the creation of benchmarks “to measure what we 
expect our neighbors to do in order to advance from one stage to another. We might even 
consider some kind of “Copenhagen proximity criteria.” 123  This statement directly 
referred to the logic of membership conditionality, expressed in the Copenhagen criteria: 
“accession will take place as soon as an associated country is able to assume the 
obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions 
required.”124 
 
The EU’s use of the logic of conditionality in countries that did not have 
membership perspective was evidenced by the similarity of mechanisms employed to 
those used in countries that did have perspective. Just as with candidate members, 
countries from the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) created Action Plans, and 
                                                
122 Kelley, J. (2006) New Wine in Old Wineskins: Policy Learning and Adaption in The 
new European Neighborhood Policy, Journal of Common Market Studies 44.1, p.3 
123 Prodi, R, 2002 “A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy As The Key To Stability”, 
Sixth ECSA-World Conference ‘Peace, Security And Stability 
124 European Council In Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993, Conclusions Of The Presidency, 
p.13 
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received regular reports from the EU Commission. Certainly, the fact that the ENP 
offered “everything but institutions”125 was significant. Some have claimed that without 
the ultimate incentive of membership, countries would be less compelled to comply 
(Grabbe 2004, Lavenex 2004). I address this argument in chapter six. Here, I show that in 
all cases the logic of conditionality remained the same, but the conditions, incentives, and 
sanctions changed. For instance, in the case of Bulgaria, the logic of conditionality 
continued to be a leading principle of the country’s interaction with the EU, even after 
membership was granted in 2007. While after 2013, the offered reward was not 
membership, the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) operated in a way that 
was very similar to pre-accession conditionality. It differed from membership 
conditionality only in the reward, which now was Schengen zone inclusion instead of EU 
membership. The above argument is consistent with Kelley’s view, but I add to it by 
claiming that a change of the conditions, rewards, and sanctions is important throughout 
the process of integration. In cases where the EU managed to alter conditions, rewards, 
and sanctions to address specific problems that underpinned corruption, EU-promoted 
reforms were not perceived by national actors as externally imposed and unclear.   
 
I show that EU conditionality had a different impact on corruption reforms in each 
of my three cases. In Bulgaria, the EU’s lack of understanding of the domestic factors 
underpinning corruption led the EU to introduce conditions that consistently focused on 
                                                
125 Chaves Gonzales, president of the Region of Andalusia (ES/PES) and rapporteur for 
the opinion on Wider Europe in Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with 
our Eastern and Southern Neighbours.said that neighbouring countries must "share 
everything with the Union but institutions" available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_COR-03-94_en.htm 
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the harmonization of law and the pace of the reforms. As a consequence, the EU’s 
conditionality led to the creation of a set of institutions that was characterized by unclear 
responsibilities, and was lacking inter-institutional coordination. In Georgia, EU 
conditionality consisted of a blanket requirement to eliminate corruption and almost 
unconditional support for President Saakashvili’s actions, which led the government to 
indeed eliminate petty corruption. However, such conditions and incentives also provided 
Saakashvili with the legitimacy that he needed in order to centralize power and create an 
environment, where rent extraction was possible by a small and elite group of 
government officials.  
 
In contrast, Montenegrin authorities were operating in an environment where 
constant interaction between the EU and domestic civil society altered the domestic 
context in a way that united civil society, and the EU Delegation formed a mutual 
understanding around the goal and the dynamics of the anti-corruption reforms. Thus, in 
contrast to Georgia, civil society did not allow the misuse of EU’s approval of 
government actions to result in centralized political power, or to lead to ad hoc changes in 
the anti-corruption institutions of the country that did not amount to a comprehensive 
reform.  
 
The previous chapter identified the cornerstones of the anti-corruption 
arrangements in Bulgaria, Georgia, and Montenegro, as well as the problems that each of 
the three countries faced. In this chapter, I turn to the particular actions of the EU that 
contributed to the shaping of these systems. I identify the critical junctures of the creation 
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of anti-corruption systems in the three case studies, and analyze the relevant actions of 
the EU before and after those critical junctures. 
 
1.  Bulgaria 
As previously discussed, the main issues preventing the effective functioning of 
Bulgaria’s anti-corruption system were a politically dependent judiciary with a strong 
prosecutor general, the lack of cooperation between different anti-corruption bodies, and 
the weak participation of civil society. This chapter examines the way in which the EU 
contributed to the establishment of Bulgaria’s anti-corruption system through 
conditioning membership upon harmonization of the law, and without specific quality 
criteria on the implementation of the newly created law.  
 
I argue that in Bulgaria the focus on harmonization of the law, coupled with time 
pressure, led to fast harmonization of domestic law with the acquis communautaire, ad 
hoc reforms instead of comprehensive reform of the judiciary and anti-corruption 
institutions, and support for populist and nationalist tendencies. Thus, the way 
conditionality was applied resulted in institutions, which were not capable of effectively 
controlling corruption, but that were merely used to sustain political parties in power, and 
to facilitate the extraction of rents.  
 
I also show that this unintended effect was a function not of conditionality itself, 
but rather of the lack of shared understandings between Bulgarian officials and the EU, 
with respect to the final goal and the tools necessary to achieve it. In contrast, in 
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Montenegro, the key local advocate of the merit and the importance of institutions 
imbued with transparency and accountability, and enjoying a high level of domestic 
ownership, was civil society. In Bulgaria, the absence of such strong, value-driven 
players to audit implementation and champion EU norms resulted in a lackluster attempt 
at achieving the intended outcomes. As a result, and despite EU’s best intentions to 
support Bulgaria in its search for the most suitable anti-corruption institutional 
arrangement, the EU consistently failed to address the core problems of Bulgaria’s anti-
corruption system, such as the inability of civil society and government officials to 
cooperate in creating policies, and to secure domestic ownership of these policy. Instead, 
it required actions, which were not only ineffective, but also led to partial reforms, 
resulting in institutions, which did not cooperate with each other, and had unclear 
responsibilities.    
 
High levels of corruption in Bulgaria consistently remained a top priority for the 
EU. The issue was first mentioned in official communication between Bulgaria and the 
EU in the EU issued opinion on Bulgaria’s progress from 1997. The Opinion singled out 
the lack of clear responsibilities among anti-corruption departments as a specific cause of 
corruption. The Opinion stated that, “Considerable discretionary power and a lack of 
clarity in allocating responsibilities and powers among Civil Service departments has 
allowed corruption to take hold easily.”126 As the previous chapter concluded, the unclear 
and overlapping responsibilities of anti-corruption agencies, as well as their inability to 
                                                
126 Commission Opinion on Bulgaria’s Application for Membership of the European 
Union DOC/97/11, Brussels, 15th July 1997, p.14 
 140 
coordinate anti-corruption efforts, indicated that the issue mentioned in the 1997 Opinion 
still persisted in 2013, and that Bulgaria made little progress in the last twenty years. 
 
In over two decades of trying to leverage varying incentives, such as membership 
conditionality and the CVM after accession in 2007, the EU failed to effect meaningful 
change in Bulgaria. After the collapse of the communist regime, Bulgaria saw two 
periods of EU conditionality:  before and after the country was granted membership in 
January 2007. The EU’s use of conditionality in both of these periods (Kelley 2004, 
2011) was clear, and the change of the main incentives should not be mistaken for a 
change of the approach. Before 2007, the EU was clear that membership was contingent 
upon Bulgaria’s ability to satisfy pre-accession conditions.127 Membership - the ultimate 
incentive that the EU could use to increase its leverage - persuaded many to place a 
strong emphasis on accession, and to argue that once membership was granted, the EU’s 
leverage was inevitably decreased (Kelley 2004, Schimmelfennig 2005, Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier 2005, Vachudova 2005). In this chapter, I show that even in the years 
before 2007, when the EU had the ultimate power, it failed to persuade Bulgaria to 
increase its institutional capacity in the area of anti-corruption because it failed to 
correctly identify the core issues, and to apply pressure on governments to introduce 
holistic anti-corruption policies.    
 
                                                
127 ibid 
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The beginning of pre-accession conditionality was marked by the start of 
negotiations in 2000. At this point, securing the rule of law became the issue that required 
the most attention. Chapter 24 of the negotiation process directed the negotiations 
between the EU and Bulgaria on judicial and home affairs. It specified the milestones that 
the country needed to achieve in order to become a member of the EU. This chapter was 
opened in June 2001. Shortly after, Bulgaria issued a negotiation position, which 
described the progress made by the country, and outlined the current state of affairs.128 
The negotiation position committed the country to fighting corruption, and claimed that 
Bulgaria had been pursuing a consistent policy, aimed at preventing and prosecuting 
organized crime and corruption. However, the language in all sections remained vague, 
and only promised the ratification of international conventions which Bulgaria had signed 
some three to four years prior.  
 
The chapter was closed only two years after it was opened. The short negotiations 
period on Chapter 24 proved to be an insufficient period for Bulgaria to introduce 
reforms pertinent to the domestic context. In the course of negotiations, Bulgaria 
introduced a new Penalty Procedural Code, and amended legislation on border and 
customs control. Coupled with the ratification of many international conventions related 
                                                
128 Negotiation Position of the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria on Chapter 24 
“Justice And Home Affairs”, Brussels, 20 February 2001, CONF-BG 9/01  
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to organized crime, fraud, and corruption, 129  these amendments signified a level of 
commitment to fighting corruption.  
 
However, commitments to fighting corruption in Bulgaria did not directly translate 
into implementation and enforcement of the law. A successful reform would have 
required a careful consideration of the existing system and a change in the institutional 
arrangement, in order to secure horizontal accountability of institutions, such as a more 
transparent mechanism for electing the magistrates in the Supreme Judiciary Council 
(SJC), and an accountable Prosecutor General. A successful reform would have also 
required guarantees for the diagonal (societal) accountability through the participation of 
civil society.  
 
Instead, in the period before 2007, when some claimed the EU had the most power 
(Vachudova 2005, Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2005), its conditionality approach 
had two consequences. First, before accession, it put Bulgaria on a path of anti-corruption 
reforms which did not specify a clear anti-corruption model as an end goal. The 
negotiation process for Chapter 24 was quick, filled with reforms that were not related to 
each other, and that did not amount to a cohesive approach toward anti-corruption efforts.  
 
Comprehensive and well thought out anti-corruption reform and simultaneous 
harmonization and implementation were not realized by 2005. For instance, in a speech 
                                                
129 Among which the 1997 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials 
In International Business Transactions and the Council of Europe Criminal Law 
Convention on Corruption (1999) 
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before the Parliament, President Purvanov stressed that, “I don’t want to dramatize the 
situation in which the country is … but our EU membership depends on how the 
Bulgarian institutions perform. In other words the law- and the institution-making process 
need to be extremely fast-paced.”130 This statement showed that he saw membership 
conditionality as a mere pressure to synchronize Bulgaria’s law with the law of the EU. 
Instead of furthering the internalization of norms that underpinned anti-corruption 
requirements of the EU, the fast-paced creation of institutions was aimed solely at 
satisfying EU conditions. Despite some objections to the President’s speech, there was 
not a discussion with respect to potential downfalls of fast-paced reforms. The lack of 
concern with quick reforms was evidence testifying to the fact that membership in 2007 
was the end goal for Bulgarian public officials, and the level of successful 
implementation of the reforms was not a priority. Similarly, all interviewed members of 
the negotiation team agreed that membership was the priority, and pressure from the EU 
was directed toward fast harmonization instead of implementation. According to some 
negotiators, the harmonization of law was a very technical process, which required 
altering more than 200 laws a month.131 Indeed, in the period when negotiations on 
chapter 24 began in 2001, to Bulgaria’s membership in the EU in 2007, the Penal Code of 
the country was amended fifteen times, five of which occurred in 2007. In the same 
period, the Law on Health was amended eighteen times. Naturally, the 2007 deadline left 
                                                
130 President Purvanov before Bulgarian Parliament July 11th, 2005 available at: 
http://parliament.bg/bg/plenaryst/ns/2/ID/29 (author’s translation) 
131 Author’s interview with a former member of Bulgaria’s Negotiation team  
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little time for implementation, consideration of local particularities, and consultation with 
the third sector.132  
 
Second, the inability of the EU to understand the necessity of long and 
comprehensive reforms in the area of anti-corruption in Bulgaria led to a structure of 
negotiations which did not prioritize anti-corruption policies and judicial reform, and 
which did not allow the negotiations on an independent judiciary to focus on tangible 
results. In Bulgaria, chapter 24 encompassed both Judicial and Home Affairs. 133 
Negotiations began with issues pertinent to home affairs, such as asylum, border control, 
and refugee issues. In the context of the recent Yugoslav wars, 9/11, and Bulgaria’s future 
role as a guardian of the EU border, the EU’s focus on home affairs was understandable. 
However, this focus also left the issue of judicial reform and anti-corruption unaddressed. 
One of the lead negotiators on Chapter 24 in the period from 2001- 2003 claimed that 
negotiations on anti-corruption policies did not take place at all, and that the emphasis 
was placed entirely on Home affairs.134 In 2003, a new negotiating team was introduced. 
Though information about the exact trajectory of the negotiation process is not available, 
it is worth noticing that instead of a reform in the judicial system, the CVM emerged as 
the result of negotiations. Again, there was very weak and superficial public debate, and 
stakeholders were not included in this decision. One representative of civil society said 
                                                
132 Authors interview with a former Head of Bulgaria’s Negotiation team. 
133 In consequent negotiations the chapter was divided in two chapters 
134 Author’s interview with a member of Bulgaria’s Negotiation Team, February 2014 
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that everyone in the NGO sector was equally surprised by the introduction of the 
CVM.135 
 
Perhaps more importantly, the lack of inclusion of civil society actors in a political 
dialogue with the EU led to the EU not receiving the feedback it needed to adjust its 
positions and actions in a way that focused them on pressing issues that sustained high 
levels of corruption. For instance, in 1991 a new mechanism for electing the Prosecutor 
General vested additional power in the office. By 1993, it became clear that the intent to 
make the prosecution independent had backfired, and instead Bulgaria had created a 
powerful institution which was not held accountable by anyone (see chapter two). 
Nevertheless, CSOs were lacking a relationship with the EU, which did not allow them to 
convey their concerns to the EU. As a result, in the period from 2000-2007, there was not 
a single mention of the problem of a powerful prosecutor in the regular reports of the EU. 
Instead, in this period, the EU focused on capacity building and failed to pressure 
domestic authorities to address the power of the Prosecutor General. Similarly, the 
Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) has traditionally suffered from a lack of transparency 
and fairness in appointing judges and prosecutors, and the EU has been equally unable to 
identify this issue.  
 
The inability of the EU to identify the most prominent problems stemmed from its 
lack of cooperation with independent civil society, and led to inept recommendations. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
135 Author’s interview Tihomir Bezlov, CSD 
 146 
The ineptness of recommendations was obvious in the fact that they often failed to target 
the real causes of corruption. For instance, in 2000, the main objections of the EU were 
related primarily to budgetary issues, such as deficiency in the funding that the state 
budget provided for the Judicial system instead of the mechanisms securing an 
independent yet balanced Prosecutor General.136 This particular issue, raised by the EU, 
indeed caused an increase in the budged for the judiciary. However, it did not balance the 
powers of the judges collegiate and the prosecutors collegiate within the SJC. Also, the 
issues raised by the EU did not address the fact that the SJC was prone to political 
influence because the additional budget was balanced in an unchanged corrupt system. In 
other words, having more funding did not mean a fair mechanism for appointing judges, 
nor did it provide conditions for decreasing the backlog in courts, nor did it create an 
institution that was capable of guaranteeing the independence and functioning of the 
judicial system. Instances like this one were not rare, and they explain why strong but 
misguided conditionality made Bulgaria incapable of fighting corruption effectively.    
 
This unintended effect of conditionality was not a function of conditionality itself. 
What appeared to be a willful neglect of EU recommendations driven by the mere desire 
of Bulgarian officials to quickly receive EU membership was indeed underpinned by the 
lack of shared understandings between the EU and domestic political elites. Lacking 
shared understandings between the EU and Bulgarian officials with respect to the goal of 
anti-corruption reforms and the intended way of achieving them hindered not only the EU 
leverage over domestic reforms, but the reforms as well. In order for one actor to 
                                                
136 EU report of the Progress of Bulgaria toward EU membership 2000 
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successfully persuade another to act in a certain way through employing rewards and 
sanctions, both actors need to have a mutual understanding of what constitutes strong 
sanctions and high rewards. This seemed not to be the case in Bulgaria. The EU saw 
membership for the post-communist countries as a way to assist their transitions137, and, 
in contrast, the majority of Bulgarian policy-makers saw membership as an end rather 
than a means to democracy. As early as 1999 (the third report on Bulgaria’s progress), the 
EU called for “creating or strengthening internal and external control structures in the 
administration and the judiciary.” 138  This recommendation continued to appear in 
consequent reports and was consistently met with a domestic response that showed the 
inability of policy makers in Bulgaria to fully comprehend ideas put forward by the EU. 
For instance, the internal structures for control that the EU referred to were the 
inspectorates within different ministries and the SJC, which at this point were failing to 
manage corruption because they did not have an established mechanism for cooperation 
(see chapter two). Such inspectorates were not created until 2007. In other words, the EU 
consistently sent its main message stressing that “implementation of actions on the 
ground” 139  was more important than public officials’ will to tackle corruption. Yet, 
recommendations have been consistently used for introduction of only partial judicial 
reform.  
                                                
137 Author’s interview with S. Diez, European Commission, DE Enlargement, Brussels 
February 2014 
138 EU Commission Regular Report on the Progress of Bulgaria toward EU Membership 
1999 
139 EU Commission Regular Report on the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism for 
Bulgaria, 2007  
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The lack of shared understandings with respect to the meanings imbued in EU 
suggestions created and sustained a tendency for Bulgarian policy-makers to misread 
EU’s suggestions, and to address them by creating ad hoc committees to investigate 
accusation of corruption, instead of establishing a comprehensive reform. This tendency 
was more obvious after accession in 2007. In 2008, the EU revealed that prominent 
Bulgarian officials, including the Minister of Agriculture, had intentionally misused EU 
funds and benefited personally. In an attempt to sanction Bulgaria for corruption in the 
area of EU funds, the EU froze €500m in aid to the country. The EU Commission 
President, Jose Barrosso stated that the government “shows that the institutions and 
systems are now in place but tangible results need to be achieved in investigating, 
prosecuting and judging cases of high - level corruption and organised crime."140 The 
new GERB government responded by creating yet another institution - a specialized joint 
team of state investigators and prosecutors whose task was to investigate cases of abuse 
and misappropriation of EU funds.141 This measure, while praised in the CVM reports, 
simply addressed a concrete instance of corruption, but did not identify the lack of 
comprehensive design of the anti-corruption institutional structure as a core problem, and 
did not mark the beginning of needed institutional reform.  
                                                
140 EU censures Bulgaria by freezing aid, The Guardian, July 23rd, 2008 available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/24/eu 
141 Velchev, V Prosecution Report 2010, supra note 36, at 45. On the misuse of EU funds 
by Bulgarian government officials, see European Parliament, Department D: Budgetary 
Affairs, How does organised crime misuse EU funds? [Study], 43, IP/D/ALL/FWC/2009 
– 56 (Sept. 12, 2009), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201207/20120717ATT49041/20
120 717A TT49041EN.pdf. 
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The sanctioning of Bulgaria in 2008 clearly did not have its intended effect because 
a similar scenario occurred again in 2013 when the EU again suspended funds. This time 
the frozen funds were under the Operational Program “Environment”, but the reasoning 
for this sanction was similar to the one from 2008 - mismanagement of funds. GERB did 
not comply with the report of the European Court of Auditors from 2011, which called 
for the imposition of higher financial corrections in projects funded with EU money. This 
case indicated that previous financial sanctions did not have a significant effect because 
they were misread by Bulgarian officials, and the issue that provoked the sanctions was 
not addressed. Institutional opportunities for the abuse of EU funds was still very much 
present. 
 
More importantly, the unintended effects of EU conditionality, in addition to a lack 
of shared perceptions, were also due to reforms that were being introduced in order to 
satisfy EU criteria, but not in order to fight corruption. The work of the Parliamentary 
Commission for Counteracting Crime was a striking example of this trend. The 
Commission met six times to address EU’s first recommendation for strengthening the 
judiciary.142 Two of the meetings were dedicated to specific instances of corruption and 
the purpose of the other four meetings was to discuss measures for improving the 
customs administration, the causes of the collapse of the banking system, and the creation 
of a public register of properties owned by high level government officials. In neither of 
                                                
142 EU Commission Regular Report on Bulgaria’s Progress toward EU Membership 1999  
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these meetings was the EU regular report discussed explicitly, nor was there any focus on 
comprehensive judicial reform. Some amendments to the Law on Commerce and the Law 
on Assets of Public Officials resulted from these meetings. However, they were 
superficial and never implemented. Yet, in an attempt to persuade legislative change, one 
MP used EU membership as main motivation, and threatened the rest of the MPs: “If you 
think that the national interest of Bulgaria is not to become EU member, you need to be 
loud and clear about it. We are a country and you know what happens to countries that 
don’t comply.”143    
 
Over the years, the EU remained consistent in its criticism of the judiciary reform, 
but this criticism unfortunately did not achieve a significant effect. A lack of mutual 
understanding between the EU and Bulgarian authorities regarding the most salient issues 
and best approaches to address them led to what Noutcheva and Bechev (2008) labeled, 
“accession fatigue.” The October 2005 annual report concluded that, “no steps were taken 
in the reporting period to modernise the prosecution service, although there remains a 
need to make it more transparent and accountable.”144 The strongest criticism of the SJC 
by the EU came as late as 2007, when the first CVM report observed a pressing need for 
an inspectorate with the SJC and concluded that, “In the absence of the Inspectorate 
                                                
143 Peter Dimitrov speech before the Parliament October 28th, 2005, available at 
http://parliament.bg/bg/plenaryst/ns/2/ID/55 Author’s translation 
144 EU Commission Regular Report on Bulgaria’s Progress toward EU Membership 
2005. 
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under the JSA, no progress can be reported.”145 This indicated a better understanding of 
the core issues leading to high levels of corruption on the part of the EU. However, it also 
came as late criticism, which had little impact on Bulgarian officials and the public – a 
fatigue from the constant flow of negative feedback from the EU. As a result, Bulgarian 
authorities did not take actions to reform the SJC and to change the procedure by which 
its members were elected. Even today, some eight years after accession, the debate 
continues to be whether the structure of SJC should be altered, rather than how it should 
be changed.  
    
Upon accession, the EU continued to apply conditionality with the same lack of 
results. This time conditionality was enforced through the Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism, which was specifically tailored to Bulgaria and Romania. Despite the fact 
that in 2007 Bulgaria was already a full-fledged member, the CVM was based on the 
same logic of conditionality. Simply put, now the ultimate incentive of EU membership 
was substituted by inclusion of the country in the Schengen zone146 – the European 
border-free area consisting of 25 states. Membership in Schengen was desirable by all 
political groups in Bulgaria. In 2014-2015, the leader of the Bulgarian socialist party – 
Sergei Stanishev and the leader of GERB and current Prime Minister of Bulgaria – Boiko 
                                                
145 EU Commission Regular Report on the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism in 
Bulgaria 2007 
146 25 member states: 22 EU countries (all except Bulgaria, Romania, Ireland, the UK and 
Cyprus) as well as three associated countries: Norway, Iceland and Switzerland. 
Denmark has signed the Schengen agreement, but has kept its freedom not to apply 
certain measures. The UK and Ireland chose to stay outside the Schengen area. 
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Borisov agreed on a common agenda, and established a common position with respect to 
Bulgaria’s membership in Schengen, and referred to Schengen as the new Berlin Wall in 
Europe. In a joint statement they said:  
We have a common position for Schengen. While this Berlin 
Wall is present, there will not be an effective common 
security and since Bulgaria has satisfied all criteria it would 
be necessary and it is time that we become members of 
Schengen.147   
 
Similarly, Meglena Kuneva from the Reformist Bloc and the current Deputy Prime 
Minister for European integration has been traditionally extremely vocal in advocating 
Bulgaria’s membership in Schengen. In 2014, she explained that “leaving Bulgaria out of 
Schengen is risky for both the country and the EU.”148 
 
This overwhelming agreement with respect to Bulgaria’s membership in Schengen 
gave the EU the opportunity to condition inclusion in Schengen upon effective anti-
corruption reforms and to continue its approach of conditionality. In turn, consistent 
criticism from the EU led to the enactment of a new Judiciary System Act (SJA) in 
                                                
147 Борисов и Станишев се обединиха в името на приемането на Бъгария в Шенген.  
Borisov and Stanishev united in the name of Bulgaria’s acceptance in Schengen [author’s 
translation] Varna24.bg, February 12th, 2015 Available at: 
http://news.varna24.bg/540835.html 
148 Сметките ни са криви ако очакваме да ни поканят в Шенген. Our calculations are 
wrong if we expect to be invited in Schengen. Investor.bg, October 18, 2015. Available 
at: http://www.investor.bg/ikonomika-i-politika/332/a/kuneva-smetkite-ni-sa-krivi-ako-
chakame-da-ni-pokaniat-v-shengen-204329/ 
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2007.149 However, there was no evidence of public discussion regarding the new SJA, 
and statements from government officials showed that the purpose of the SJA was to 
simply address EU criticism, but not to make the SJA functional and effective. The EU’s 
specific recommendation for internal control within the judges collegiate, for example, 
was addressed with a proposition for imposing disciplinary sanctions for judges who 
breach the Oath of Office. This proposition, though vague about the exact meaning of 
breach of Oath of Office, was passed in Parliament. Later it was struck down as 
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. As a result of its inadequacy, the SJA was 
amended and supplemented seventeen times in the period between 2007-2012.  
 
Failed interpretations of EU recommendations and a general lack of understanding 
of the purpose of these recommendations had a negative impact on other institutions as 
well. For instance, the idea for a Specialized Criminal Court was entirely credited to 
GERB, the party in power at the time. It was presented as a consequence of EU’s 
recommendation in the CVM report, despite the fact that in the reports such an explicit 
recommendation was not found. Instead, the report called for changes in the pre-trial 
procedures, such as investigation of alleged crimes. Such procedures were often lengthy 
and when it came to corruption, it was not always clear which one was the investigating 
agency. None of these pre-trial issues would have been addressed by the creation of a 
Specialized Criminal Court, for the Court did not have investigating powers.   
 
                                                
149 State Gazette of Bulgaria No. 64/7.08.2007 
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Perhaps most importantly, the CVM not only failed to achieve the goals it had set for 
itself, but it had a negative impact. Both scandals at the State Agency for National 
Security (SANS) and the Commission for Prevention and Ascertainment of Conflict of 
Interest (CPACI) were politicized and used by different political parties to gain dividends. 
The controversial appointment of a head of SANS in 2013 (see Chapter two) led to the 
longest mass protest in the post-communist history of Bulgaria, with corruption the main 
grievances of the protesters. The consequent political rhetoric was centered on high levels 
of corruption, and political parties used it to increase their constituencies. For instance, 
the majority of political parties’ campaign statements primarily focused on corruption and 
disregarded their ideological orientation.  
 
The protest resulted in national elections, and, during the protests, EU 
Parliamentary elections took place. In both campaigns, the issue of corruption was 
prioritized at the top of all political parties platforms. Coupled with the lack of clear steps 
as of how to address corruption, campaigns were reduced to appealing to voters based on 
the issue of the day. 150  Therefore, the creation of SANS and CPACI was highly 
ineffective in addressing corruption and conflict of interest, and instead it served to 
solidify the pre-existing trends of party populism as political strategy. This is because 
political strategy populism is less concerned with the details of specific movements and 
                                                
150 GERB has been consistently placing the fight against corruption and organized crime 
at the top of the party’s agenda.  See Граждани за Европейско Развитие на България 
[Citizens For The European Development Of Bulgaria] [GERB], Програма на 
Политическа Партия ГЕРБ за Европейско Развитие на България [Gerb Platform For 
The European Development Of Bulgaria], (2013) available at 
http://www.gerb.bg/bg/pages/otcheti-za-predizborni-kampanii-88.html 
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whether they meet preconceived platforms and agendas. Populist movements, such as 
GERB in Bulgaria, aim to bypass formal political institutions and use informal 
institutions in the name of “direct” and “immediate” action.151 The actions of the leader 
of GERB, Borisov, confirmed Jones’s idea of populist leaders as “political entrepreneurs” 
who compete to catch any voters and displace established political parties as the main 
mechanism for capturing votes (Jones 2007).  
 
The creation of anti-corruption institutions that were empty shells (Dimitrova 2007) 
as a response to negative CVM reports had an impact beyond just reinforcing populism. 
Some political parties, such as ATAKA and the National Front for the Salvation of 
Bulgaria (NFSB), used their electorate’s exhaustion from negative CVM reports to 
promote a nationalist ideology, and to amplify anti-EU sentiment in Bulgaria. Emil 
Cohen, the head of Bulgaria’s Tolerance Salvation NGO, explained the approach of the 
two nationalist groups to amplify xenophobia and to call for a strong nationalist state152 
                                                
151 One of the earliest formulations in this direction originates with William Kornhauser 
who distinguishes between populist and liberal democracy: Populist democracy involves 
direct action of large numbers of people, which often results in the circumvention of 
institutional channels. Liberal democracy involves political action mediated by 
institutional rules, and therefore limitations on the use of power by majorities as well as 
minorities. The difference between liberal democracy and populist democracy, then, does 
not concern who shall have access to power (in both cases, there is representative rule); 
rather, it concerns how power shall be sought, the mode of access. In liberal democracy, 
the mode of access tends to be controlled by institutional procedures and intermediate 
associations, whereas in populist democracy the mode of access tends to be more direct 
and unrestrained. Kornhauser, William, The Politics of Mass Society, (New York, The 
Free Press of Glencoe, 1959), p. 131. 
152 Political extremism on the rise in Bulgaria, DW, July 2014. Available at: 
http://www.dw.de/political-extremism-on-the-rise-in-bulgaria/a-17613184 
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with the EU’s repeated accusation of Bulgaria having rampant corruption and a poorly 
functioning judiciary. Anti-EU sentiment was clearly expressed in ATAKA’s political 
program for the election in 2014. The leader of the party, Volen Siderov openly blamed 
the striking difference in living standards between Bulgaria and other EU members to 
Bulgaria’s membership in the EU. 153  Siderov, who was also the head of the Anti-
Corruption Committee in Parliament in 2013-2014, claimed not only that CVM is 
crushing the national esteem of Bulgarians, but also that, “The Europact only maintains 
the power of the domestic bank and corporative oligarchy.”154 Furthermore, Siderov’s 
comments on the CVM report from January 2015 were focused on interpreting the report 
as positive and practically dismissing its significance. With this rhetoric, ATAKA won a 
substantial number of seats in every Parliament since 2005, and was a decisive force in 
the 42nd National Assembly (2013-2014).  
 
Indeed, the constant flow of negative reports from the EU created a fatigue instead 
of shaming because they did not adequately address domestic norms and meaning. The 
CVM consisted of six benchmarks identified by the Commission, and not one of them 
was dedicated to civil society’s participation. This is not to say that the CVM did not 
assert the role of civil society in the fight against corruption.  To be fair, an analysis of all 
CVM reports showed increasing discussions of civil society and increasing demand on 
                                                
153 Планът Сидеров срещу Колониалното Робство.  Управленска Програма на 
Партия АТАКА.  The Siderov Plan against the Colonial Occupation.  Program of 
Political Party ATAKA. Available at: http://ataka.bg/Programa_ATAKA_PLAN_full.pdf 
154 Планът „Сидеров“: Нов Път за България, (”Siderov” Plan: New Way for Bulgaria), 
p. 3, (Author’s Translation).  Available at:  
http://ataka.bg/Programa_ATAKA_PLAN.pdf 
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the part of the EU for inclusion of civil society in the decision-making  process. Though 
increased, this recent focus on civil society remained sporadic and overgeneralized. For 
instance, the CVM report from February 2014 was the one that mentioned civil society 
the most; however, it did not specify a clear mechanism for securing the participation of 
the third sector. In the next chapter, I show that this problem dates back to before the 
CVM was introduced in 2007. The failure to address it then created an unstable and 
dysfunctional relationship between the EU and domestic CSOs, and set the CVM up for 
suboptimal achievement of its goals.  
 
2.  Georgia 
 
In the following section, I examine the role of the EU in the process of creating 
anti-corruption institutions in Georgia. I argue that through almost unconditional support 
and praise for Saakashvili’s actions, the EU served to legitimize the incumbent and his 
anti-corruption activities that often proved to be at odds with democratic principles. This 
in turn allowed Saakashvili’s government to create power structures, to further solidify its 
power, and to create an environment conducive to grand corruption while virtually 
eliminating petty corruption.  
 
In the period before the Rose Revolution in 2003, the EU and other international 
actors were extremely critical of high levels of corruption in Georgia (Stefes 2006, 
Papava and Tokmazishvili 2006). When in 2003, domestic grassroots organizations, such 
as KMARA! (Enough!), the Liberty Institute, GYLA (who first contested the 2003 
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election results), and Rustavi-2 (a national TV station that gave media outlet to 
protestors) led the Rose Revolution, the EU, through the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA), had already applied pressure to Georgia to fight corruption.155 It had 
also condemned the lack of transparency in the 2000 elections and had pressed President 
Shevardnadze to “further political, economical and judicial reforms, with a view to 
establish a democratic and market oriented society in Georgia.”156 
 
Toward the end of 2003, the EU was worried both about Shevardnadze’s methods 
and his Soviet past, and saw new hope in the Rose Revolution and its leader - Mikhail 
Saakashvili. He represented the people “who knew English and computers,”157 had a 
Western education, had openly declared Georgia’s pro-EU orientation, and had 
committed to the fight against corruption. The Presidency of the EU declared:  
The Presidential election has opened up new opportunities 
for Georgia. The EU now looks forward to helping Georgia 
and the other countries of the South Caucasus to come 
closer to the European family.158 
 
                                                
155 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Georgia, art 73 (1) 
156 Declaration by the Presidency on Behalf of the European Union on the Re-election of 
President Eduard Shevardnadze of Georgia, Brussels, April 2000 
157 Eduard Shevardnadze’s speech before the 2003 elections as quoted by Gia Nodia, The 
Dynamics and Sustainability of the Rose Revolution, in Michael Emerson, 
Democratisation in the European Neighbourhood, CEPS Paperback Series (CEPS 
Paperback Series), issue: 1 / 2005, pages: 1-240 
158 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the Presidential 
elections in Georgia, Brussels, 9 January 2004 
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Support for Georgia was continuously conditioned upon success of the anti-
corruption reforms:  
The EU welcomes Mr. Saakashvili's first public comments 
following his victory on the need to combat corruption and 
to uphold the rule of law. Progress in this reform programme 
will facilitate increased international support and 
engagement in Georgia's development.159 
 
The hope that the EU saw in Saakashvili’s victory soon translated into actions 
which legitimized further the government’s anti-corruption reforms. Bilateral relations 
intensified in 2004, Georgia was included in the European Neighborhood Policy, and 
Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) funds were made available. The RRM provided 
Georgia with €4.65 million to assist measures to reinforce the rule of law and democratic 
processes in Georgia.160 Finally, the EU also adopted a Joint Action establishing the EU 
Rule of Law Mission in Georgia - EUJUST-THEMIS,161 in the context of European 
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), in order to assist in the development of a 
government strategy to guide the reform of the country's criminal justice system. 
Saakashvili understood the support that the EU provided him as a tool for legitimizing 
domestically his radical anti-corruption reforms, but also to centralize power. As a result, 
these reforms did eliminate petty corruption, but they did not change the culture of 
                                                
159 ibid 
160 Press release EU commission, Georgia: €4.65 million to reinforce the rule of law and 
democratic processes, Brussels, 2 July 2004 
161 EUJUST THEMIS covered the expenditure to EUR 2,3 million. Press release, 2603rd 
Council meeting General Affairs and External Relations Brussels, 13 September 2004 
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corruption in Georgia, and created an environment in which grand corruption could 
thrive.  
 
The government used both the financial support and the legitimacy provided by the 
EU to introduce drastic reforms immediately after it took office in 2004. It started with 
revamping the police force. This was a twofold process. First, reforms in the Ministry of 
Interior abolished some institutions and created new ones. 162  The most prominent 
example is the Police Academy, which moved from a Soviet-style institution to an 
Academy where acceptance became merit-based. Second, the government fired 80-90% 
of all police officers. 25,000 to 30,000 trained police officers were left unemployed 
without an explanation and more importantly without compensation. Shortly after this, 
Saakashvili explained to National Public Radio in Washington that “most of them did 
have savings because they were corrupt and they had money.” 163  Similarly, the 
mechanisms by which new police officers were hired were unclear and therefore not 
merit-based. The MoI hired young and inexperienced people who seemed to be loyal to 
                                                
162 The National Bureau of Passport-Visa and Citizens Registration was transferred to the 
Ministry of Justice. The Main Administrative Board of Highway Patrol was established. 
The Ministry of Internal Affairs eliminated the Main Administrative Boards of Traffic 
Police, Protection of Public Order, Ecology Police and the Transport Department. The 
Financial Police was established within the Ministry of Finance. However, the criminal 
offences in regard to money laundering and forge money remain within the structure of 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as they are mostly connected to other types of organized 
crimes. The Central Telephone dispatch system is at least functioning in the capital 
Tbilisi and in all regional capitals. The so called “Protection Police” is still a part of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, but is not funded from the Ministry’s budget. 
163 Georgia's National Police Corruption Project, NPR on September 15, 2005. 
Avaialble at: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4849472 
 161 
higher-officials and the ruling party rather than to professional standards (Kupatadze et al 
2006). 
 
Part of the reforms consisted in the restructuring of the Ministry of the Interior 
(MoI). Indeed, such restructuring discontinued the Ministry’s financial dependence on its 
involvement in the shadow economy from Shevarnadze’s era (Wheatley 2005). However, 
MoI remained powerful, and organized hierarchically with no external control or 
transparency. The reforms centralized the MoI and were justified by the government as a 
measure to prevent the formation of corruption-prone informal power centers. In turn, 
MoI became prone to serve political interests. The lack of a National Director of Police or 
similar police professional who would report to the political post of the Minister (and 
arguably, to an external oversight body) and hold overall responsibility for police actions 
led to the virtual assumption of the role of the highest police officer in the country or 
police headquarters (Krunic and Siradze 2005). As a result, police officers are in fact 
dependent on the governing party.   
 
Finally, the reform indeed produced immediate results, but it was not backed up by 
social dialogue and a societal agreement about the necessity of such reforms. In turn, the 
reforms did not represent a step toward the necessary change of the culture of corruption 
in Georgia. Instead, citizens and the new police officers’ compliance was driven by fear 
of losing their jobs, and not by clear understanding of the necessity to downsize the 
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police force and the detrimental effects of corruption.164 In other words, the revamped 
police reflected the values of the new political elite, but not necessarily the values of the 
wider population. Therefore, the absence of social dialogue and shared understandings 
about norms that dictated everyday behavior between the population and the new political 
elite created compliance that was driven by the logic of consequences, rather than the 
logic of appropriateness. This type of compliance could prove unstable under a future 
government, which might not be able to sustain the level of sanctions that were driving 
compliance during Saakashvili’s regime.  
 
Despite the lack of social agreement on the reform, and clear violation of the rights 
of fired policeman, the EU was blinded by the immediate success and the boldness of the 
reforms. As a result, it was not able to critically analyze the reforms. The 2005 Georgia 
Country report issued by the EU Commission stated: “...an extensive reform process is 
underway in the area of the police and the judiciary. This remains a key priority of the 
Georgian government and is therefore substantially supported by the EU.”165 As a result, 
the EU did not pressure Georgia into further ensuring the rule of law through becoming a 
part of international conventions regarding the rule of law and cooperation on criminal 
matters. For instance, Georgia was not a member of the Lugano convention and did not 
have an agreement for cooperation with Eurojust. In terms of bilateral agreements with 
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and Development (CIPDD), April 2014 
165 European Neighbourhood Policy: Country Report Georgia, EU Commission, March 
2nd, 2005 
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EU member states for cooperation on judiciary and law enforcement, in 2013 Georgia 
had only twelve agreements, most of which were with former communist countries.166  
 
The undemocratic nature of the reforms and the inability of the EU to see 
Saakashvili’s actions as centralization of power were shocking for some people within the 
EU Mission in Georgia. Though they were taken aback by Saakashvili’s approach, EU’s 
official stance was to approve it and support it because it was effective.167 Even more, the 
EU rewarded Saakashvili’s approach. In 2006, it signed an Action Plan which opened 
new partnership perspectives, such as,  
The perspective of moving beyond cooperation to a 
significant degree of integration, deepening trade and 
economic relations; providing the opportunity for 
convergence of economic legislation, the opening of 
economies to each other, and the continued reduction of 
non-tariff barriers to trade.168  
 
This further support again provided Saakashvili with powerful tools to legitimize 
his reforms. An officer at the time from the Ministry of Justice who wished to remain 
anonymous said: “Putting aside the public, we had to often pressure other institutions or 
                                                
166 Georgia signed agreements for cooperation on judicial affairs and law enforcement 
with Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, UK.  available at: Ministry of Justice  Ministry of justice: 
http://www.justice.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=139&info_id=1511 and 
Ministry of Interior Affairs http://www.police.ge/index.php?m=413 (Author’s translation) 
167 Author’s interview with a representative of the EU delegation who wished to remain 
anonymous, March 2014
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168 Georgia’s Action Plan  
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sub agencies in the Ministry to agree with our policies, by telling them that the EU has 
demanded these policies.”169 She continued to explain how effective this was, for the 
biggest fear of low and mid-level bureaucrats was a return to a situation similar to the 
Shevardnadze regime. The domestic and international public alike were persuaded by the 
same rhetoric. For instance, in the midst of the three months when the country was left 
without a police force, Saakashvili declared Georgia a full European member when he 
declared:  
 
For anyone who ever thought, or hoped, that Georgia was a 
failed State, our Revolution and our people, proved them 
forever wrong ... The second lesson of the Rose Revolution 
is that Georgians have become full members of Europe and 
the European family. In reflecting on this point, I am not 
simply looking to geography, but rather, to national 
identity... our Revolution was about people fighting for their 
freedom and their desire to live in a democratic society. A 
society that respects human rights, freedom of speech, the 
rule of law and the belief that citizens and citizens alone, 
have the right to choose their leaders and their destiny... I 
am the President of democracy!170 
 
In 2005, the EU and domestic actors that were approving of Saakashvili’s methods 
declared that addressing corruption only through a reform of the police force was 
insufficient, and pressed Saakashvili for more tangible reforms. Such reforms were the 
                                                
169 Author’s interview with a former official at the Ministry of Justice 
170 Speech delivered by Mikhail Saakashvili at John Hopkins University, 4th February 
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“strengthening respect for the rule of law” 171 which was to take place by altering the 
judiciary, law enforcement agencies, and penitentiaries. As a response, on January 18, 
2005, Saakashvili’s administration set up a Working Group tasked to elaborate a strategy 
by June 1st, 2005. The Working Group included representatives from different NGOs, 
such as Transparency International (TI), the Georgian Young Lawyers Association 
(GYLA), and the Young Economist Association (YEA). However, it was coordinated by 
the National Security Council of Georgia, which was the President’s advisory body and 
was part of the State Chancellery. Though the Working Group’s efforts indeed resulted in 
an anti-corruption strategy, the way it was organized empowered the President by placing 
the power of executive decisions in his hands.172  
 
The Working Group also had the support of the EU, which again indicated the 
support Saakashvili’s actions were receiving by the EU, despite their undemocratic 
character. The EU in fact almost doubled its financial support for Georgia (European 
Commission 2005). Without such support by the EU, Saakashvili would not have been 
able to legitimize or to finance his reforms. The European Commission was the major 
sponsor of the reforms. According to the EU Delegation in Georgia, the EU made 
considerable contribution to the criminal justice system reform in the country, which 
                                                
171 EU Commission Communication 2005 
172 Presidential Decree #815: A special Anti-Corruption Policy Division was created 
within the newly formed National Security Council’s Department of State and Public 
Security. 
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included the police reforms, and between 2008 and 2013, the EU provided more than €20 
million to the Criminal Justice System.173 
 
This support came without a consideration for the shortcomings of the process by 
which an anti-corruption strategy was elaborated. First, the Working Group did not meet 
until March 2006, which represented a delay that signified the lack of will on the part of 
the government. After its initial meeting in March 2006, meetings were sporadic and ad 
hoc, rather than agreed upon and scheduled bi-weekly meetings. In turn, the irregular 
meetings left the participating NGOs out of the process and highly discouraged.174  
 
Finally, similarly to the case of the police reform, no public discourse took place in 
order to support the decision-making  process of the Working Group. Internal strategies 
were required by each ministry’s representative, and NGOs were supposed to comment 
on them. However, submissions from NGOs were rare and NGOs complained of the 
superficiality of the documents received. Public debate was not attempted either. No draft 
was publicized, the public’s opinion was not sought, and the document was compiled 
primarily by the National Security Council and government representatives. The lack of 
will on the part of the government, the hindered work of NGOs, and a complete disregard 
                                                
173 Justice, Freedom, and Security programs of the EU in Georgia.  Available at: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/projects/overview/justice_freedom_secu/index_
en.htm 
174 Author’s interview with an expert at GYLA, March 2014 
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for public opinion deprived the first Georgian strategy from domestic ownership and 
discouraged NGOs to cooperate with the government.  
 
In this sense, the National Anti-Corruption Strategy that resulted from the efforts of 
the Working Group was not agreed upon by all major stakeholders, and was used to 
further legitimize Saakashvili’s reforms before international entities. On June 24, 2005175, 
the President approved the National Strategy. This approval came shortly before the 
Group of States Against Corruption’s (GRECO) assessment group was scheduled to 
assess Georgia’s compliance with GRECO recommendations. Based on this report, the 
EU once again praised the government’s efforts and provided further legitimacy for the 
reforms. 
 
The EU support for Saakashvili allowed him to embark on an approach which 
eliminated petty corruption. Part of the reform in the Ministry of Justice was based on the 
government’s idea of the principle of one window, which allowed citizens to receive 
certificates issued by a particular agency at one place. Georgia’s government had 
determined by now that the most salient reason for the overwhelming corruption in the 
country were unclear rules and broad bureaucracy, and the one window principle was 
designed to address this problem. Indeed, it significantly simplified the obtaining of 
public services. Immediately after the implementation of the principle of one window, the 
government determined that it was not enough. Saakashvili declared that the level of 
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corruption in Georgia required radical measures, and delegated the task to further develop 
the principle.  
 
In 2008, the Ministry of Justice began to implement the project of Public Service 
Hall,176 which incorporated all the “one windows” in one building and made most of the 
services electronic. Newly equipped with technology and a shiny building, the Public 
House opened its doors in 2011, and in the next two years sixteen more public service 
halls were open, practically covering all major Georgian cities.  
 
In creating the Public Service Hall, and choosing to address problems of 
unmotivated staff, lack of technology and financial resources, and bureaucracy, 177 
Saakashvili took a specific path to fighting corruption, which ensured three factors that 
were essential for the solidification of the incumbent’s power. First, it was the elimination 
of petty corruption. Second, Saakashvili received international and domestic support for 
the government. Finally, domestic and international actors’ attention was taken away 
from grand corruption. The combination of these three factors allowed Saakashvili to 
concentrate power in a small elite group, and create an environment conducive to grand 
corruption.178 
 
                                                
176 The Public Service Hall brings under the same roof the National Bureau of 
Enforcement, The National Archive of Georgia, the National Agency for Pubic Registry, 
the Civil Registry Agency, and the Notary chamber of Georgia. 
177 Author’s interview with Nino Evgenidze, Economic Policy Research Center, October 
2014 
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First, the Public Service Hall indeed turned out to be extremely efficient in 
reducing petty corruption. Prior to its existence, everyday activities of citizens were 
subjected to various institutional red tape, which in turn bred an environment susceptible 
to high levels of corruption. The Public Service Hall simplified everyday activities of 
citizens, such as obtaining a business or marriage license, acquiring a passport, or 
registration of property. Thus, it radically decreased bureaucracy, and, as a consequence, 
petty corruption as well. Many domestic and international reports attested to this. 
According to the Global Corruption Barometer in 2013, only 4% of Georgians were 
asked for a bribe.179 
 
Second, by choosing to tackle petty corruption, Saakashvili won points both 
domestically and on the international level, and moved Georgian’s and international 
actors’ attention away from the topic of corruption. Domestically, the Public Service Hall 
received the approval of the majority of the population. By addressing the immediate 
problems that sustained corruption in the everyday life of citizens, Saakashvili not only 
increased his approval rating domestically, but he also made corruption an issue of a low 
salience among the population. Internationally, the EU met both the principle of one 
window and the Public Service Hall with standing ovations, and the World Bank declared 
Georgia to be the post-communist country that fought against corruption most effectively 
and made the most progress.  
 
                                                
179 Global Corruption Barometer, 2013 
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Most importantly, the newly revamped approval of Saakashvili, combined with 
reduced attention to the high level political corruption, allowed the incumbent to solidify 
his power (Börzel and Pamuk 2013). The Public Service Hall, however, was not designed 
as a policy-making institution, and high-level political corruption was not within its 
charter. These reforms then allowed Saakashvili to completely capture the creation and 
implementation of anti-corruption policies, and to promote legislation that concentrated 
in his hands authority over anti-corruption institutions, which were responsible for high 
level political corruption.  In turn, the power over the policy-making institutions (see 
chapter two) allowed for rent extraction by the political elite.  
 
In sum, continuous approval by the EU for Saakashvili’s reforms served to 
legitimize the incumbent, and to empower him to capture the anti-corruption agenda of 
Georgia. In turn, Saakashvili’s government indeed was tremendously successful in 
addressing some forms of corruption, but it did not introduce effective normative change. 
In fact, a study by East-West Management Institute shows that Georgian culture still held 
values necessary for corruption to thrive: trust in one’s immediate circle is significantly 
higher that trust in institutions and civil society. More importantly, support from the EU 
allowed the incumbent to create politically dependent institutions, solidify his power, and 
to instrumentalize anti-corruption policies to settle internal power struggles, and tighten 
its grip on the exchange of resources. Most importantly, his government did so with 
strong support from the EU, and did not need to bring domestic stakeholders in to the 
process, such as representatives of civil society. 
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3.  Montenegro 
Just as in Bulgaria and Georgia, the EU applied conditionality in order to pressure 
the government of Montenegro to introduce anti-corruption reforms to lower levels of 
corruption. However, in contrast to Georgia and Bulgaria, I argue that conditionality in 
Montenegro achieved more sustainable results. In the following paragraphs, I aim to 
answer the question why EU conditionality was more effective in Montenegro as 
compared to the other two case studies. I argue that the higher level of success of 
conditionality in Montenegro can be explained by the type of and the way in which EU 
introduced conditions, incentives, and sanctions. More specifically, the EU was 
significantly more attentive to the domestic context in Montenegro, and it emphasized the 
implementation of legislature instead of mere harmonization of law, as was the case of 
Bulgaria. Also, the EU introduced a more comprehensive way of assessing progress, and 
required a track record of the effects of reforms. Perhaps more importantly, the EU 
conditioned closing the negotiation chapters upon tangible results, which prevented 
Montenegro from experiencing the same time-related pressure as Bulgaria did. As a 
result, the reforms took longer than in Bulgaria and certainly longer than the radical 
overnight changes introduced by Saakashvili in Georgia. However, anti-corruption 
reforms were subject to public debate in which all stakeholders partook, and thus the 
reforms enjoyed higher levels of domestic ownership.   
 
Corruption in Montenegro was identified by the EU as an issue that needed 
immediate attention from the very beginning of the country’s interaction with the EU. 
Even before the country received its independence from Serbia in 2006, the EU voiced its 
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concern with respect to high levels of corruption through the Stability and Association 
Pact. Later, the EU explicitly conditioned membership upon changes in the judicial 
system and the introduction of functioning anti-corruption institutions. While in 2013, the 
EU had not yet applied sanctions against Montenegro, it had expressed a readiness to do 
so should the need arise, thus committing to its conditionality approach.  
 
In 2011, shortly before the opening of the negotiation process, the EU announced 
certain changes in its approach which took the membership negotiations in general, and 
the fight against corruption in particular, on a path that differed from that of Bulgaria and 
Georgia. First, the EU separated the content of what used to be Chapter 24 of the 
negotiations - Judicial and Home Affairs - into two chapters. This meant the introduction 
of a separate chapter dedicated to judicial reforms, and indicated commitment to 
negotiations on the particular topic of corruption as a stand-alone subject. In turn, this 
meant that the pressing issue of high levels of political corruption and dysfunctional anti-
corruption institutions was not going to be tucked in as part of largely understood home 
affairs. Instead, and in contrast to Bulgaria, it was to be given the necessary attention. 
 
Second, the EU requested that the chapter on judicial reform was opened first and 
closed last. This demonstrated an understanding on the part of the EU with respect to how 
pressing the issue of corruption was, and the precise mechanisms by which it could be 
addressed. For example,  “The rule of law is now at the heart of the enlargement 
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process”180 because “countries need to tackle issues such as judicial reform and the fight 
against organised crime and corruption early in accession negotiations.”181 This was a 
promising change from the fast paced negotiations that took place in Bulgaria. It showed 
an understanding of the necessity to comprehensively change the system and avoid ad 
hoc reforms. It also meant corruption in all areas of the political and social life could be 
addressed systematically through the process of closing all chapters. The long process of 
negotiations on the Judicial Affairs chapter aimed not only to prevent fast harmonization 
of the law, but also to secure appropriate implementation as well. As part of the 
protracted process, the EU has created considerably clearer impact indicators for 
Montenegro. 
 
As a result of these two changes, conditionality in Montenegro took on a more 
evolved form than in Bulgaria and Georgia. This form is attested to by two main 
characteristics of EU conditionality in Montenegro. First, instead of conditioning a closer 
relationship between the EU and Montenegro on harmonization of the law, the EC reports 
emphasized implementation of new legislation and policies. Second, the 
recommendations provided by the EU targeted specific domestic problems, and were 
synchronized with domestic state and non-state actors, thus creating more domestic 
ownership.  
                                                
180 Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament And The 
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3.1  Focus on Implementation and Track Record 
The EU’s focus on implementation had been consistent in Montenegro since 2001, 
when the country became a member of the Stability Pact Anticorruption Initiative (SPAI). 
As early as 2001, the EU observed that there was no financial control unit for government 
institutions. Budget users were requesting transfers to their bank accounts with the 
Payments Bureau and then spending them. Apart from this approval of spending, which 
was merely filed after processing, there was not documentation in the payment process, 
nor were there any control over expenditure. To move toward a more transparent system, 
the EU recommended that the authorities develop an interim financial control system 
using, as a minimum, a payment voucher. Each ministry created an Accounting and 
Control Section which was responsible for ensuring that the financial regulations issued 
by the Minister for Finance were put into practice, especially in the areas of income, 
commitments, expenditure, and financial and other assets. Once these institutions were 
created, an implementation phase followed, and a separate unit (The Internal Audit Unit) 
was created in 2003, whose responsibility was to ensure these measures were effectively 
implemented. The focus on implementation remained a major characteristic of EU’s 
conditionality in Montenegro. The EU’s Enlargement Strategy Paper from 2013 
confirmed this. The section on Montenegro stated that the strategy “maximises the time 
countries have to develop a solid track record of reform implementation, thereby ensuring 
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that reforms are deeply rooted and irreversible. This new approach is a key element of the 
negotiating framework for Montenegro.”182   
 
In order to facilitate implementation, and to ensure an overall balance in the 
progress of negotiations across different policy areas, the Commission also created new 
rules for the screening process and a timeframe for the opening of specific chapters. The 
following passage reveals this:  
 
Given the link between the chapters Judiciary and 
fundamental rights (C 23) and Justice, freedom and security 
(C 24) and the values on which the Union is founded, as 
well as their importance for the implementation of the 
Acquis across the board, should progress under these 
chapters significantly lag behind progress in the negotiations 
overall, and after having exhausted all other available 
measures, the Commission will, on its own initiative, or on 
the request of one third of the Member States, propose to 
withhold its recommendations to open and/or close other 
negotiating chapters, and adapt the associated preparatory 
work, as appropriate, until this imbalance is addressed.183  
 
Therefore, a special emphasis was placed not only on corruption and anti-
corruption, but also on a balanced progress across chapters. This in itself indicated EU’s 
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 176 
higher level of understanding of the domestic context in Montenegro in comparison with 
previous enlargements.  
 
The focus on implementation, and EU’s emphasis on conditioning membership on 
tangible results from the reforms was also evident by that fact that the EU did not provide 
a specific date for accession. Instead, it conditioned accession upon tangible results. The 
EU did not commit to an accession date, and instead declared: 
The negotiations will be based on Montenegro’s own merits 
and the pace will depend on Montenegro’s progress in 
meeting the requirements for membership ….The shared 
objective of the negotiations is accession. By their very 
nature, the negotiations are an open-ended process whose 
outcome cannot be guaranteed beforehand. 184  
 
The lack of a temporal condition relieved policy makers in Montenegro from the 
pressure to quickly introduce new institutions and legislation in order to satisfy EU 
requirements. Instead, Montenegro was allowed time and space for public debate, which 
considered the opinions and the propositions of the majority of stakeholders, such as 
representatives of CSOs and business, and secured domestic ownership of the reforms. 
 
In this sense, officials in Montenegro used membership negotiations as a learning 
experience. The head of the Commission for Prevention of Conflict of Interest (CPCI) 
explained that Montenegro should not strive to become like the original members of the 
EU, or even like the successful post-communist members, because, “Montenegro is not 
                                                
184 Accession Document, Brussels, June 29th, p. 8 
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Germany, France, or even Italy and never will be.”185 He firmly stated that the largest 
benefit for Montenegro of becoming an EU member was that the country “learns what 
democracy should look like and applies it domestically.” 186  He was not alone in 
interpreting membership negotiations with the EU as a learning experience. A member of 
the negotiating team concurred the point made by CPCI and added that the EU must learn 
as well. He claimed that,  
Europeans are often at a discontent with what we are doing 
but it is our job to educate them and explain to them that 
Montenegro and its people have certain traditions and habits 
which need to be considered while reforming any system 
and especially the judiciary.187 
 
This process of mutual education was a lengthy one and the fact that Montenegro 
did not have a projected date for acceptance in the EU served the country’s best interest.  
According to the former Minister of European Integration, the leading and most 
important principle for Montenegro in the process of negotiations was, “quality before 
speed - it is better to enter [the EU] ready, as a NATO member, economically 
competitive, and with stronger institutions including an independent judiciary.”188 
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As a result of the innovative and improved use of the EU’s conditionality strategy, 
the first Action Plan to Fight Corruption and Organized Crime was elaborated in 
Montenegro in 2006 - that was five years before the official start of the negotiations and 
it was synchronized with the EU Mission in the country at this time. In contrast, 
Bulgaria’s first anti-corruption strategy was created by a think-thank after the start of the 
negotiations, and was never followed by an Action Plan, while Georgia’s first strategy 
was a product of the Ministry Justice only, and its authors never referred to the EU for 
advice or approval. Montenegro’s action plan was intended for the period of 2006-2007. 
In this period, 27% of the measures were implemented, 26% were partially implemented, 
and 44% were not implemented.189 Most measures were implemented by the Directorate 
for Anti-Corruption Initiative (DACI) and the lowest performer was the Privatization 
Council. Indeed, the percentage of implemented policies was not satisfactory, but the EU 
proved to be flexible, and instead of creating a completely new strategy, it altered the 
existing one. This brings me to the second characteristic of conditionality in Montenegro 
- namely the extent to which conditions in Montenegro were compatible with the 
domestic context.  
  
3.2  Domestic context considered 
In contrast to Bulgaria and Georgia, in Montenegro the EU reached out to all 
domestic stakeholders, which allowed it to adjust the conditions, incentives, and 
sanctions. For instance, the Stability Pact Anti-corruption Initiative (SPAI), in contrast to 
                                                
189 Monitoring report by MANS, October 2008 
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similar initiatives in other countries, reached out to civil society. In the beginning of 
2001, the Senior Representative of Montenegro for SPAI gave several interviews with 
influential newspapers, and thus used them to promote the initiative, and to invite civil 
society to join the implementation of the Action Plan. This publicity resulted in several 
meetings with NGOs and Trade Unions, which led to the creation of a specific website 
dedicated to monitoring the implementation of anti-corruption policies. Such 
participation and publicity promoted the activities of SPAI, and provided a forum for 
public debate. Most importantly, it marked the beginning of a relationship between the 
EU and domestic civil society, which provided a channel of communication through 
which the EU could receive feedback regarding the effects of its conditionality.    
 
The EU continued its interaction with civil society over the years after 2001. It 
learned about the domestic context from NGOs, and was able to iteratively alter its 
conditions, incentives, and sanctions in order to increase its leverage over policy makers. 
In light of the traditional structures of power in Montenegro, the EU understood that 
instead of sanctioning Montenegro for not performing on the Action Plan, it needed to 
understand the potential of the country to comply. In 2008, after numerous meetings with 
NGOs and state institutions, and after reports sent to the EU Delegation by MANS and 
CRNVO, the EU established the necessity of a new Action Plan.  
 
A new and improved form of conditionality was possible in Montenegro by 
supporting the participation of the majority of stakeholders in anti-corruption reforms, 
and, most significantly, including civil society. For instance, the change in the structure 
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of negotiation teams marked a significant difference with previous enlargements. The 
negotiating team in Montenegro was composed of six bodies: College for Negotiations on 
Accession of Montenegro to the European Union, State Delegation, Negotiating Team, 
Working Groups for Preparation of Negotiations on Individual Negotiating Chapters, 
Office of the Chief Negotiator, and the Secretariat of the Negotiating Team.190  Working 
groups for Chapter 23, Judiciary and Basic Rights, and Chapter 24, Justice, Freedom and 
Security, were the first two to be established. The Working Public officials consistently 
and publicly stated their support for the inclusion of civil society groups in the process of 
negotiations. However, the Decision from July 2012 was not explicit about the method of 
selection and appointment of CSOs, and suggested that CSOs could be included in as 
experts by the main negotiator. After the first meeting in Brussels, where some NGOs did 
not attend because they were not satisfied with their status in the process of negotiations, 
the EU applied pressure for full inclusion of NGOs in the working groups. The Head of 
the EU mission in Montenegro, Ambassador Drobnic, stated on the behalf of the EU 
Delegation in Montenegro: 
Let me underline that Montenegro is now entering a very 
demanding phase of its accession process, which requires 
continued and focused efforts to maintain consensus on 
European integration not only among all political actors, but 
also among the citizens who need to be fully informed. To 
that end, civil society has the key role in monitoring the 
                                                
190 Government of Montenegro, 2012, Available at: 
http://www.mip.gov.me/en/images/stories/download/Predlog_Odluke_o_us- 
postavljanju_strukture_1.pdf 
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accession negotiations and making the process transparent 
by informing the citizens through its activities.191 
 
Thus, as of August 2012, the Secretariat of the negotiating team changed the Rules 
of Procedure and made NGO representatives full members of working groups, with the 
ability to contribute to the process.192 In 2013, six CSOs were included in the working 
groups on Chapters 23 and 24, and they were provided valuable feedback to the EU 
Delegation in Montenegro. This represented a feedback mechanism, which was missing 
in all previous enlargements, and which proved to be of tremendous value for the EU 
because the EU was now equipped with the necessary information regarding the effects 
of its requirements, and how they could be improved.   
 
In summary, conditionality in Montenegro took on a new form and extended the 
principle of the three “C”s (conditionality, consolidation, and communication) defined in 
the 2005 enlargement strategy to a principle of seven “C”s to include credibility of the 
reforms, crisis management, concrete results, and common priorities. The realization of 
these points was made possible by more flexibility on the part of the EU, larger and 
deeper public debate, and inclusion of representatives from the third sector in the process 
of negotiations.  
                                                
191 Speech of the Head of the EU Delegation in Montenegro Ambassador Mitja Drobnic 
on April 9th, 2013 for the 2nd meeting of the EU-MNE Civil Society Joint Consultative 
Committee, available at: http://www.delmne.ec.europa.eu/code/navigate.php?Id=2565 
192 Portal Analitika, 2012, http://portalanalitika.me/politika/vijesti/63090--lakoevi-uloga-
nvo-sektora-je-da-do- prinese-a-ne-da-kontrolie-pregovaraki-proces-.html (Author’s 
Translation) 
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Certainly this is not to say that Montenegro eliminated corruption completely, and 
that institutions in 2013 were entirely immune to political influence. Montenegro has 
much work to do and the path to EU membership has proved to be a difficult one. 
Reports of domestic NGOs and international institutions continued to often exhibit 
discontent with the progress made by the country. For instance, the progress report from 
2013 state the following:  
 
Corruption remains prevalent in many areas and continues 
to be a serious problem. The implementation of the relevant 
legislative framework has shown a number of shortcomings, 
which require further legislative action. The capacity of 
supervisory institutions in charge of checking political 
financing and conflict of interest still needs to be 
enhanced.193 
 
However, what differentiated Montenegro from Bulgaria and Georgia was that 
reforms were slow, but they were targeted toward a comprehensive change of the system, 
and enjoyed a higher degree of domestic ownership because of the strong participation of 
civil society in them. Considering the fact that Montenegro opened Chapters 23 and 24 in 
March 2013, it is clearly too early to claim that they are successful. However, the 
motivation of public officials attests to the current success of the new form of 
conditionality employed by the EU in Montenegro.  
 
                                                
193 EU Commission Regular Report on Montenegro’s Progress toward EU Membership, 
2013, p. 9 
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4.  Conclusion 
This chapter showed that EU’s conditionality approach led to different outcomes 
depending on the way conditions, sanctions, and incentives were formulated and 
introduced, and on the domestic perception of EU actions. While in all countries the EU 
applied conditionality, and the logic of deepening the relationship with the EU upon 
satisfaction of certain criteria remained the same, the nature of conditions, incentives, and 
sanctions were different in all three countries. In Bulgaria, the EU approached the 
negotiation process by stressing the importance of the harmonization of law. This 
remained the focal point of the negotiations for their entire duration, and indeed led to 
Bulgarian legislation that was compatible with EU legislation. However, neither the EU 
nor Bulgarian policy-makers were particularly concerned about the process of 
implementation. On the one hand, coupled with the fast-paced harmonization of law 
directed by the deadline of January 1st, 2007, conditionality in Bulgaria led to artificial 
reforms that did not amount to a comprehensive, all-encompassing transformation of the 
judicial system and the network of anti-corruption institutions. On the other, driven by the 
necessity to quickly introduce new legislation, Bulgarian authorities and policy-makers 
perceived EU membership as an end in itself, rather than a means to transition to 
democracy. The result of these failed negotiations was that in 2005-2006, the country was 
underprepared to become an equal member of the EU, and the EU was forced to establish 
a new mechanism specifically tailored to Bulgaria in order to continue to apply 
conditionality.   
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In contrast, the EU approached Montenegro with a more elaborated and evolved 
form of conditionality. The lack of an accession date allowed both EU and Montenegrin 
stakeholders to learn from each other and to systematically work on anti-corruption 
reform. The EU managed to be flexible, to alter conditions, and to follow up with reform 
recommendations which were suitable for the domestic context.  
 
Perhaps the most important variation in the EU approach in Bulgaria and 
Montenegro was in the focus on implementation in the latter country, and on 
harmonization on the former. In Montenegro, the EU established a system for measuring 
progress which relied upon an established track record of results of the reforms, which 
was lacking in Bulgaria. This approach led to slower reforms, but reforms that proved to 
be significantly more adapted to domestic context and subject to domestic ownership.  
 
The Georgian case showed a third approach of conditionality. Here, the EU 
embarked on almost unconditional support for Saakashvili’s government because it saw 
immediate results from the 2005-2008 reforms. Blinded by the seeming success of these 
not always democratic reforms, it failed to condition a closer relationship with the 
country upon elimination of high-level political corruption. At the same time, Saakashvili 
used the positive evaluations that he was receiving from the EU to legitimize eradicating 
petty corruption, while concentrating power in a small, elite group. The almost complete 
lack of petty corruption decreased the salience of the issue of corruption, while the 
introduction of loopholes in the law that allowed for rent seeking from high level 
officials, left an environment conducive to high level political corruption.   
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Chapter Four – The EU and Domestic Civil Society 
 
I have shown in the previous chapter that in the post-communist world, civil 
society varies with respect to its ability to influence the policy-making process (Börzel 
and Buzogany 2010, Sardamov 2005, Nodia 2011). This chapter analyzes the efforts of 
foreign actors to shape domestic civil society, and focuses specifically on EU’s actions in 
the three post-communist countries. It argues that in Montenegro, where the EU became 
timely and intensively involved with civil society, the EU managed to establish a 
partnership relationship with domestic NGOs. In turn, this relationship allowed the EU to 
receive feedback that was not attempting to further the interests of a particular political 
party and to iteratively adjust its recommendation, incentives, and sanctions. The chapter 
also shows that a partnership between the EU and civil society in Montenegro legitimized 
domestically NGOs and provided them with more leverage to apply bottom-up pressure 
to the government. In contrast, such a relationship was not established in Bulgaria and 
Georgia, and civil society was incapacitated. 
 
The cases of Bulgaria, Georgia, and Montenegro show that the degree to which 
civil society facilitated the adoption of EU-promoted reforms indeed varied over the 
years and across countries. In the years following the Rose Revolution, Georgian civil 
society was consistently underrepresented in the decision-making  process, and its input 
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with respect to anti-corruption reforms was practically overlooked. Indeed, many 
Georgian NGOs conducted research regularly, monitored the work of institutions, and 
were publicly critical. However, they also saw their participation as on paper only.194 A 
clear measurement of NGOs participation did not exist, and all fifteen interviewed NGOs 
reported that policy makers considered no more than one or two of their proposals. This 
situation served as a highly demotivating factor and one that additionally decreased the 
participation of civil society organizations in the decision-making  process.  
 
In contrast, in Montenegro civil society organizations were included not only in the 
functioning of different domestic anti-corruption agencies, but also in the structure of the 
EU negotiations process. Thus, NGOs in Montenegro were provided a real opportunity to 
influence both the EU integration and the management of corruption. Finally, in Bulgaria 
NGOs were consistently incapable of securing societal accountability and their 
participation in the decision-making was not well-regulated.  As a consequence, NGOs’ 
involvement in the efforts to address high levels of corruption became superficial. While 
reports by some think-tanks exposed specific problems related to abuse of power, these 
organizations did not have internal capacity, nor were they networking with other NGOs 
in order to use reports to effect decision-making . The lack of societal accountability, in 
turn, created an environment that was conducive not only to high levels of political 
corruption, but also for corruption in all levels of the public bureaucracy.  
 
                                                
194 Author’s interview with Erekele Urushadze, Transparency International Georgia, 
October 2014 
 187 
The variation in the ability of civil society to further externally-promoted anti-
corruption reforms was especially puzzling in light of the numerous efforts of the EU and 
other international entities to develop domestic civil society into an actor that was 
capable of balancing between cooperation, monitoring, and opposing reforms, and 
serving as a liaison between citizens and ruling elites. The EU consistently stressed the 
importance of a developed civil society for consolidating democracy in the post-
communist world. The necessity of a partnership between the EU and domestic civil 
society was embedded in the principle of participation of civil society that the EU 
expressed shortly after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. This principle of participation was 
especially pertinent for furthering Europeanization in areas characterized by normative 
discrepancies between the EU and individual countries. Such was the case of anti-
corruption reforms in the post-communist world where long communist regimes left 
legacies of centralization of power and lack of transparency. This chapter then asks why 
did the EU achieve varying results with respect to developing civil society that was 
capable of applying the necessary pressure to national governments to introduce, 
implement, and enforce effective anti-corruption reforms?  
 
I argue that the extent to which civil society was capable of contributing to securing 
the rule of law in Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Georgia was directly determined by the 
degree of cohesion of civil society. Without claiming that what the EU did or did not do 
is the sole explanatory variable of the variation of civil society in the three countries, I 
forward the argument that three significant variations in the approach of the EU to 
domestic non-state actors determined the ability of the latter to participate in the policy-
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making process. I show that the EU’s approach to developing civil society varied in 
timing of involvement, intensity of involvement, and kind of interaction with domestic 
NGOs. As a result, the level of cohesiveness of the NGO sectors in Bulgaria, 
Montenegro, and Georgia became very different. In Montenegro, the EU was actively 
involved in the development of civil society from the beginning of the countries’ post-
communist transition and managed to establish a partnership-based relationship with 
domestic NGOs. In Bulgaria, the EU did not get involved until after the beginning of 
formal membership negotiations. Finally, in Georgia, the EU abandoned the development 
of civil society in its early stages.  
 
I claim that when a timely and partnership-based relationship exists between the 
EU and civil society, domestic ownership of reforms is more likely because civil society 
can help socialize the ideals behind the reforms, and secure a sense of domestic 
ownership for them. For instance, in Montenegro, the EU established a partnership with 
domestic NGOs, while in Georgia and Bulgaria, the EU dominated the interaction with 
domestic civil society and unidirectionally diffused norms of transparency, accountability, 
and political participation. The presence or absence of such partnership directly impacted 
the extent to which civil society internalized norms of transparency, accountability, and 
participation in the decision-making process, and the extent to which it was capable of 
cooperating with governments and serving as a channel of norm diffusion to citizens.  
 
The second argument that I make in this chapter is that the ability of the EU to 
learn from domestic civil society and the development of civil society are interrelated 
 189 
processes that depend on each other. For instance, I argue that in Montenegro the EU was 
made aware of the domestic context through its interaction with domestic NGOs. This 
learning process, in turn, was possible because of a partnership between the EU and 
Montenegrin civil society which equipped civil society with the tools it needed in order to 
reach out to citizens and relay their grievances to both the EU and the government. In 
contrast, where the EU did not establish a partnership with domestic NGOs it was not 
able to learn from them and adjust its conditions, incentives, and sanctions. A partnership 
between the EU and domestic civil society was not present in Georgia, or in Bulgaria, and 
the EU did not manage to acquire the information necessary to adapt its conditions, 
incentives, and sanctions. In turn, the EU failed to increase its leverage over the 
government.  
 
To make these arguments, I first show that civil society in the three case studies 
varied in their level of cohesion. In the second part of the chapter, I proceed to explain 
how differences in EU actions in each case were causally related to the cohesion of civil 
society. In the final part, I address the implication that different types of civil society had 
on anti-corruption efforts. 
 
1.  Employing a Social Network Analysis 
 
I employ a Social Network Analysis (SNA) in order to determine the cohesion of 
civil society and the EU’s influence on civil society across time and space. SNA allows 
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me to holistically analyze the system of interactions among network actors (Provan and 
Milward 1995, Tanjasiri et al. 2010, Valente and Davis 1999).  
 
To perform the SNA, I created a database of NGOs in the three countries in the 
three periods of time. The sampled NGOs were selected based on their mission and goal 
statements. Information was gathered from official databases in the three case studies195 
and through interviews in which NGO officials enumerated projects and interactions with 
the EU. The final sampling of NGOs in the three time periods in the three case studies 
provided me with the following distribution: For Bulgaria: 2003 - n=64, 2007- n=94, 
2013 - n=97, for Georgia 2003 n=41, 2007 n=39, and 2013 - n=44, for Montenegro in 
2013 n=75. 
 
In order to understand how the state of civil society changed over time, I present a 
snapshot of the network of NGOs in three critical periods (2003, 2007, and 2013) for the 
three case studies. In these critical junctures, one should expect dense network ties 
because these years marked stepping stones in the fight against corruption, as well as in 
the EU’s engagement in all three countries. For Bulgaria, these years represent critical 
junctures because 2003 marks the beginning of EU’s active involvement with civil 
society; in 2007 Bulgaria became a member of the EU and in 2013 Bulgaria had the 
largest street protests ignited by high levels of corruption. The same years were critical 
junctures for Georgia as well. In 2003, the Rose revolution took place, 2007 is 
                                                
195 For Bulgaria: database of the Ministry of Justice, For Georgia: database of the Public 
Registry, For Montenegro: database of the Ministry of Interior  
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immediately prior to Saakashvili’s second term in office, and 2013 marked the first 
electoral change of government in Georgia, and also the transitioning of the country from 
a presidential to a semi-presidential/parliamentary system. Data limitations prevent me 
from performing a full scale SNA for Montenegro because information about NGOs’ 
relationships before 2013 is not readily available. Therefore, I employed a SNA for 
Montenegro only in 2013 and supplemented with interviews, data, and documents 
analysis for the years 2003 and 2007.  
 
I am also looking to establish the influence of the EU in the process of shaping civil 
society in Bulgaria, and in this sense the three selected years were critical junctures as 
well. The first period encompassed the network of NGOs in the initial years of EU 
involvement in developing civil society in the three countries. This allowed me to analyze 
the state of civil society immediately prior to the EU’s active involvement. However, 
projects on which various NGOs collaborated often extended for more than one year. For 
this reason, all projects that began or ended in 2003, and despite their respective 
beginning or ending date, were coded as relationships as well. Therefore, the approach 
allowed for encompassing a larger period, namely the period between 2002-2004.  The 
other two samples were from 2007 and 2013. As with the 2003 sample, in reality the 
period included projects that began a year earlier and finished a year later.   
 
I coded a network linkage between two NGOs based on whether they had at least 
one joint project, or partnership (Gulati et al. 2008, Hagedoorn and Duysters 2002, Koka 
and Prescott 2006). I used undirected relations because in many cases measuring these 
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kind of relationships is more robust (Wasserman and Faust 1997). When included in the 
analysis, an EU’s relationship with NGOs was coded as 1 based on the number of 
conferences, workshops, and lectures organized by the EU for representatives of civil 
society, or events organized by domestic NGOs and attended by the EU. When such 
interaction did not exist, the relationship was coded as 0. It is important to clarify that 
monetary relationships, such as funding for projects, were intentionally left out of the 
analysis. The reason for this was the difference in the funding mechanisms employed by 
the EU in the three case studies. For instance, cases such as Bulgaria, where funding was 
indirect and distributed through individual ministries, would have required the inclusion 
of state institutions as well. There was another reason for omitting financial transactions 
in the coding of data. If financial transactions led to socialization, it would mean that they 
also led to the type of relationships that I code here. Therefore, encoding monetary 
transactions was not required for a complete analysis. I also used undirected relations 
because it was my intent to capture not only the way in which the EU socializes domestic 
NGOs, but also whether or not the EU learned from national non-state actors, and thus 
which actor initiated the interaction was irrelevant.  
 
To explore rough variation in the level of cohesion of civil society over time in 
each case I used the density value of the network. The density value shows the level of 
connectedness of nodes, and represents an index of the degree of dyadic connection in a 
population. It is calculated by dividing the number of existing connections (T) by the 
total number of possible connections (Nx(N-1)), D= (2xT) / (Nx(N-1)), where the ties T 
are undirected. 
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To account for the anti-proportional relationship between graph density and size 
(Faust 2006), I checked density findings by also considering the percentage of connected 
NGOs (Scott 1987). Where density and percentage of connected nodes agree in 
comparing two graphs, I safely concluded that this was a reflection of different 
comparative levels of cohesion.  
 
In order to show the role of the EU in shaping the state of civil society, I used a 
centrality measure. Centrality identifies the most important or influential nodes within a 
graph. A high degree of centralization identifies a hierarchy in the network where central 
nodes control the amount of interactions and the flow of information in the network. In 
this case, the impact of unconnected NGOs was hindered, and their role was only 
important in relation to the centers of power. There exist various different algorithms to 
calculate centrality which attempt to capture different network dynamics (Knoke and 
Song 2008, Scott 2000). I employed Eigenvector centrality for two reasons. First, it 
considers the degree of influence of the connections, and second due to the level of 
precedent in applications to social network analysis.  
 
Formally, for node v the eigenvector centrality is calculated by  
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where for a graph G:=(V,E) with |V| number of vertices, A = a{v,t} is the adjacency 
matrix. In the extremes, a{v,t} = 1 if vertex v is connected to vertex t, and a{v,t} = 0 if 
they are not connected. In an iterative process, eigenvector centrality accounts for the 
difference between connections to high-scoring and low-scoring nodes: connections to 
high scoring nodes contribute more to the score of the measured node than connections to 
low-scoring nodes. Eigenvector centrality provides a normalized value relative to other 
nodes in the network. This makes the comparison across time difficult, but it can be used 
to rank the EU’s influence within the network. I used this ranking in order to determine 
the change of the EU’s influence over time. I also showed the distribution of eigenvector 
centrality in the network in order to show the relative centrality of the EU to other nodes 
in the network. 
 
2.  Characterizing Civil Society 
Previously, I claimed that the level to which civil society engaged with anti-
corruption policies, good governance, and EU integration in each country depended on 
how capable of uniting in a common anti-corruption agenda and of acting as a coherent 
actor it was.  Here, I relay on SNA in order to determine the level of unity of civil society 
in each case, and I complement the findings with information gathered through 
interviews and analysis of documents.  
 
I use the density of the NGO network as a measure of the extent to which civil 
society is united because density shows how connected NGOs were. The denser the 
network is, the more information flows in it and it is more likely that actors unify behind 
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a common agenda. I build here on the idea that actors that are highly connected will 
define proper behavior through the behavior of their peers. Lui et al. (2005) called this 
type of behavior justification imitation. They found evidence that support an information 
argument and a socialization argument for imitating behavior. The information argument 
claimed that densely connected actors were likely to have access to the same information 
(Granovetter 1973) and thus imitation would become the dominant behavior. The 
socialization argument suggested that highly dense networks functioned as “cliques” 
(Kraatz 1998) creating strong behavioral pressures to conform to rather than to adopt new 
practices. Similarly, Valente’s (1995) analysis showed that network density was indeed 
associated with faster diffusion within the network. In summary, highly connected actors 
were more likely to form shared understandings and to have a common agenda.  
 
The SNA findings were corroborated with qualitative data gathered through 
interviews and documents analysis and showed variation in the level to which civil 
society in all three countries was capable of acting as a unified actor. In the period 2003-
2013, Bulgarian civil society consisted of disunited think-tanks whose activities were 
limited to creating detailed reports with respect to the corruption and anti-corruption 
activities in the country. Similarly, in Georgia, civil society was not coherent, but also 
characterized by cliques of NGOs’ based on their sympathy to a particular political party. 
Finally, in Montenegro, civil society was capable of unifying around a common anti-
corruption agenda and thus became stronger than its Bulgarian and Georgian 
counterparts. 
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2.1  Bulgaria 
In examining the level of connectedness of NGOs in Bulgaria, the SNA showed 
that NGOs became less connected to one another over the years. In 2003, the density 
measure of Bulgaria was only 0.021, which meant that NGOs, engaged in anti-corruption 
and good governance activities, were weakly connected to each other. The year 2007 
observed a striking decline of more than 20% of the 2003 density value. This decline was 
partially due to the increased number of NGOs that were created immediately prior to 
Bulgaria’s membership in the EU. Many of these NGOs were established for the 
execution of a single project and then ceased their operations. Even in this case, however, 
the network of NGOs remained limited. The data showed little improvement by 2013. 
Bulgaria’s NGOs networks density value was 0.12 and the percentage of NGOs that were 
connected increased minimally from 43.6% to 47.4%.  
 
Moreover, in 2007, in addition to increased levels of exclusion, the data showed the 
emergence of separate networks. These networks not only remained undeveloped by 
2013, but they disappear completely. A closer look at the participants in the SNA also 
suggested that the NGOs that were centers of power in 2003 remained the same 
throughout the years, and became well established as think -tanks over the years. In sum, 
the findings showed that the NGO sector in Bulgaria underwent little positive 
transformation from 2003 to 2013. The decreasing value of the density metric of 
Bulgarian NGOs indicated a high number of disconnected projects, and consequently the 
lack of unified anti-corruption agenda. 
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The very low level of networking was also evidenced through data gathered in 
interviews with NGOs representatives and in document analysis. Such data revealed a 
highly distrustful environment in which NGOs operated. While interviewees did not 
acknowledge their own ties to political parties, more than half of them were specific to 
point out other NGOs connections and the way the NGOs in question were created in 
order to further a particular politician or politician’s interest. For instance, one 
interviewee from an NGO, when asked about cooperation with a different NGO that had 
a very similar agenda, said: “We don’t work with them because they are the BSP 
(Bulgarian Socialist Party) puppet and they will cease to exist when the BSP is not in 
power.”196 This sentiment was repeated in many interviews, and showed that NGOs did 
not trust each other and consciously refrained from working together. Similarly, NGOs 
representatives accused other NGOs of being established for the purposes of rent 
extraction only. For instance, the Anti-corruption Network was an informal citizens 
network whose goal was to systematically direct corruption complaints to government 
institutions and to follow the developments on these complaints. While other 
organizations had attempted to do the same, a representative of the Anti-corruption 
Network informed me that they were intentionally avoiding other organizations. The 
reason for this was that they highly doubted the intentions of the other organizations, and 
said that each organization selectively reports instances of corruption depending on the 
actor and their political ties. 
 
                                                
196 Author’s interview with a representative of a NGO. 
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This environment of distrust in many cases prevented NGOs from cooperating with 
each other. Furthermore, it created a self-perpetuating perception of NGOs regarding 
their counterparts, which proved detrimental for NGOs ability to establish common 
agenda, or to mobilize even when crucial decisions regarding judicial reforms or the 
creation of major anti-corruption institutions were made.  
 
Civil society in Bulgaria did not manage to unite even when high levels of political 
corruption provoked citizens to spontaneously mobilize in mass protests. The 
appointment of Delian Peevski as a head of the State Agency for National Security 
(SANS) was one of these instances. One of SANS roles was to fight corruption in the 
high echelons of power, and Peevski was in a clear conflict of interest because of his 
mother’s ownership of a large number of media outlets. His appointment, in 2013, led to 
the longest street protest in Bulgaria since the country began its transition to democracy 
in 1989. In light of the 2013 protests triggered by high levels of political corruption, it 
would be expected that the third sector would unify around an anti-corruption agenda in 
order to support citizens’ protests. Contrary to this expectation, the findings from the 
SNA indicate an inactive and disorganized NGO sector in 2013.  
 
Indeed, the protests were a sign of general discontent with high levels of corruption 
in Bulgaria. However, the protests did not mean that civil society was activated by high 
levels of political corruption. There is no evidence that the protests were organized from a 
particular NGO or a coalition of NGOs. Once the protests were ongoing, NGOs did not 
become active in guiding them or in helping the protestors to elaborate demands. Finally, 
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informal conversations with protestors and interviews with NGOs representatives did not 
indicate any attempt on the part of organized civil society to steer the protest in a 
particular direction, or to help mediate a productive negotiation process between the 
ruling elite and the citizens on the streets. In fact, one representative of Podkrepa - the 
oldest union in Bulgaria, said: 
 The problem with this protest is that the protestors’ 
demands go as far as resignation of the government. If we 
get involved we can do this in two days. We don’t get 
involved because it is going to be bad for the country to go 
through the winter without a government.197  
 
This statement and the results of the SNA showed that the protest in itself did not 
indicate that civil society was activated in Bulgaria in 2013. Thus, in the period 2003-
2013, the NGO sector in Bulgaria remained void of shared understanding, goals, and 
approaches, and this became the most evident in the protests of 2013. 
  
                                                
197 Author’s interview with a representative from Podkrepa Union 
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Graph 1: Density of Bulgaria NGO Networks in 2003, 2007, and 2013 
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2.2  Georgia 
The density of NGOs’ networks in Georgia showed a decrease in connectedness of 
civil society over the years. In 2003, at the outset of the Rose Revolution, Georgia’s NGO 
network had a density of 0.024. This was the highest density value for Georgia in the 
three periods that were analyzed in this study. The relatively high to other periods density 
in 2003 was consistent with the claim that in a comparison to 2013 Georgia had a better 
developed civil society at the time of the Rose Revolution (Börzel 2011). The claim is 
based on the ability of civil society in Georgia to organize and successfully lead efforts to 
topple Shevarnadze’s government. Yet, in an environment where high levels of corruption 
triggered the Rose Revolution, it would be expected that the density of anti-corruption 
NGOs in 2003 would be significantly higher. Instead, a value of 0.024 showed a 
relatively highly disconnected198 NGO sector.  
 
Nevertheless, in 2003 NGOs were indeed capable of organizing a large portion of 
the population to defend the resignation of Shevarnadze. However, three large NGOs 
were the main organizers and their goal was not cooperation with other NGOs, but rather 
getting people out on the streets. Furthermore, the main actor was a loosely organized 
social movement Khmera! (Enough), which had no structure or previously expressed 
values, and existed solely for the purposes of toppling the regime. While undoubtedly 
significant for the future political development of the country, the success of Khmera! did 
                                                
198 Density of a network is measured on a scale of 0 to 1, where 1 represents the densest 
network in which each node is connected to each other node  
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not indicate a well developed civil society sector with clear values and the ability to 
defend them. This was evident in the constant decline of the connectedness of NGOs in 
the years to follow. In 2007, the density of Georgia NGOs networks decreased to 0.023 
and in 2013 it was down to 0.015. In a similar manner, the percentage of connected 
NGOs decreased over the years. While the number of anti-corruption NGOs remained 
about the same, the percentage of connected NGOs decreased from almost 47% in 2003, 
to 40% in 2013. I interpret this growing gap in the NGO sector in Georgia as showing the 
inability of civil society to organize around a common agenda, and consequently an 
inability to exercise control over the government and to constructively participate in the 
decision-making  process in the period 2003-2013.   
 
Interviews corroborated the findings of the SNA and also revealed the emergence 
of politicized clusters among NGOs. Similarly to Bulgaria, ten out of the eighteen NGOs 
representatives that were interviewed wrote off the efforts of NGOs that are not 
politically aligned with the interviewees’ own NGOs as working for either Saakashivili’s 
party or his opposition. Interviews also revealed that on the rare occasions when NGOs 
cooperate with each other, they did so in clusters which were based on their sympathy to 
a particular political party. In 2013, there was an emerging cluster of NGOs that were 
headed by former officials in the Saakashvili administration. According to one 
interviewee, these NGOs exhibited a highly liberal orientation, they attempted to defend 
and perpetuate Saakashvili’s reforms, 199  and consequently were standing strictly in 
                                                
199 Author’s interview with Tamar Tomashvili, an Academic Director of the National 
Institute for Human Rights (NIHR) Georgia 
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opposition to the current government. In turn, this created an additional divide within the 
third sector and prevented them from acting as a coherent actor that was mobilized by a 
common anti-corruption agenda. In summary, Georgia witnessed a significant decline in 
the quality of its civil society over the years after the Rose Revolution. While in 2003 
civil society was not strong, in 2013 it was certainly weaker and significantly more 
disunited.  
 
Finally, coalitions of NGOs were rare in Georgia and when they existed they were 
small and consisted of only the largest NGOs, thus leaving smaller NGOs out and 
additionally deepening the divide within the civil society sector. For instance, reports on 
Georgia praised the work of the Open Government initiative launched in 2012. The 
initiative targeted issues such as freedom of information, citizens’ participation, and 
implementation of high standards in public service. On February 5th, 2013, eighteen 
Georgian NGOs submitted a list of recommendations to the Prime Minister Bidzina 
Ivanishvili to improve the Open Government Partnership action plan and to raise the 
profile of commitments undertaken by the government in this plan. Indeed, the initiative 
was a positive example of the development of civil society in Georgia. However, the 
eighteen NGOs participating in it reflected the gap in the civil society sector in Georgia 
because similar to other EU initiatives and projects, only the largest NGOs were 
participating, and no attempt to include smaller NGOs was made. 
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Graph 2: Density of NGO Networks in Georgia 
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2.3  Montenegro 
Given data limitations, only a partial SNA of Montenegro was possible. A 
restructuring of the registration system for NGOs in 2012-2013 rendered NGOs 
registration data before 2012 unavailable. This made an SNA analysis of civil society in 
2003 and 2007 especially challenging, and is the subject of future research. Much can be 
learned from the 2013 analysis, however. The dissolution of former Yugoslavia left civil 
society in all the newly sovereign states in weak positions vis-à-vis state institutions. By 
2013, this situation had significantly improved. Findings from the SNA show that 2013 
the density of NGOs networks in Montenegro were very high in comparison to the other 
analyzed cases and periods. Montenegro’s anti-corruption and good governance NGOs 
had a 0.038 density value. This is the highest value in all three examined countries in all 
periods, including Bulgaria in 2013, when the country was already a member of the EU 
for six years. Similarly, Montenegro in 2013 had the highest percentage node 
connectedness of any analyzed case and year. According to results from SNA, in 2013 
78.95% of anti-corruption NGOs were cooperating with another NGO on at least one 
project. In comparison, in Georgia 47% were cooperating, and in Bulgaria only 40% 
worked on a project together with at least one other NGO.  
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Graph 3: Density of NGO networks in Montenegro in 2013 
2013 density =0.038 
 
Interviews with representatives of NGOs confirmed the high levels of cooperation 
within civil society in 2013, and showed that this cooperation had been ongoing at least 
since 1992, when Montenegro had its first unsuccessful attempt to receive independence 
from Serbia. In contrast to Bulgaria and Georgia, Montenegro’s NGOs often formed 
coalitions and cooperated on projects. The effects of NGOs cooperation were clearly 
observed in the results of the independence referendum in 2006. Analysts were in 
agreement that it was the public discussion of further affiliation with the EU that was led 
by NGOs and that contributed the most to the outcome of the referendum and the 
following independence of Montenegro. Weak support for independence after the ousting 
 207 
of Milosevic was reversed, and most of the 25 percent that voted ‘don’t know’ or ‘don’t 
care’ in April 1992 expressed support for statehood in 2006. As Batt (2006) argued, this 
result was to a large extent the product of NGOs work toward the creation of a society 
indoctrinated in the democratic norms the EU was promoting. The internalization of these 
ideas factored into the establishment of Montenegro’s new national identity. In an attempt 
to distinguish itself from the brutality of the Milosevic regime, Montenegro moved 
toward becoming a modern state – a process entirely guided by the idea of returning to 
Europe. In the words of Batt (2006), “Being Montenegrin now meant being European.”200 
 
Similarly, a coalition led by the Center for Development of NGOs (CHRVO) 
resulted in the inclusion of NGOs in the fourth layer of the EU-Montenegro negotiations 
structure. According to the head of CHRVO, it was the strong coalition of NGOs and its 
cooperation with the EU that made it possible to push the government to agree to such an 
arrangement201 that did not have a precedent in the post-communist world.     
 
Anti-corruption NGOs in Montenegro were also significantly more aware of their 
function as norm setting entities than the ones in Bulgaria and Georgia. Data gathered 
through interviews showed that NGOs in Montenegro agreed on their purpose: most anti-
corruption NGOs defined their goals not as much in terms of fighting corruption, but 
rather in terms of furthering the melding of domestic norms and values to those of the 
                                                
200 Batt, J. (2006) The EU's 'soft power' at work in the Balkans, European Union Institute 
for Security Studies. 
201 Author’s interview with Ana Novakovic, CHRVO. November 2013 
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EU. In almost every interview, the NGO acknowledged that simply by creating strategies 
and action plans corruption was not going to be eradicated nor even managed. According 
to most interviewees, domestic cultural trends, shaped by legacies from historical events 
and periods, needed to be reversed in order for corruption to decline. Accordingly, the 
role of NGOs became to cooperate with the EU in order to effectively expose corrupt 
officials, while simultaneously working to educate ordinary citizens in various EU-
promoted norms and values.  
 
Finally, NGOs also understood becoming an EU member as a process, rather than 
an end goal. This is evident in the logo of one of the major NGOs in Podgorica:  The 
Center for Civic Education claims that Democracy is to be learned. Dejan Milovac form 
the Network for Affirmation of NGOs (MANS) put it nicely, “one of the worst case 
scenarios for Montenegro would be rushing through the negotiation process, we need the 
time to slowly but effectively go through the process of becoming Europeans.”202  
 
3.  Explaining the State of Civil Society  
To explain why civil society looks differently in different post-communist 
countries, I turn to the role played by the EU in shaping the third sectors in Bulgaria, 
Georgia, and Montenegro. In order to portray the progress of civil society development in 
all three countries, I begin with a brief comparison of the state of civil society before and 
after the EU’s involvement in all three countries.  
                                                
202 Author’s interview with Dejan Milovac, MANS, Podgorica MNE, November 2013 
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In the beginning of the 1990s, civil society in Bulgaria was not organized and 
lacked strong ideological underpinnings. Civil society in Bulgaria started to emerge in the 
mid 1980s as a result of the new opening with the policies of Glasnost and Perestroika. 
As of 1986, a couple of loosely organized entities (“the non-formals”) appeared on the 
political scene organizing around ethnic and environmental issues. By 1989, there were 
an array of dissident organizations covering three main areas – environment, human 
rights, and Glasnost and Perestroika. Such organizations could not compare to dissidence 
in other East European countries which had the history of Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, 
or the Committee for the Defense of Workers (KOR) and Solidarity in Poland. Bulgarian 
dissidence by comparison was late and poorly organized, lacking mass support and a 
clear vision. It included no more than 200 people who were members of various 
organizations; a large part of which were communist party members as well (Zankina 
2011).  
 
Following the collapse of communism, many of those early dissident organizations 
turned into political formations of various types and participated in elections, many of 
them ending up with representatives in parliament. This is not surprising, given that the 
mode of emergence of Bulgarian civil society marked the sector with a character of an 
opposition force. It also points to the early failure of the NGO sector to consolidate. The 
1990s proved this inability. It was most obvious in the inability of civil society to 
organize the protests of 1996-1997 when Videnov’s government led the country to what 
is known as the Videnov winter (Stone 2007). During this time, the value of the Bulgarian 
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lev decreased from 240 to the dollar to 500 to the dollar in only two months and inflation 
increased to 311%.  Indeed, this rapid economic collapse prompted people to protests and 
triggered consequent elections. However, the protest was spontaneous instead of 
organized by civil society groups. Also, in contrast to Georgia in 2003 (see below), where 
civil society had an enormous role in delivering information to the citizens with respect to 
the fraudulent elections of November 2002, Bulgarian civil society did not manage to 
formulate popular demands and to organize the protest.  
 
Some sixteen years later, a similar scenario developed. In 2013, the longest protest 
in Bulgarian history took place. Similarly to Georgia in 2003, it was motivated by high 
levels of corruption. However, in contrast to Georgia, the protest was not provoked by 
well-presented findings of NGOs. Instead, it came as a result of the blunt appointment of 
Delian Peevski, whose mother owned most of the media outlets and who was accused 
numerous times of conflict of interest and tax evasion, for the head of the State Agency 
for National Security, which was responsible for preventing and investigating grand 
corruption. Throughout the protest, civil society proved incapable of organizing popular 
grievances and translating them into demands which could be negotiated with the ruling 
party. Instead, the protestors voiced vague and unclear (anti-corruption measures), or 
unreasonable (abandoning of all political parties) demands.  
 
In Georgia, before the Rose Revolution civil society was indeed stronger than its 
analogue in other countries in the Caucuses. With the 1997 Civil Code, Shevardnadze had 
allowed the development of civil society, registration was made easy, and restriction for 
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operations were lifted (Wheatley 2005). Immediately prior to the Rose Revolution, there 
were around three to four thousand NGOs in Georgia. They were also primarily financed 
by international organizations such as USAID, the George Soros Foundation, and the EU. 
In light of the weak Georgian economy at the time, international funding for NGOs made 
them capable of paying salaries higher than the ones in the public sector. While it is a 
stretch to argue that civil society organized the Rose Revolution, it is fair to say that its 
ability to carry out parallel vote tabulation, and consequently to expose the grossly 
fraudulent result, led to the Rose Revolution.  
 
With the Rose Revolution, the state of NGOs changed and in the next ten years 
NGOs became progressively more disconnected from each other, lacking an unified 
agenda, and incapable of influencing the decision and policy making process. NGOs also 
became increasingly deprived of skilled personnel and funding, which they could use in 
order to mobilize public support and pressure the government. Even GYLA (one of the 
oldest and most prominent NGOs in Georgia dating from before the Rose Revolution) 
was unable to bring its corruption reports and policy suggestions to fruition. According to 
Sophia Chareli, a representative of GYLA, neither of the seven policy proposals that they 
have made available to the government in the period 2004-2012 have been addressed or 
considered.203  
 
Similar to Georgia and Bulgaria, Montenegro civil society started its post-
communist journey in a weak state. Its development in the early 1990s was taking place 
                                                
203 Author’s Interview with Sofia Chareli, GYLA, April 2014 
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in the context of the Yugoslav wars, isolationism from the West and sanctions, political 
repression, and a rapidly declining living standard. As part of Serbia at the time, the 
larger part of Montenegrin civil society aligned themselves with the Montenegrin 
authorities in a struggle against Miloševic’s rule and in an ambition for independence. 
This in turn led to decreasing the role of civil society as representative and advocate of 
citizens’ interests vis-a-vis the government. 
 
By 2004, civil society in Montenegro had developed faster than its analogues in 
other countries from the Western Balkans. For instance, in 2004 it managed to mobilize 
popular opinion in a campaign to protect the Tara River and its canyon from plans to 
flood it for the development of hydro-electric power. This success testified to the ability 
of CSOs to collaborate effectively and gained parliamentary approval of a “Declaration 
for the Protection of the Tara River.”204 In turn, this forced the government to abandon its 
projected development of energy resources on the river.  
 
According to a report by the Technical Assistance for Civil Society in the IPA 
countries Organization (TASCO): 
As a sector, civil society in Montenegro has succeeded 
better than others in the region in raising its profile in the 
public eye and cultivating the trust of the people. On 
account of advocacy and networking of national NGOs, the 
sector is also now well positioned to take advantage, in 
terms of gaining a greater involvement and say in the 
policy-making process, of the ongoing course of 
                                                
204 Declaration for the Protection of the Tara River, Montenegro Parliament, 2005 
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institutional and legal reform which will begin to gather 
pace as the country progresses toward European 
integration.205  
 
By 2006, the significantly stronger ability of Montenegrin civil society to influence 
outcomes in cases of corruption, conflict of interest, and freedom of information, relative 
to other countries in the region, was well established. This year, the government moved to 
make the Prime Minister Djukanovic a president of the Montenegrin Investment 
Promotion Agency, thus empowering him to negotiate and control foreign investment 
deals. A coalition of NGOs, led by MANS, petitioned the Constitutional Court and 
argued that Djukanovic's seat on the investment board was a conflict of interest. The 
argument was considered and the NGO coalition won, with the court ruling it 
unconstitutional for the prime minister to sit on the board of an independent public 
institution.  
 
Additionally, in 2012-2013 civil society in Montenegro was consulted on 76 anti-
corruption measures. In 32 of them, the proposition and evaluations of NGOs were 
accepted. With respect to other 32 measures, NGOs agreed with the evaluation of the 
                                                
205 TASCO (2010) Civil Society Organisations’ Capacities In The Western Balkans And 
Turkey. Available at: http://www.tacso.org/doc/Report_CSO_Capacities.pdf 
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relative institutions, and the remaining measures were left to be a subject of a joint 
revision between the NGOs and the implementing agencies.206 
 
Without suggesting that what the EU did or did not do is the sole explanatory 
variable, I show in the next pages that EU actions were a variable that had a significant 
impact on the character of civil society. I also show that the reason behind the EU’s 
impact is due to the tendency of CSOs to the EU for guidance in all aspects of their 
democratization, including civil society development, from the very beginning of 
Montenegro's transition.  
 
During the process, the EU has consistently stressed the importance of a developed 
civil society for democracy to be consolidated in these countries. The necessity of 
partnership between the EU and domestic civil society was embedded in the principle of 
participation of civil society that the EU expressed early in the post-communist 
transitions of the countries from the former Eastern Bloc. This principle of participation 
was especially pertinent for furthering Europeanization in areas characterized by 
normative discrepancies between the EU and individual countries. Such was the case of 
anti-corruption reforms in post-communist countries where long communist regimes left 
legacies of centralization of power and lack of transparency.  
 
                                                
206 Radulovic, V., V. Calovic, V. Maras (2013) Iza Statistike – Analiza Presuda I Podaci 
o Rezultatima antikorupcijskih reformi, Катологизациjа у публикациjи Централна 
Народна Библиотека Црне Горе, (Author’s Translation) 
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The EU first acknowledged the necessity of civil society’s active participation in 
the process of Europeanization in the Treaty of the EU. The document stated that “the 
institutions shall, by appropriate means, give citizens and representative associations the 
opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union 
action”. 207   A February 2000 discussion paper dedicated to the issue presented the 
rationale of cooperation between the EU and NGOs in five main points: (1) Fostering 
participatory democracy, (2) representing the views of specific groups to the European 
institutions, (3) contributing to policymaking, (4) contributing to project management, 
and (5) contributing to European integration. What brought together these five points was 
the idea that when cooperating, NGOs were empowered to serve as a liaison between 
citizens, national governments, and the EU. The document declares:  
 
By encouraging national NGOs to work together to achieve 
common goals, the European NGO networks are making an 
important contribution to the formation of a "European 
public opinion" usually seen as a pre-requisite to the 
establishment of a true European political entity. At the same 
time this also contributes to promoting European integration 
in a practical way and often at grassroots level.208   
   
                                                
207 Treaty on the EU (Maastricht Treaty), February 7th, 1992, Article 11, available at: 
http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-
making/treaties/pdf/treaty_on_european_union/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf 
208 EU Commission Discussion Paper (2000) The Commission and non-governmental 
organisations: building a stronger partnership. 18 January 2000, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/civil_society/ngo/intro_en.htm. 
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This view was consistently affirmed in other documents throughout the years. The 
Commission White Paper on European Governance reinforces that, “Policies should no 
longer be decided at the top. The legitimacy of the EU now lies with the participation of 
its citizens”.209  This principle of participation is also established in the Constitutional 
Treaty of the EU which states that,  “the European Union recognises and promotes the 
role of the social partners at Union level, taking into account the diversity of national 
systems; it shall facilitate dialogue between the social partners, respecting their 
autonomy.”210  
 
The EU also demonstrated a clear understanding of the necessity of politically 
unbiased feedback that it received from domestic NGOs. In a Communication from 
December 1992, the EU Commission declared the necessity for, “an open and structured 
dialogue between the Commission and special interest groups.”211 It also affirmed its 
belief in the “need to remain open to outside input and it to include NGOs which wish to 
put their views forward”.212  
 
                                                
209 EU Commission White Paper on European Governance, 25 July 2001 
COM/2001/428, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:l10109 
210 Treaty Establishing A Constitution For Europe Adopted by the European Convention 
on 13 June and 10 July 2003, Article 47 
211 An Open and Structured Dialogue Between the Commission and Special Interest 
Groups (93/C 63/02) Official Journal of the European Communities 5.3.93, Available at: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:JOC_1993_063_R_0002_01&from=EN 
212 Commission Communication 1992, JO C63 of 5 March 1993 
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Although the EU seemingly had a clear vision of what a developed civil society 
should look like and how it was to be achieved, I show in the following pages that 
significant variation in the EU approach to civil society in the three countries led to 
variation in the state of civil society that resulted. This variation was three-fold. It was 
based on the time, the intensity, and the kind of involvement the EU had in the process of 
developing civil society in each country. 
 
3.1  Intensity of EU Involvement 
To show intensity of EU involvement, I deploy again a SNA and more specifically 
an eigenvector centrality measurement. I use the eigenvector value as a proxy to the 
influence of the EU because nodes with a high degree of centrality serve as hubs in the 
network and thus they are key players with high influence over the whole network. 
Eigenvector centrality is appropriate for this analysis because it robustly considers the 
number and influence of those to which a nodes is connected (Katz 1953, Hubbell 1965, 
Taylor 1969, Hoede 1978, Coleman et al. 1966, and Friedkin 1991). Thus, I assume that 
where the eigenvector centrality of the EU was high, the EU had a high level of influence 
in the network and vice versa. 
 
In Bulgaria, the eigenvector value of the EU showed that the centrality of the EU 
decreased over the years. In 2003 and 2007, the EU ranked first (EV =1) but in 2013 its 
eigenvector centrality is reduced to 0.678 and the EU is ranked fifth. This means that in 
2003 and 2007, the EU was the most connected node in the network. In 2013, the 
centrality of the EU decreased, suggesting that a decrease in its influence on the network. 
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In this period, the EU also lagged behind the most influential node by almost 40%, 
suggesting that its influence over the network of domestic anti-corruption NGOs was 
further decreased. Therefore, I find that the influence of the EU became increasingly 
lower in the 2003 - 2013 period and more specifically after the accession of the country 
into the EU.  
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Graph 4: Centrality (λ) of the EU in Bulgaria’s NGOs’ Networks in 2003, 2007, 2013 
 
 220 
In Montenegro, the findings from the SNA showed that the EU was the most 
connected node in the network with a score of 1 (EV=1) and therefore the most 
influential one. In terms of the influence of the EU therefore, the EU was the most central 
node in the network. I interpret this as the EU having a significant impact on shaping the 
third sector in Montenegro.  
 
Graph 5: Centrality (λ) of the EU in Montenegro’s NGOs networks in 2013 
 
     EU λ=1 
 
 
In Georgia, the eigenvector centrality of the EU showed that the EU went from 
almost no influence in 2003 to high levels of influence in 2013. In 2003, the EU was the 
second most influential node in the network. However, it lagged behind the most 
influential node by almost 20%. In 2007, Saakashvili had already passed some of his 
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major anti-corruption reforms. The EU was content with developments in Georgia and 
abandoned the development of the third sector. As would be expected, the centrality of 
the EU fell to fourth place. In 2004, Georgia became a member of the ENP and in 2009 
the EU introduced the Civil Society Forum through its Eastern Partnership Program 
(EaP) and began to actively engage with some non-governmental actors. These two 
developments resulted in the significant increase of the influence of the EU on the 
domestic civil society sector, and in 2013 the EU was the most influential actor in the 
network of domestic NGOs. Furthermore, the high centrality of the EU in 2013 was 
evidenced by the score of the second most influential NGO, whose eigenvector centrality 
value is less than half of that of the EU at 0.455. 
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Graph 6: Centrality of the EU in Georgia’s NGO network in 2003, 2007, and 2013 
    
  
 223 
 
 
3.2  Timing of EU Involvement 
In addition to how intense the involvement of the EU was in the three case studies, 
the timing of involvement of the EU with domestic NGOs was essential for 
understanding the variation in the outcome as well. I build here on research showing that 
change in actors’ self-perception, interests, and consequently behavior needs continuity 
from actors’ previous status. A large body of scholarly work argued that in the absence of 
continuity, an abrupt approach to change may produce a general orientation toward 
resistance to the attempted change. For instance, Moran and Brigtham (2000) argued that: 
People need a sense of personal integrity and consistency 
over time. Change that strikes at the core of a person's sense 
of who they are will activate powerful motivations to return 
things to the status quo. This demand for personal 
consistency is one of the major forces working against the 
implementation and stabilization of organization change.213 
 
In the following paragraphs, I show that in cases such as Montenegro, where the 
EU got involved in developing civil society earlier in the process of post-communist 
transition, it had significantly more opportunities to alter civil society in a way that 
domestic non-state actors became aware of their role, and were willing and capable of 
delivering politically unbiased information to the EU. In contrast to cases such as 
Bulgaria, where the EU got involved after membership conditionality peaked, and in 
cases such as Georgia, where the EU interrupted its efforts to cooperate with domestic 
                                                
213 Moran and Brigtham (2000) Leading organizational change, Journal of Workplace 
Learning: Employee Counselling Today, Volume 12, Number 2, 2000 p. 70 
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NGOs for a significant period of time, I show that an abrupt change in the EU’s 
involvement was unfavorable for the abilities of civil society.  
 
3.2.1  Late Involvement of the EU in Bulgaria 
In Bulgaria, the EU’s involvement represented a rapid discontinuity not only from a 
virtually non-existing civil society during the communist regime, but, more importantly, 
from other international actors’ efforts to develop a NGO sector in the country. The EU 
did not get involved in the development of civil society in Bulgaria until the early 2000s. 
The 1997 Opinion on Bulgaria’s Membership Application stated: “Responsible officials 
and NGO staff have little knowledge of foreign circumstances and legislation and there is 
a major shortage of resources.”214 
 
By then and under and the influence of the main donor, USAID, the Bulgarian 
NGO sector had already established a particular character that was in line with the US 
pluralistic understanding of civil society. The training that NGOs received at the time 
followed that logic and NGOs were primarily educated in their role as service providers 
in the narrow areas in which they were operating. What lacked were efforts to develop 
civil society in their capacity as actors that were capable of impacting the policy making 
process while simultaneously serving as a liaison between citizens and the state. 
 
                                                
214 The Commission of the European Union (1997), Commission Opinion on Bulgaria’s 
Application for Membership of the European Union, p.99 
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After 1998, EU’s efforts to develop civil society were channeled through its main 
pre-accession instrument – PHARE. In 1998, the PHARE program significantly increased 
its funding for civil society development. The strategy that the EU employed significantly 
departed from USAID’s. In line with the European understanding of the role of civil 
society and with corporatist models throughout Europe, the EU treated NGOs as 
participants in social partnerships with governments, and therefore the EU was 
advocating close cooperation between the two. Thus, the late involvement of the EU. 
coupled with an approach deviating from the one USAID had used, meant that the EU 
was faced with the task of changing an existing NGO sector, rather than developing it 
from the ground up.   
 
The active involvement of EU with civil society in Bulgaria also coincided with the 
peaking of membership conditionality, and consequently became a part of the final goal 
of EU membership. At the same time, though, the EU did not have an acquis with respect 
to civil society, and civil society was not formally part of the negotiation process. As a 
result, EU’s efforts to develop civil society were not well defined and remained vague 
both with respect to their final goal, and with respect to the tools deployed toward this 
goal. This approach to developing the third sector in Bulgaria left NGOs unclear with 
respect to their role both domestically and in relationship to the EU. Thus, many NGOs 
assumed the role of research organizations, while others did not manage to establish the 
necessary capacity to exist longer than the time required for the completion of their first 
and only project. 
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In 2004, under EU pressure, Bulgaria introduced tax cuts for NGOs that were 
foundations.215  As a result, the number of NGOs increased significantly.216 This peak in 
the number, coupled with the lack of capacity of most small NGOs, led to an additional 
division in the sector. Civil society in Bulgaria became composed of large think-tanks 
and small NGOs created and lasting for one project which were not exchanging 
information or cooperating on projects. Therefore, the late involvement of the EU led to 
the inability of civil society in Bulgaria to establish a common anti-corruption agenda, to 
support it with a comprehensive plan for pressuring the government into effective 
reforms, and to cooperate with the EU.  
 
3.2.2  Interrupted Involvement in Georgia  
In contrast to Bulgaria, where the EU got involved in developing civil society late 
in the post-communist transition of the country, in Georgia, the EU interrupted its 
involvement after Saakashvili assumed power in 2004.  
 
In the years immediately after the collapse of the communist regimes, the EU was 
occupied with ethnic tension in Georgia. The EU was also concerned with the raise to 
power of Shevarnadze, who until 1985 served as First Secretary of the Georgian 
Communist Party (GCP) and between 1995 and 1991 as a Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
the Soviet Union. The EU saw this as continuity from the communist regime and became 
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 227 
sympathetic to and supported domestic civil society actors that were opposing 
Shevardnadze’s regime. In this sense, the EU was involved in the development of civil 
society in Georgia prior to the Rose Revolution. In fact, in comparison to other countries 
in the region, prior to the Rose Revolution civil society in Georgia was well recognized 
internationally and connected with transnational NGOs and international organizations. 
Some international organizations used to fund NGOs in order to increase their visibility 
domestically. Stefes found that one international organization funded a prominent NGO 
to work from an office in the Parliament Building (Stefes 2006)  
 
Saakashvili’s victory at the 2003 presidential elections was a turning point for the 
Third Sector in Georgia. Both the domestic public and international donors associated the 
majority of civil society217 with the new government. This perception was strengthened 
by the fact that NGOs provided human resources to the new government. In such a 
situation, it was not surprising that international donors (including the EU) were very 
comfortable with the new government. After all, they had previously established 
relationships with NGOs that were now in power and often with particular individuals 
from these organizations. In this context, after 2004, the EU did not prioritize civil 
society development. Specifically in the area of anti-corruption reforms, it worked 
primarily with the new government. The fact that NGOs that were left out of the 
governance process and were consistently pointing out non-democratic elements of the 
anti-corruption reforms and did not have EU support to apply pressure to the government, 
                                                
217 A small group of NGOs, led by the Former Political Prisoners for Human Rights, have 
declared themselves against politicization of civil society in 2000 and were not associated 
with the supporters of Saakashvili. 
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attests to the interrupted relationship between the EU and civil society in Georgia in the 
period between 2004-2009.   
 
The EU did not become active in developing civil society until 2009, when the 
European Partnership Civil Society Forum was launched. The Forum was a multi-layered 
regional civil society platform which promoted European integration, and facilitated 
reforms and democratic transformations in the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries.218  
This platform specifically addressed the development of civil society by providing 
opportunities for meetings, conferences, and cooperation between Georgian and EU 
NGOs. The work of the forum was organized into five working groups. In turn, their 
work was even more narrowly specified in subgroups. Work on anti-corruption was 
assigned to a specific subgroup, tasked with the development of a dialogue with 
international donors regarding anti-corruption and in particular with European donors 
aiming to change donor policies.219  The subgroup was also responsible for strengthening 
cooperation between EaP and EU CSOs, and for developing common initiatives aimed at 
sharing expertise and experience between the EU CSOs and the EaP countries.220  
 
The interruption of the EU’s engagement with civil society proved to have a 
negative impact on the NGO sector in Georgia. When the EU became involved in 2009, 
                                                
218 The Eastern Partnership countries are Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, the 
Republic of Moldova and Ukraine 
219 Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum website: http://eap-csf.eu/en/working-
groups/wg1-democracy-human-rights/wg1-subgroup21/ 
220 ibid 
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its efforts represented a significant discontinuity in the relationship it once had with the 
third sector there, and it needed to work with a highly demotivated and disunited civil 
society. As one interviewee put it: “The EU is building on something broken.”221 
 
3.2.3  Early Involvement in Montenegro 
In contrast to Bulgaria, where the EU involved itself in the process of developing 
civil society late after 1989, and to Georgia, where the EU interrupted this process in 
2004, in Montenegro the EU was consistently involved from the beginning of the post-
communist transition of the country. Even before Montenegro received independence 
from Serbia, its civil society was engaged by the EU. The Stabilization Pact had a 
separate section on the development of civil society which stated the precise steps that 
needed to be taken. Specifically in the area of judicial reform and the fight against 
corruption, the role of civil society was acknowledged, and efforts to include civil society 
in the anti-corruption agenda were made through the Stability Pact Anti-Corruption 
Initiative (SPAI). The founding documents of the SPAI stated “International and local 
non-governmental organisations and bilateral aid agencies are combining their efforts 
with those of national governments and international organisations to combat and curb 
corruption in South-eastern Europe.”222  
 
                                                
221 Author’s interview with Tamar Pataraia, CIPDD, Georgia, March 2014 
222 SPAI, 2001, Anti-Corruption Measures In South-Eastern Europe 
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The domestic NGOs of Montenegro cooperated with international and Western 
European NGOs. As Pilar V of the SPAI stresses, the development of a strong civil 
society is crucial for the successful curbing of corruption. Many steps in this direction 
were taken through the SPAI, but the most important one is that it provided a forum for a 
permanent dialogue between local NGOs and business representatives, and their 
European counterparts. SPAI was initiated in February 2000 as part of the Stability Pact 
adopted in 1999. One of the main functions declared by SPAI is promoting the 
development of civil society specifically in the area of anti-corruption. Between 2005 and 
2006, through the auspices of SPAI there were six conferences in which NGOs 
partook.223  
 
3.3  Kind of Cooperation Between EU and Civil Society 
Cooperation between CSOs and domestic authorities, as well as between CSOs and 
the EU, took on many forms. In some cases, the EU led the interaction without much 
consideration of NGOs opinion. In this case, the EU could not learn from domestic non-
state actors, nor could it evaluate its progress in developing civil society. A different form 
of relationship was where the EU became a partner of civil society. In this case, 
communication between the EU and civil society was as between equals, and both actors 
learned from each other. I call the former a domination relationship and the latter a 
partnership relationship.  
 
                                                
223 Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative, Available at: http://rai-see.org/events/ 
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A partnership relationship where the EU and civil society are equal actors that 
exchange information for the purposes of mutual education is consistent with EU’s 
principle of partnership. This principle is foundational for multi-level governance (Bruszt 
2008), promoted by the EU. Scholars agree that the principle of partnership is a policy-
making tool that allows stakeholders to exchange information and ideas (Bauer 2002, 
Nanetti et al 2004, Milio 2007, European Citizen Action Service 2005, 2010). Recently, 
‘partnership’ has been examined as a structural principle for policy-making in the EU 
(Bauer 2002).  
 
Though the EU definition of partnership does not specifically mention the 
involvement of CSOs,224 one Council regulation225 specifies that member states need to 
establish a wide and effective association of all the relevant bodies in the creation of 
particular policies.  Partnership here does not simply refer to the EU’s involvement with 
domestic government authorities, but it also presupposes a wider consultation of all 
stakeholders, including employers’ organizations, trade unions, and NGOs. The creation 
of such bodies promotes equality and its final goal is the creation of the most 
representative partnership at the national, regional, local, or any other level (Council of 
the European Communities, 1999). Therefore, the principle of partnership refers to the 
                                                
224 “Community operations shall be such as to complement or contribute to corresponding 
national operations. They shall be established through close consultations between the 
Commission, the Member State concerned and the competent authorities designated by 
the latter at national, regional, local or other level, with each party acting as a partner in 
pursuit of a common goal...”
 
Article 4 of the 1988 Framework Regulation, Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2052 (Council of the European Communities, 1988) 
225 Article 8 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1260 
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idea that cooperation between domestic non-state actors and the EU is crucial for the 
process of Europeanization.  
 
In the following section, I show that this principle of partnership was not always followed 
by the EU, and often the EU developed a relationship of domination with domestic civil 
society. Consequently, its attempts to unidirectionally diffuse norms were unsuccessful.  
 
3.3.1  Partnership of the EU and Domestic Civil Society in Montenegro 
In contrast to the situation in Bulgaria and Georgia, foreign and international 
engagement with civil society in Montenegro took on a different shape. The EU 
established a partnership with the domestic third sector which proved to be the most 
favorable form of interaction for Montenegro’s process of democratization and anti-
corruption activities. This partnership meant more time was required for the EU to diffuse 
norms relative to other cases studied, but also led to a higher level of internalization 
because the EU norms and rules were subject to extensive public debate in which all 
domestic stakeholders partook. The analysis below is based on interviews and document 
analysis and shows that domestic Montenegrin NGOs indeed internalized norms of 
transparency, accountability, and participation in the decision-making  process better than 
their Bulgarian and Georgian counterparts.  
 
The internalization of norms of participation in the decision-making  process as a 
result of the cooperation between domestic NGOs and the EU was evidenced by the 
successful attempt of NGOs to insert themselves in the negotiation process. In 2011, the 
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Government of Montenegro agreed to include NGOs in the fourth layer of the negotiation 
teams on each chapter, and thus let them have a tangible say in the anti-corruption 
reforms. The fourth layer of the negotiating structure consisted of working groups, which 
were responsible for the analysis and assessment of the compatibility of Montenegro's 
legislation with EU acquis (screening), as well as for the development of negotiating 
positions, with support of public and other bodies and institutions. The inclusion of 
NGOs in the negotiation structure allowed for the evaluation of EU requirements against 
the particularities of the domestic context.  
 
Originally, the idea of including NGOs in the negotiation structure resulted from 
the efforts of a coalition of NGOs led by the CRNVO (the Center for Development of 
NGOs). When asked to explain the process by which they arrived at the idea, NGOs 
pointed out their extended communication and cooperation with the EU. NGO 
representatives and representatives of the EU delegation agreed on the cause of this 
proposition – the NGO sector truly understands the gravity of its role not only in the fight 
against corruption, but also in the holistic process of democratization. Ana Novakovic,226 
the head of the CRNVO, was the initiator and author of the proposal. She explained in an 
interview that the idea for this cooperation, which was unique to the post-communist 
world, came up during an informal conversation with the EU delegation representative 
during a conference organized by the EU. In the process of creating the proposal, she 
regularly approached representatives of the EU delegation and made sure she had their 
advice and approval. This is only one example of cooperation between the EU and NGOs 
                                                
226 Author’s interview Ana Novakovic CHRVO,  
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in Montenegro which lead to a novel and effective way to keep a check on corrupt 
government officials. The NGO community, as well as the EU Delegation in Montenegro, 
also agreed on the effectiveness of having NGO representatives included in the 
negotiating groups. The main benefit that they pointed out is that NGOs could provide 
the EU with information about internal debates and processes in the creation of 
negotiating positions. The high value placed on this by representatives of the EU 
Delegation in Montenegro indicates the trust that Delegation had in civil society’s 
feedback. As the chief negotiator on Chapters 23 and 24 in the EU delegation puts it, “the 
NGOs are one of the very few actors around here that we can trust.”227  
 
Based on the interaction of the EU and domestic civil society, the EU altered its 
approach to financing NGOs in a way that provided independence and legitimacy to 
NGOs. As I theorized, the interaction of NGOs and the EU led to an evolving 
relationship which justified the dedication of large amounts of funding to civil society in 
Montenegro based on achievements. In contrast to Bulgaria, the funds for civil society 
development were consistently distributed directly by the EU instead of through state 
bodies, thus allowing the creation of a politically independent civil society.  
 
Until 2007, the primary EU funding for civil society capacity building in 
Montenegro was channeled through the CARDS program. In 2008, CARDS was replaced 
by the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). The Civil Society Facility (CSF) 
as part of IPA was set up even before the opening of the negotiation process, thus 
                                                
227 Author’s interview with Annalissa Giansanti, EU Delegation to Montenegro  
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separating the process of EU accession from the efforts to develop civil society. Its 
purpose, as established in the founding document, was to, “contribute to anchoring 
democratic values and structures, human rights, social inclusion and the rule of law, 
thereby supporting the EU integration process.”228 For this reason, the EU’s budget in 
2011 was EUR 1 800 000 and in 2013 the tentative amount assigned for the development 
of the civil sector was EUR 1 000 000. 
 
Both 2010 and 2011 reports stressed the importance and the effectiveness of civil 
societies participation in the decision-making  process, and emphasized that funds were 
for supporting the work of NGOs and further developing civil society. Although the 
reports also acknowledged that some NGOs had been subject to political and 
administrative pressure, it did not deny the critical role NGOs and other civil society 
groups played in the integration process in Montenegro.  
 
In the period of 2007-2013, funding for civil society, and, more specifically, the 
NGO sector, was channeled through one of the IPA components, namely political criteria. 
As in Bulgaria, the distribution of these funds was done through a National Authorizing 
Officer (NAO), 229  which was a high-ranking official in charge of sound financial 
                                                
228 Civil Society Facility 2013, amending the programne for 2011-2013: (7) Country 
Fiche: Montenegro, p.2 available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/financial_assistance/ipa/2013/multi-
beneficiary/pf_7_csf_me_amend_1_csf_2011-2012-_allocation_2013_final.pdf 
229 IPA Implementing Regulation 
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management of IPA. The Montenegrin NAO was the Assistant Minister of Finance for 
Treasury Operations in the Ministry of Finance.  
 
In contrast to Bulgaria, two provisions introduced in Montenegro worked to 
prevent empowerment of the state, and provided the EU with real possibility to manage 
the funds. First, the EU involved itself in the distribution of public funds. In 2013, state 
funding was provided only by the revenues from games of chance (the lottery). Often the 
process of distribution of this type of funding was characterized by a lack of transparency 
and monitoring mechanisms.230  However, recent changes of relevant legislation in the 
field of lottery games established a provision that enabled co-financing of EU supported 
projects. This co-financing could be in the amount of missing funds, and up to 10% of the 
overall value of the project in question. Therefore, NGOs were presented with an 
incentive to work toward more transparent procedure in the process of securing state 
funding. 
 
Finally, the EU introduced a grants mechanism, which in 2013 was by far the most 
preferred way to access EU funds. As a matter of fact, some prominent NGOs, such as 
MANS, consistently declined the opportunity to participate in state funding from the 
lottery because it was not perceived as being a government sponsored organization. 
Grants were submitted directly to the EU delegation and funds were managed directly by 
the same institution. Thus, a more transparent process was put in place. More 
                                                
230 Authors interview with Ana Novakovic CHRVO, November 2013 
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importantly, though, this direct funding allowed the relationship between NGOs and the 
EU to be strengthened, and to take place without government involvement. As a result, 
the EU presented the possibility for sub-granting.231  As of 2012, two organizations in 
Montenegro were implementing sub-granting programs. They contracted with 28 
organizations altogether. This clearly shows that the number of EC beneficiaries in the 
country has increased.232 To make the process more efficient, the EU organized numerous 
conferences and workshops focused on educating NGO representatives in the art of grant 
writing and management.233   
 
In sum, a strong and direct relationship between NGOs and the EU in Montenegro 
was developed from the very beginning of the country’s post-communist transition. This 
relationship was self-perpetuating and supported a process of learning for both the EU 
and domestic NGOs. In turn, NGOs and the EU altered their preferences and behavior 
and became more productive for the introduction of anti-corruption reforms. As a result, 
EU’s efforts to promote civic values and norms through the third sector were never 
directly linked to requirements in the pre-accession process, and developing civil society 
through the creation of institutions was never on the agenda. Instead, a constant dialogue 
between NGOs and the EU was and still is taking place at the time of writing. This 
communication began prior to Montenegro’s independence from Serbia and, in contrast 
                                                
231 Presented in the IPA 2009 Civil Society Development National Program 
232 Country report: Montenegro Country profile for the year 2012, Prepared by: Centre 
for Development of Non- Governmental Organisations 
233 TACSO, 2011, Developing and Managing EU-Funded Projects 
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to Bulgaria, years before Montenegro had membership prospects. Finally, because of this 
early engagement, the EU and domestic NGOs managed to progressively establish a 
relationship of trust based on shared meanings and understandings. The EU was not in a 
rush to impose conditions. Instead, they were learning from domestic non-state actors as 
much as domestic non-state actors were learning from the EU. I come back to the precise 
anti-corruption implications of such a relationship in the last section of this chapter.  
 
3.3.2  Domination of the EU in Bulgaria 
In contrast to Montenegro, the type of relationship that NGOs had with the EU in 
Bulgaria was dominated by the EU. Interviewed NGOs consistently expressed discontent 
regarding the EU’s decreased interest in their work in the 2003-2005 period,234 and the 
general strategy of the EU to interact with state authorities rather than non-state actors. 
This strategy empowered the state and placed NGOs in a position of dependency on state 
institutions. As a general strategy, the EU remained largely oriented toward building 
strong relationships with the state and ruling elites within Bulgaria, and less engaged with 
non-state actors (Börzel and Buzogány 2010). This was evident in the way the EU 
dispersed funds for civil society, and instead of developing NGOs, it rendered them 
dependent on the state.   
 
To distribute funds for civil society, the EU called for the establishment of National 
Authorizing Officer (NAO), who had the overall responsibility for the financial 
                                                
234 Author’s interviews November 2013 – May 2014  
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management of PHARE funds - the main source of EU funds for developing civil society. 
The NAO was to be appointed by the Council of Ministers, and Dimitar Ivanovski was 
the first to occupy this position. Following the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) victory in 
the 2005 parliamentary elections, Ivanovski became Deputy Minister of Finances without 
resigning from the NAO position, thus conflating the responsibilities of two offices and 
not leaving space for NGOs to participate in the distribution of EU funds.   
 
The EU also required the creation of an Implementation Agencies (IA) within each 
ministry. The IAs were in charge of tendering, contracting, payments, and technical 
implementation of Investment Support projects, and other projects if such were 
specifically provided. It is worth noting that both the NAO and the IA were part of the 
national administration. Hence, NGOs were dependent on the administration for their 
financing. For instance, in the area of structural funds distribution, Ordinance 171/2002 
regulates the formation of the various monitoring bodies. According to it, most members 
of the monitoring bodies are representatives of the central government. In turn, this 
arrangement made state control inevitable, and left little room for the inclusion of non-
state actors (Yanakiev 2010). Instead of decentralization, the state strengthened its role 
and dominant position through the Ministry of Finance, leaving limited roles for other 
actors (Yanakiev 2010). The IAs within different ministries became extremely influential, 
for they were essentially given the authority to select recipients, determine the type of 
projects worth PHARE funding, and monitor spending (through yet another agency 
within the national administration). To be fair, the IAs included civil society 
representatives, and in theory it was supposed to be politically independent from 
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government. However, the lack of a tradition of strategic planning and programming in 
Bulgaria hindered the independence of IAs. Such independence demanded specific 
changes, among which was included a clear mechanism securing the involvement of 
CSOs (Marinov et al. 2006). The inclusion of CSOs in 2002 in programming of the pre-
accession funds of PHARE, ISPA, and SAPARD could be regarded as the first attempts at 
creating an institutional framework for partnership between the EU, Bulgaria’s NGOs, 
and Bulgaria’s state authorities. However, this attempt had limited success because the 
then developed National Development Plan was never officially adopted.  
 
Instead, IAs became involved in the process of fund distribution in two ways. They 
were either responsible for implementation of PHARE civil society programs, such as 
LIEN and ACCESS, or they assisted the government and the EU delegation in designing 
the call for proposals.  This approach, however, did not entirely secure the independence 
of the IAs, as in reality the government was often directly involved in selecting the 
members of the IAs.  
 
Aware of some of these problems, the EU did not release all control of its funding 
for CSOs to national actors. A Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) was also created. It 
consisted of the NAO, NAC, and the Commission representatives in charge of PHARE 
programs review. The JMC met once a year to review the outcome of activities on the 
PHARE program, and NGOs were rarely included in the meetings. Considering the fact 
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that PHARE was one of the two major pre-accession instruments, a yearly meeting was 
insufficient.235  
 
To be fair, the programs introduced by the EU did have limited effects on civil 
society participation. For instance, in the area of environmental politics, civil society has 
been indeed active. Dimitrova (2014) shows that environmental NGOs find links with the 
EU to be strategic channels for influence. She reveals that as of 2007, NGO 
representatives use direct contact with EU institutions in order to apply pressure to the 
national government. However, these results have only been found in the environmental 
protection sector, and, as shown above, they are not evident in other sectors, such as anti-
corruption. Furthermore, while environmental NGOs may indeed use linkages to the EU, 
the extent to which they are successful remains questionable; Bulgaria remains the EU 
member with the least effective environmental protection laws. 
 
The ineffectiveness of the relationship between the EU and domestic civil society 
created in Bulgaria was confirmed by interviews with representatives of the EU. Only 
five of the seventeen interviewed NGOs saw the potential to cooperate with the EU on 
the issue of anti-corruption. However, they generally saw the strength of the EU in the 
EU’s potential to freeze government funds, and not in supporting the efforts of the third 
sector to influence policy-making. As a result, during the protests in 2013 only Protestna 
Mreja (Protest Network) - an informal organization established in the beginning of the 
protest - made an attempt to reach out to the EU for support and legitimization of the 
                                                
235 Author’s interview with a member of the IA in the Bulgarian Ministry of Finances 
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protest. Protestna Mreja sent an open letter to ALDE regarding the election of Delian 
Peevski for MEP earlier in May 2014.  
 
The inability of CSOs to seek support from the EU also hindered the reverse 
process - namely the CVM’s ability to benefit from feedback by domestic civil society. 
The CVM’s website specified only nine out of the existing 5000 Bulgarian NGOs that 
were considered by the CVM to have exerted positive influence on judicial reforms and 
anti-corruption policies, and were thus trustworthy. From them, three are branches of 
international NGOs (TI, Open Society, and the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee) and the 
rest were think tanks with no membership base, and thus incapable of systematizing 
citizens’ grievance. The EU Commission’s Communication in office in Bulgaria claimed 
that the EU regular reports both before and after accession in 2007 were, “based on 
contributions from the Bulgarian Government, as well as from the Commission services, 
Member States, NGOs and other stakeholders.” 236  However, information on which 
specific NGOs, how many of them, and the selection criteria, was not available. 
Therefore, the precise engagement of the EU with NGOs in Bulgaria in the process of 
creating progress reports was unclear. For the most part, the EU Commission worked 
with individual experts regardless of the organization they belonged to, if any. While 
these experts do provide valuable information to the EU with respect to the progress of 
anti-corruption reforms, they hardly express the opinion of an organized third sector.     
 
                                                
236 Author’s written communication with Ognian Zlatev, EU Commission Representation 
in Bulgaria. 
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3.3.3  Georgia - Building on a Broken Civil Society  
As specified above, the interaction of the EU and non-state actors in Georgia was 
interrupted for an extensive period of time between 2004 and 2009. When the EU became 
engaged again in 2009 through the Civil Society forum initiative of the Eastern 
Partnership, it was met with a highly fragmented domestic civil society which lacked 
capacity and knowledge with respect to impacting anti-corruption reforms.   
 
Interview data suggested that the initial abandonment of Georgian civil society by 
the EU immediately after 2004 had two key effects: first, the EU became incapable of 
receiving feedback from civil society, and second, civil society did not see the EU as a 
partner which could support civil society to become a cohesive actor, and thus help 
further its agenda and guide NGOs in their attempts to apply pressure to the government.    
 
The attempts of the EU to work with civil society were consistently weak in the 
period after the Rose Revolution. Between 2004 and 2008, these attempts were primarily 
evidenced by the inclusion of civil society in each anti-corruption project sponsored by 
the EU. There were many such projects in this period and NGOs indeed participated in 
each of them. However, blinded by an unrealistically optimistic view of what was left 
from civil society in Georgia, the EU placed some strong pre-requisites on NGOs in order 
to participate in anti-corruption projects. For instance, most of the requirements for an 
organization to qualify for an inclusion in an anti-corruption project specified that NGOs 
needed to be a first tier organization. This meant that they needed to have effective upper, 
middle, and lower structural units, clearly formulated mission statements, good public 
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outreach, short and long-term strategic plans, and sizable annual budgets (between 
$100,000 - $200,000). A study performed by the United Nations Association of Georgia 
(UNAG) and the Centre for Strategic Research and Development of Georgia (CSRDG) 
found that only about 16% of NGOs in 2005 qualified as such237. While some NGOs with 
time would learn to talk the talk and receive EU grants, a majority of civil society did not 
have access to real cooperation with the EU. This created an additional divide in the 
Third Sector in Georgia. In addition, EU aid delivered through CSO channels privileged 
international NGOs over their national counterparts. For instance, of all 156 ongoing anti-
corruption projects in Georgia in 2007, only 48 programs were implemented by local 
NGOs.238   
 
These actions by the EU bred not only additional division in the civil society of 
Georgia, but also mistrust of the NGOs with respect to the EU. In interviews, 
representatives of the NGOs were asked to identify the most reliable international or 
foreign organization that could be helpful in structuring a project in a way that it had the 
most leverage over the government. USAID was the first choice for most NGOs with the 
exception of one, and the EU was consistently placed at third and fourth place. Many 
representatives of NGOs were not sure in what capacity the EU could help, other than 
provide funding. However, small NGOs knew that their status would not qualify them for 
funding. 
                                                
237 Development of Civil Society Organizations in Georgia: Countrywide Assessment 
Report, United Nations Association of Georgia and Center for Strategic Research and 
Development, Tbilisi 2005 
238 Information from the EU Delegation in Georgia 
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In turn, the further division of civil society caused by the efforts of the EU to 
include non-state actors led to the inability of NGOs to provide feedback to the EU with 
respect to the anti-corruption reforms, and the way in which non-state actors could be 
effective. The EU did not actively search for civil society’s cooperation because it did not 
trust the ability of civil society to provide politically unbiased feedback. In an informal 
conversation, a representative of the EU Mission in Georgia, that was directly responsible 
for civil society development, was very clear on the affiliation of NGOs with political 
parties, and consequently the bias in their reports. Local NGOs were rarely asked to 
contribute to data gathering for EU evaluation reports. From fifteen interviewed NGOs, 
only four had been asked to do so and seven had volunteered information.  For instance, 
GYLA was asked to contribute to a study performed by the EU delegation. The 
information required was related to the number and nature of cases that they had 
addressed in a period of time. At the same time, a study carried out by GYLA regarding 
large scale corruption in the public procurement of a significant road construction project 
was not taken into consideration by the EU and was not mentioned in the following 
evaluation report. 239   This bred additional distrust of the EU by the third sector in 
Georgia.  
 
The variation in the interaction of the EU with civil society over the years with 
respect to timing, intensity, and kind of involvement steered the development of NGO 
sectors in the three countries in different directions. These developmental trajectories 
                                                
239 Author’s interview with Sophia Chareli, expert at GYLA, Tbilisi, March 2014 
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manifested themselves in different abilities of civil society to impact the creation and 
implementation of anti-corruption reforms domestically. The main variation was in the 
ability of civil society to bridge the gap between state and society by balancing 
cooperation, monitoring, and effectively opposition of government’s actions.  
 
4.  Conclusion 
This chapter analyzed the effects that the EU had on developing civil society in the 
post-communist world. Using SNA and data gathered through interviews and document 
analysis, it focused on the limits and opportunities of the EU to increase the abilities of 
civil society to balance between cooperation, monitoring, and opposing government 
introduced anti-corruption reforms. The chapter made two arguments. First, by using a 
density metric of SNA, it showed that the variation in the ability of civil society to 
contribute to anti-corruption reforms was strongly correlated to civil society’s level of 
cohesiveness, and the extent to which NGOs were capable of acting as a unified player.  
Second, the chapter showed that the influence of the EU varied because the EU 
approached civil society in a different way in each of the studied countries. This variation 
was in the timing of involvement, the intensity of involvement, and in the kind of 
involvement of the EU with domestic non-state actors. Most importantly, the chapter 
showed that the initial involvement of the EU with domestic NGOs created a self-
perpetuating relationship between the EU and NGOs, which manifested itself either as a 
partnership or domination of the EU. The next chapter will show that the variation in the 
EU’s approach to civil society resulted in allowing the EU to secure domestic 
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internalization of norms underpinning externally suggested reforms in some countries and 
not in others.  
 248 
Chapter Five – Synergy 
 
The theory tested in this study showed that the interaction between two entities 
alters not only their actions, but their identities and preferences as well (Wendt 1994, 
1999, Checkel and Moravcsik 2001, Karns and Mingst 2004). I argued that in the process 
of fighting corruption in the post-communist world the roles and the actions of both 
domestic and international actors were essential (Jacobsen 1996, Millner 1997, Putnam 
1998, Scully 1997). Domestically, I focused on two types of actors:  First, I discussed the 
actions and perceptions of state actors that were representative of the executive, 
legislative, and judicial powers in each country. Second, I analyzed the abilities of 
domestic non-state actors, such as NGOs, to apply pressure to the state, to diffuse norms 
among citizens, and to effectively monitor the creation, implementation, and enforcement 
of anti-corruption policies.  
 
Internationally, I emphasized the actions of the EU. Without claiming that what the 
EU did or did not do is the single explanatory variable with respect to variation in anti-
corruption reforms among post-communist countries, I showed that the EU participated 
in the shaping of domestic actors throughout the entire period of the post-communist 
countries’ transitions to democracy. There were two reasons for the EU’s impact on 
domestic actors:  First, immediately after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, small Eastern 
European and Central Asian states were left without the former USSR’s umbrella and 
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looked to the EU to understand the path to democracy and a Western style of governance. 
Second, the EU understood the importance of political and economic stability in its 
immediate neighborhood and engaged in assisting post-communist transitions.  Therefore 
the involvement of the EU had an impact on each and every aspect of the transitions, and 
thus it altered the way post-communist states secured the rule of law and introduced anti-
corruption reforms.  
 
This chapter discusses the relationships among the three aforementioned players 
(domestic civil society, domestic state institutions, and the EU). It explains why the 
interaction among these actors took on a different shape in each country and consequently 
led to variation in the outcome of anti-corruption efforts. Three types of relationships are 
the focus of my theory: The first relationship is between the EU and the state government 
and examines the way in which the EU applies conditionality to states.  In this chapter I 
show that results from conditionality varied across countries and that this variation was 
due to the level of fit between the conditions, sanctions, and incentives the EU chose to 
employ on the one hand and the domestic context on the other hand.  
 
The second relationship is EU’s interaction with non-state actors. I argue that in 
cases where the EU not only served as a teacher of norms to civil society (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1993), but also learned from civil society, the EU-domestic civil society 
relationship resembled a partnership and created an environment amenable to the 
construction of functional anti-corruption institutions.  
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The final relationship is the state’s interaction with domestic non-state actors. This 
relationship is shaped by both the interaction between the EU and civil society and the 
interaction between the EU and state institutions. Where the EU socialized civil society in 
norms of participation in the decision-making  process, civil society-state relations were 
more likely to be cooperative and civil society was better equipped to effectively monitor 
the implementation of anti-corruption policies. In contrast, where the EU failed to engage 
in political dialogue with civil society, civil society was underprepared to monitor state 
officials and was more likely to serve as a constant opposition to the state. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 5.1 Interaction between domestic civil society, state, and the EU  
EU 
National 
government 
Domestic  
CSO 
 
 251 
In this chapter, I first examine the cross-country variation of the EU’s approach to 
conditions, sanctions, and incentives. Then, I proceed to explain why the simultaneously 
developing processes of socialization and conditionality resulted in anti-corruption 
reforms that varied by country. Here, I am interested in why only in some countries did 
attempts to socialize civil society result in conditions, incentives, and sanctions which 
supported a sense of domestic ownership of externally-promoted reforms, while in other 
countries such attempts failed to do so.   
 
1.  Variation in Types of EU Conditionality across Cases 
 
The EU’s interaction with state and non-state actors varied by country. The 
previous chapter showed that in Bulgaria and Georgia the process of socialization was 
weak. In these two countries, the EU’s engagement came late in the process of 
transitioning to democracy, or the engagement was interrupted by events related to the 
introduction of anti-corruption policies. In contrast, in Montenegro, the EU’s attempts at 
socialization of domestic civil society began before membership conditionality and were 
consistent even before Montenegro received independence from Serbia (socialization 
proposition).  
 
I also compare the interactions of the EU and state institutions in the three 
examined cases and show that conditionality was strong in Bulgaria and Montenegro, but 
weak in Georgia. More importantly, I show that in contrast to Bulgaria and Georgia, 
conditions, incentives, and sanctions in Montenegro were compatible with the domestic 
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context and flexible with respect to the anti-corruption trajectory the country took (the 
conditionality proposition).  
 
Finally, I argue, the variation in the EU’s approach to civil society led to different 
types of conditionality in the three countries. The variation in the extent to which 
conditions, incentives, and sanctions were designed to address well-defined problems and 
were the product of cooperation between domestic actors and the EU, led to different 
outcomes in terms of the domestic capacity to create, implement, and enforce reforms 
that were compatible with the social and political context of each country. The variation 
in the EU’s conditionality across countries was based on the flexibility of the EU to alter 
conditions, incentives, and sanctions in order to make them more compatible with the 
domestic environment, and on the focus that EU placed on implementation versus 
harmonization of law.   
 
1.1  Cross-country Variation in the Focus of Conditionality 
The approach that the EU took in the three countries was consistent with the 
principles of conditionality regardless of the three countries’ membership status: As I 
showed in chapter three, Georgia was the subject of the same logic of conditionality 
despite the lack of membership incentive, and in Bulgaria conditionality continued 
through the CVM even after accession.  
 
However, conditions varied, as did incentives and sanctions. This variation was not 
only in the size (Schimmelfennig et al. 2005), the strength (Vachudova 2005, Schwellnus 
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2005), or the credibility (Andonova 2005) of the incentives and sanctions, but more 
importantly in the focus of the conditions. In Bulgaria, the EU consistently stressed 
harmonization of the law and did not engage in advising and supporting the process of 
implementation and enforcement. Similarly, before and after accession, incentives and 
sanctions were always financial and were not directly experienced by citizens.  
 
In Georgia, the EU had been consistently posing the general condition of 
eliminating corruption since before the toppling of Shevarnadze’s regime. This condition, 
however came without a requirement for the country’s inclusion in international anti-
corruption conventions, nor did it specify the way in which the EU was going to measure 
progress. The vague demands of the EU left their interpretation to the ruling elite and 
allowed Saakashvili to introduce reforms that did not eliminate corruption but rather 
transformed corruption. In terms of incentives and sanctions, the case of Georgia differed 
from both Bulgaria’s and Montenegro’s cases. Georgia had no membership prospects and 
thus the EU could not leverage the ultimate incentive. However, it was consistently 
praising the achievements of Saakashvili’s radical reforms and was sending signals that if 
these reforms continued the EU would deepen its relationship with Georgia. Indeed, 
shortly after the beginning of Saakashvili’s reforms, Georgia became a member of the 
ENP, and in 2014 the country signed an Association Agreement with the EU.  
 
Finally, in Montenegro, the EU approached the fight against corruption in a way 
that showed a better understanding of the capacity of the country to manage corruption 
and to implement EU-promoted policies. In Montenegro, the EU focused on 
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implementation, while leaving the design of institutions and legislation to domestic 
actors. By 2013, Montenegro had not been sanctioned though the EU made its 
preparedness to financially sanction the country clear and credible. Montenegro, instead, 
had received numerous incentives from the EU. For instance, in 2010 Montenegro 
received a visa-free regime with the EU as a reward for satisfying the conditions 
presented in the Roadmap to Visa Liberalization.240 The Roadmap emphasized lowering 
levels of corruption and the creation of anti-corruption institutions as important 
milestones. In 2009, EU Commissioner Ollie Rehn presented the EU decision to grant a 
visa-free regime to Montenegro and stated that  
On the basis of roadmaps presented by the Commission, the 
countries have made important progress in improving 
passport security, in strengthening border controls, in 
reinforcing the institutional framework to fight organised 
crime and corruption, as well as in external relations and 
fundamental rights.241 
 
This reward was also of a different type in comparison to the rewards that Bulgaria 
was receiving while in the process of negotiations. In Bulgaria, rewards were exclusively 
of a financial nature, and they did not have an immediate effect on the citizens. Instead, 
governments and local officials very often misappropriated funds. In contrast, in 
Montenegro, the reward of visa-free travel was granted directly to the citizens prior to the 
beginning of negotiations. Ollie Rehn expressed his understanding about “how much visa 
                                                
240 Visa Liberalisation With Montenegro, Roadmap, May 8th, 2008. Available at: 
http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/White%20List%20Project%20Paper%20-
%20Roadmap%20Montenegro.pdf 
241 EU Commission Press Release IP/09/1138, Brussels July 15th, 2009. Available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-09-1138_en.htm 
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free travel means to them [citizens of Montenegro].”242 Granting a reward that directly 
impacted citizens, instead of the government, represented a change in the nature of the 
rewards provided by the EU. A deeper relationship with the EU was directly experienced 
by the citizens of the country, not only on paper, but in action as well. Directly rewarding 
citizens also meant that the government was not given the power to mediate the benefits 
of a deepening relationship between Montenegro’s citizens and the EU. In turn, this new 
type of reward provided a clear understanding among Montenegrins regarding their 
individual responsibility, potential to satisfy requirements, and the benefits of deepening 
the relationship with the EU.  
 
In Georgia, the EU’s incentives were directed entirely toward the government and 
more specifically to the supporters of Saakashvili. These incentives came primarily in the 
form of approval of Saakashvili’s reforms which further legitimized his actions 
domestically and allowed him to deepen grand corruption and eliminate petty corruption. 
   
1.2  Cross-country Variation in the Flexibility of Conditionality  
The EU conditionality also varied, in terms of its flexibility, in synchronizing and 
collaborating with domestic actors in formulating its conditions. This flexibility was a 
direct function of the level to which the EU learned about the capacity of domestic actors 
to comply with conditions provided by the EU and the ability of the EU to incorporate its 
knowledge in subsequent rounds of recommendations.   
                                                
242 ibid 
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The level of flexibility is visible in the presence or absence of a date or accession. 
In situations where the EU did not have the resources to be flexible, the presence of 
accession date proved to not only fail to aid, but also hinder anti-corruption reforms. For 
instance, from the beginning of the negotiations in 2001, Bulgaria had a final date for 
accession to the EU. This created time pressure among domestic state and non-state 
actors. It also created pressure on the EU Delegation in Bulgaria (before 2007) which 
managed the negotiation process, and consequently on the office of the EU Commission 
in the country that was responsible for monitoring the reforms and the implementation of 
the CVM recommendations after accession in 2007. In the period from 2001 to 2013 this 
pressure consistently prevented the EU from leaving adequate space and time for 
implementation of reforms and for evaluating the compatibility of the policies it was 
suggesting with the domestic context.  
 
Unlike Bulgaria, Georgia did not experience time constraints because the country 
did not have a membership perspective. This might have been beneficial for both Georgia 
and the EU because it could have provided time for the EU to increase its knowledge of 
the domestic context and to be most flexible with respect to the conditions, incentives, 
and sanctions that it was presenting to the country. However, blinded by the immediate 
success of Saakashvili’s reforms and in the absence of feedback from civil society, the 
EU failed to use this flexibility. The vagueness of the conditions presented to Georgia by 
the EU and the almost unconditional approval of Saakashvili’s anti-corruption policies 
legitimized both his reforms and the way he decided to implement and enforce them.  
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In the period before the Rose Revolution in 2003, the EU remained consistently 
critical of the country’s performance in the fight against corruption. After 2004, when 
Saakashvili clearly signaled his commitment to eliminate corruption and began to 
introduce radical changes, the EU drastically changed course. In the next ten years the 
EU was highly supportive of what the government had proposed in terms of eliminating 
corruption. While this change of course came as a result of Saakashvili’s strong 
commitment, it was also the result of civil societies’ inability to bring awareness to the 
EU with respect to the undemocratic nature of the changes Saakashvili was making. In 
turn, instead of closely monitoring Saakashvili’s reforms and providing recommendations 
that addressed specific problems, the EU unintentionally legitimized Saakashvili’s future 
actions and allowed him to centralize power and create an institutional environment 
conducive to rent seeking from the small but powerful group around him. In sum, the EU 
failed in its flexibility with respect to conditions, incentives, and sanctions in Georgia 
because it almost completely abandoned NGOs as alternative sources of information 
regarding the progress of the reforms.  
 
Finally, in Montenegro, as in the case of Georgia, the EU did not provide a 
projected date of accession. In contrast to Bulgaria, this lack of such date allowed a high 
degree of EU cooperation with civil society. As a result, the EU had time to learn about 
the domestic context and to apply appropriate conditions, incentives, and sanctions. 
Perhaps more importantly, the EU could create adequate mechanisms to measure progress 
and apply its knowledge regarding the potential of the country to comply continuously. In 
 258 
other words in Montenegro, EU conditionality was an iterative process that was 
characterized by constant learning and adjustment of actions based on new knowledge 
provided by civil society. This iterative process was absent in Bulgaria and Georgia, 
where conditionality remained the same as it started in the beginning of the countries’ 
transitions.  
 
The next section follows the process of interaction between the EU, civil society, 
and the state in each individual country. I show the critical junctures in each case where 
the process of interaction between the three entities could have taken a different trajectory 
and the way the chosen trajectory impacted the resulting anti-corruption institutions.  
   
2.  The Impact of the EU’s Varied Interactions with Domestic Actors on Anti-
corruption Institutions 
 
I theorized that in the presence of a partnership between NGOs and the EU, NGOs 
were more inclined to unite around an anti-corruption agenda, to synchronize their 
actions in order to apply bottom-up pressure to the government, and to provide feedback 
to the EU. The following section explains why variation in the EU relationship with 
NGOs led to variation in the EU’s approach to conditionality and consequently to 
variation in the anti-corruption institutions in each of the case studies. The main argument 
is twofold: on the one hand cross-country variation in the extent to which the EU 
socialized non-state actors created variation in the domestic context in which anti-
corruption institutions were formed and in turn variation in institutions’ ability to create 
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an environment that is not conducive to corruption. On the other hand, where the process 
of socialization was bi-directional between the EU and the state, there was an impact on 
the EU’s approach to conditionality which changed the nature of conditions, incentives, 
and sanctions.  
 
I found that in Bulgaria the EU failed to consistently socialize civil society. As a 
result the EU could not attain an understanding of the underlying problems that sustained 
corruption and thus did not provide conditions that were directly addressing these 
problems. Instead of focusing on implementation and enforcement of laws, the EU 
emphasized mere introduction of institutions and harmonization of the law. Similarly in 
Georgia, the EU abandoned its attempts to reach out to civil society immediately after 
Saakashvili’s coming to power. However, the resulting institutions in Georgia were 
different from the ones in Bulgaria in that they allowed for the transformation of 
corruption from endemic to centralized. I show that this is due to variation in the 
conditionality approach that the EU employed in these two countries. In contrast to both 
Bulgaria and Georgia, in Montenegro the EU was consistent in socializing civil society 
even before the country received independence and outside of the context of membership 
conditionality. In turn, three important processes that were largely missing in Bulgaria 
and Georgia took place and allowed Montenegrin authorities to introduce slow but 
comprehensive and effective anti-corruption reform: first the EU received feedback from 
domestic NGOs, second, the EU was flexible in its conditions, incentives, and sanctions, 
and third, NGOs managed to apply bottom-up pressure on the government.  
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2.1  Bulgaria’s Disconnected Civil Society in the Context of Strict 
Conditionality 
In Bulgaria the EU failed to approach civil society actors from the very beginning. 
This failure prevented NGOs from contributing in three ways to the creation of a context 
suitable for the creation of functional anti-corruption institutions. First, civil society 
consistently lacked a relationship with the citizens. Second, the EU never appropriated 
the ability to cooperate with the government in order to produce sustainable anti-
corruption reforms. Third, failed socialization did not create a productive relationship 
between civil society and the EU. In turn, the EU remained consistently deprived of 
unbiased feedback and incapable of adjusting its recommendations, incentives, and 
sanctions to be compatible with the domestic context. These three characteristics 
prevented the EU from identifying a way in which it could leverage domestic non-state 
actors to pressure policy makers into effective reforms. Similarly, the EU did not have the 
capacity to identify shortcomings in the third sector and address the problem. As a result 
the gaps between state, society, and the EU became self-perpetuating.  
 
2.1.1  Disunited Civil Society 
The failure of the EU to mobilize, and imbue values of transparency, accountability, 
and political participation in Bulgarian civil society led to the inability of civil society to 
unite and establish a common strategy for contributing to the establishment and 
implementation of anti-corruption institutions. The inability of civil society to unite in an 
anti-corruption agenda was evidenced by the density of NGOs’ networks metrics within 
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the SNA. This measure showed that Bulgarian NGOs consistently did not work together 
and that their level of cooperation decreased over the years after the negotiations with the 
EU began in 2001. Bulgarian NGO networks received the highest density score in 2003 
and by 2013 this score has decreased almost by 50%. 
 
Moreover, the inability of the EU to support the unification of Bulgarian NGOs 
resulted in NGOs lacking a common strategy for participating in the fight against 
corruption. While in interviews some NGO leaders were defending the thesis that 
corruption is local and international entities should not be engaged in its management, 
others were firmly defending the notion that only more sanctions from the EU could help 
resolve corruption issues. Only a small group of NGOs identified the necessity of raising 
awareness among the population and making information accessible and available to 
citizens. Even among the members of this small group a lack of cooperation with other 
NGOs was present. Perhaps more importantly, in contrast to Montenegro, interviews 
showed that most Bulgarian NGOs perceived their counterparts as politicized, working to 
further someone’s political agenda, and thus not trustworthy. This lack of trust naturally 
prevented NGOs from cooperating and sustained the disunited character of Bulgarian 
civil society.  
 
The extent to which the EU was responsible for this insufficient interaction was 
indicated by the EU’s level of influence in the SNA and supported by interviews with 
representatives of the third sector. Interviews showed that in Bulgaria the EU did not 
approach even pro-EU NGOs and did not mobilize them to serve as domestic partners of 
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the EU in the process of Europeanization. The majority of interviewed subjects suggested 
that the primary role of the EU in the first years of transitioning to democracy was to 
fund projects. Interviewees specified that most of these projects were geared toward 
building the administrative capacity of NGOs and not toward developing an 
understanding of the role of NGOs in establishing and implementing anti-corruption 
institutions. With the exception of two NGOs243, none of those interviewed were capable 
of identifying a conference, workshop, or another type of information exchange event 
which helped them to understand the most efficient and effective way to partake in the 
decision-making  process.244 Further, interviewees claimed that this role of the EU did not 
change throughout the years. 
 
As a result, even NGOs that openly marketed themselves as pro-EU did not 
elaborate a specific mechanism by which they could cooperate with the EU in order to 
shame corrupt government officials. According to most NGOs, the EU could have 
leverage only if they applied even more severe financial sanctions. This line of thinking 
indicated the NGOs’ lack of understanding of the mechanisms by which they could aid 
the EU in diffusing norms of transparency and accountability domestically. It also 
indicated a transfer of responsibility to the EU and the government.  
 
2.1.2  Gap between the CSOs and Citizens 
                                                
243 These were the Center for the Study of Democracy and the European Institute 
244 Author’s interviews with Bulgarian NGOs focusing on corruption, anti-corruption, 
and good governance policies. 
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The second major characteristic of Bulgarian NGOs was that they remained ill-
equipped to represent the grievances of citizens. This was because no NGOs in Bulgaria 
had a membership base sufficient to make them independent from government funding. 
Therefore, the gap between citizens and NGOs remained large over the years. A series of 
studies by CIVICUS, the civil society index, showed that trust in NGOs in Bulgaria was 
low between 2003 and 2013. CIVICUS data245 reaffirmed the 2008 European Values 
Survey (EVS) findings of widely spread distrust among Bulgarians, both of each other 
and of the NGO sector. The fact that citizens were not aware of NGOs’ potential and 
were not engaged in participation through NGOs is evidenced by data gathered by the 
EVS. In 2008 the EVS reported that 81.5% of the population had never participated in 
any organizations, and that 86.9% had never participated in voluntary activities. In 2010 
only 13.1% of the population declared participation in NGOs or civic associations in the 
previous five years.246 Participation remained weak not only in NGOs but also in political 
parties. In 2009, 95.6% declared that they had never been involved in political parties. 
 
The large gap between NGOs and the public prevented NGOs from acting as 
channels of EU norms diffusion. In contrast to other countries, such as Montenegro, 
Bulgarian civil society actors could not successfully promote norms of transparency, 
accountability and political participation among the population. Such norms remained 
                                                
245 Open Society Institute – Sofia (OSI-S) data on Civil Society Index, CIVICUS, surveys 
conducted February-April 2009 
246 European Value Survey 2011 
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weak, and all attempts at their strengthening were domestically perceived as externally 
imposed.  
 
The weakness of norms of transparency, accountability, and political participation 
is evidenced by the level of acceptability, susceptibility and awareness of corruption. A 
recent survey (2014) found that 30% of the population above the age of 18 years accepted 
some form of corruption. Unexpectedly, this level of acceptance was coupled with a 
strong awareness of corruption:  While it was difficult for Bulgaria’s population to 
provide an exact definition of corruption, around 70% of the population surveyed by 
Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) was capable of identifying acts of 
corruption.247   
 
At the same time, Bulgarians were susceptible to corruption. In 2014, 23.7% 
admitted to giving bribes because they were pressured and 5.5% admitted to giving bribes 
without being pressured into it248. These numbers represented an increase from previous 
years and also the highest percentage of people who admitted to corrupt behavior in the 
last fifteen years. Indeed, increase in awareness with respect to corruption identified 
partial socialization.  However this progress remained muddled by high levels of 
acceptance.   
 
                                                
247 Center for the Study of Democracy (2014), Corruption Reloaded: Assessment of 
southeast Europe 
248 ibid 
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The combination of high awareness, high acceptability and high susceptibility is 
not very puzzling when one analyzes corruption as a social norm. Bulgarians understood 
that corruption was not desirable, but they also did not see a way to avoid it. An 
overwhelming belief (94%)249 that a person is either “very likely” or “likely” to be asked 
for a bribe suggested that corruption in Bulgaria was understood as a widespread and 
normal practice. At the same time, involvement in corruption seemed to be perceived as 
highly effective in dealing with problems of everyday life. Informal surveys and 
conversations with citizens confirmed the willingness of many to compromise their 
convictions in order to get better medical treatment and/or to deal with traffic 
violations.250 In other words, corruption was seen as bad but necessary and effective 
behavior which is part of Bulgarian culture. Even in 2013, when high levels of corruption 
brought Bulgarians out on the streets to protest, rates of corruption did not decrease – a 
controversy that evidenced partial socialization of norms of transparency and 
accountability.  The general attitude toward corruption was further sustained by an 
overwhelming apathy in Bulgaria. In 2013 over half of the population of the country 
believed that corruption cannot be substantially reduced. Said a representative of a major 
anti-corruption NGO in Bulgaria: “Corruption has always been part of Bulgarian culture, 
                                                
249 Data from SELDI available at seldi.net 
250 Author’s interviews with patients at four major hospitals in Bulgaria 
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we are used to gift giving and though it is officially corruption, it is going to be very hard 
to stop these practices.”251 
 
2.1.3  CSOs Insufficient Feedback to the EU 
The consistent lack of cooperation between the EU and domestic NGOs prevented 
the establishment of a relationship between them which was based on trust and which 
could provide the EU with politically unbiased feedback. For instance, information 
provided by NGOs was only sparsely included in the EU Commission’s Regular Reports. 
In the instances where the EU was seeking information from non-state actors, it 
approached individual experts, instead of networks of NGOs. In turn, NGOs remained 
unmotivated to cooperate in monitoring the creation and implementation of anti-
corruption institutions. An interview with the EU Commission officers in Bulgaria 
pointed to the lack of established channels through which the EU considered the opinion 
of non-state actors. The answer provided by the Commission’s office there was unclear 
and stated that the “commission is doing its best to approach NGOs.”252  
 
This gap in the information exchange between NGOs and the EU rendered the EU 
unable to alter its conditions, recommendations, incentives, and sanctions in order to 
make them more compatible with the domestic context. As a result, the EU remained 
                                                
251 Author’s Interview with a representative from Corruption Network, a Bulgarian anti-
corruption NGO 
252 Author’s interview with an official at the Office of the EU Commission in Bulgaria 
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insistent on fast-paced harmonization of law before 2007 and remained vague in its 
recommendations after 2007.  
  
2.1.4  The EU’s Impact on State - CSO Relations in Bulgaria 
The inability of the EU to mobilize potential domestic partners in the process of 
Europeanization, even when its involvement peaked, created a disunited NGO sector that 
was incapable of representing the grievances of citizens before national policy-makers. In 
turn, this kind of civil society sector proved not to be equipped to exert influence over 
policy- and law-makers, producing a dysfunctional relationship between the domestic 
civil society sector and the state.    
   
Most Bulgarian NGOs took on the shape of think-tanks but they were not capable 
of exerting influence over the policy making process. NGOs, such as the Center for 
Liberal Studies, The Center for the Study of Democracy, and the European Institute had 
tremendous research potential as well as general pro-EU orientation, primarily because 
they understood the value of producing unbiased studies on the progress of anti-
corruption reforms. Yet, none of the policies suggested by these NGOs were considered 
by policy- and law- makers. For instance, in 2001 the Center for the Study of Democracy 
(CSD) was tasked with the establishment of a coalition of NGOs to create the first 
national anti-corruption strategy. The CSD indeed formed a coalition (Coalition 2000) 
that consisted of domestic and international NGOs, government officials, and 
representatives of political parties. It also performed research on best practices in the EU 
and in countries from the post-communist space that were at the time considered more 
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advanced in their anti-corruption policies. One notable achievement of the coalition was 
to bring anti-corruption discourse to the forefront of the policy agenda. There had been 
virtually no discussion in Bulgaria about this issue prior to CSD’s work. The resulting 
strategy, however was weak and was never implemented. The lack of implementation as 
well as the manner in which the strategy was prepared signaled two disturbing trends. 
First, NGOs were not prepared to evaluate the domestic context and to create a strategy 
that was compatible with it. One of the heads of the project acknowledged the 
inadequacies in the strategy and stated that “we were not sure what we were asked to do, 
and more importantly how to do it, so we naturally turned to these [countries] that had 
already done it.”253  When asked to explain the exact corruption problem that they were 
trying to address with the strategy, he answered that a survey among the population was 
performed, but also that it was small and hardly representative for the entire country. The 
most salient finding of the survey was that “corruption is high especially in customs.”254  
 
Second, the failure to implement the strategy showed the inability of civil society 
coalitions to pressure the state into acting upon NGOs’ suggestions or at least to consider 
them. The Strategy was indeed a subject of discussion in two of the meetings of the 
parliamentary commission for anti-corruption. However, it was never brought to the 
Parliament’s floor. When asked to share their thoughts on the lack of implementation, 
representatives of the coalition claimed that the party in power was the one that was 
                                                
253 Author’s interview with Tihomir Bezlov, CSD 
254 ibid.  
 
 269 
exhibiting the most pro-EU orientation in the country’s history of transitioning to 
democracy and thus they did not see the need nor did they have the power to apply any 
pressure.255 
 
In sum, a majority of NGOs in Bulgaria in the beginning of the country’s post-
communist transition took a pro-EU integration position and identified norms of 
transparency, accountability, and participation in the decision-making process as positive 
and necessary. This was what Checkel called type I internalization (Checkel 2005, 804) 
in which actors can identify what is acceptable and what is not. The failure of the EU 
consisted of the fact that it did not work toward moving internalization to type II where 
“Conscious instrumental calculation has now been replaced by taken-for-grantedness.”256 
The EU did not mobilize NGOs by ensuring their access to mechanisms through which 
they could engage citizens and cooperate with policy-makers in order to achieve 
functional anti-corruption reforms. In turn, the gap between NGOs and citizens, the gap 
between the EU and NGOs and the dysfunctional relationship between state and civil 
society deepened and became self-perpetuating.  
  
2.2  Montenegro’s Complete Circle of Interaction  
In contrast to Bulgaria and Georgia, the EU engaged Montenegro’s civil society 
from the very beginning of the country’s post-communist transition, beginning even 
                                                
255 Author’s interview with a representative from Coalition 2000 
256 Checkel, J. (2005) International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction 
and Framework, International Organization, 59 (2005), p. 805 
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before Montenegro received its independence from Serbia in 2007. As a result, 
Montenegrin NGOs were capable of contributing to the creation of effective anti-
corruption institutions in three ways. First, civil society was united in an anti-corruption 
agenda and was working as one actor to further reforms. Second, civil society reached out 
to citizens and became capable of representing their grievances before the government as 
well as before the EU. Finally, NGOs were empowered to provide the EU with politically 
unbiased feedback and thus allowed the EU to adjust its conditions, incentives, and 
sanctions to be compatible with the domestic context. In other words, Montenegrin civil 
society through its interaction with the EU learned how to fill the role of a liaison 
between the state and the citizens. It also understood that a trustworthy relationship with 
the EU would not only legitimize the activities of the third sector, but would also 
empower civil society to apply pressure to state authorities to forward their work.  
 
2.2.1  United Civil Society 
The constant cooperation between the EU and Montenegrin civil society resulted in 
a domestic NGO sector which acted as a single unified actor and thus was able to apply 
bottom up pressure to the government, to participate in the decision-making  process, and 
to effectively monitor the implementation and enforcement of anti-corruption policies. 
The ability of civil society to unite on an anti-corruption agenda was evidenced by the 
frequency of projects where NGOs cooperated. This frequency was measured through 
density of the networks of anti-corruption/good governance NGOs. Despite data 
limitations, the results from the Social Network Analysis showed that in 2013 more than 
three quarters of the NGOs cooperated with at least one other NGO. This ability of civil 
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society to unite and to establish a common strategy for counteracting corruption meant 
that in comparison to other transitioning countries such as Bulgaria and Georgia, the third 
sector was strong and capable of applying pressure to the government.  
 
Perhaps more importantly, interviewed Montenegrin NGOs indicated a deep 
understanding and internalization of their role in society. All interviewed NGOs agreed 
on what their role in society entailed. In comparison to their Georgian and Bulgarian 
analogues, anti-corruption NGOs in Montenegro were significantly more aware of their 
roles as watchdogs of the government and as channels of norm diffusion among citizens. 
Most anti-corruption NGOs define their role not in terms of fighting corruption but rather 
in terms of furthering the approximation of domestic norms and values to those of the 
EU. In almost every interview the NGO acknowledged that corruption is not to be 
eradicated nor even managed through strategies and action plans for their 
implementation. According to most interviewees, domestic cultural trends, shaped by 
historical events and periods needed to be reversed in order for corruption to decline. The 
role of NGOs then became threefold: they strived to cooperate with the EU in order to 
effectively expose corrupt officials, while simultaneously working to educate citizens in 
various EU norms and values, and finally to cooperating with the state in creating anti-
corruption policies. In contrast to Bulgaria, Montenegrin NGOs also understood EU 
membership as a process, rather than an end goal. As a result, NGOs successfully 
educated the EU about the domestic progress on anti-corruption reforms and managed to 
relay citizens’ grievances to the government. In turn, slow but steady and effective 
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institutional reforms were performed, and corrupt officials were put on trial (see chapters 
two and four). 
 
2.2.2  Norm Diffusion to Citizens 
The work of NGOs to educate the citizens of Montenegro in norms of transparency, 
accountability, and political participation was evidenced in their logos and projects. For 
instance, the logo of one of the major NGOs in Podgorica - The Center for Civic 
Education (CCE) - claimed that Democracy is to be learned [Demokratija se uči]. When 
asked to explain, the head of the NGO stated that the EU and EU integration was, and 
should have been, nothing more than a learning experience with respect to what 
democracy is, how to consolidate it, and sustain it.257  
 
The idea that Montenegro’s Europeanization was a learning process had 
underpinned all CCE’s activities since their start in 2002. For instance, the CCE 
organized a School for Politicians and Democracy every year beginning in 2003. The 
school brought together future and present politicians, representatives of the EU, and 
ordinary citizens. By 2013 the School had been successfully completed by 687 citizens of 
Montenegro. They represented activists of non-governmental organizations, 
representatives of political parties, journalists, officials of local and state authorities, and 
students. Though at the period of participation in the School participants did not always 
                                                
257 Author’s interview with Dragana Koprivica, Center for Civic Education 
 
 273 
belong to the above listed structures, by 2013 many of them were at the positions of the 
policy makers or leaders of NGOs.258  
 
This forum allowed different actors to share their ideas and understandings with 
respect to subjects such as cooperation between NGOs and policy-makers, anti-
corruption reforms, and to proposed solutions to immediate problems facing Montenegro. 
Over fifty lecturers presented their views of democracy and the rule of law in the school, 
and more importantly, in each module there was a representative from the EU or a 
member state of the EU. This additionally strengthened the relationship between NGOs 
and the EU and allowed NGOs to provide feedback to the EU throughout the years. The 
school also increased the political participation of Montenegrins:  According to the head 
of the CCE “citizens who at the time were not engaged in politics and/or civic 
participation attended our school and as a result became involved either in political 
parties or in CSOs.”259 The school furthered democratization by creating a forum for 
discussion among people that would normally not have the chance to elaborate their 
understandings of democracy and to learn from each other. The participation of future 
and present politicians and government officials in the School project, also created a 
culture of mutual awareness among NGOs on the one hand and policy- and law- makers 
on the other.  
 
                                                
258 Democracy School, CCE. Available at: http://cgo-
cce.org/en/programi/demokratija/skola-demokratije/#.VgBcA7QVblI 
259 Author’s interview with the Deliborka Uljevic, Center for Civic Education 
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The CCE also worked closely with other NGOs to promote norms of transparency, 
accountability, and civic participation among citizens as well as an understanding of the 
role of the EU in the process of Montenegro’s democratization. For instance, one of the 
projects that gained wide recognition and indeed reached out to Montenegrins was the 
EU Info Bus - on the Road to the EU project. The project consisted of a bus that in the 
course of 11 months visited different towns in the municipalities of Cetinje, Danilovgrad, 
Kolašin, Mojkovac, Nikšić and Podgorica and organized over 45 events. At each stop 
citizens received EU information brochures and participated in EU quizes. A round table 
discussion on the role of a local community in the process of the EU integration was 
organized at each location as well. This brought citizens closer to the process of EU 
integration and according to one observer “made citizens aware of why the process of 
Europeanization is important for their everyday life.”260 One observer also pointed out 
that the number of citizens that the project reached was small and it was still too early to 
identify any tangible results in terms of the extent to which people’s understanding was 
altered. However, the fact that NGOs together with the EU Delegation saw the necessity 
for involving citizens was already a couple steps ahead of what domestic non-state actors 
and the EU did in Georgia and Bulgaria. More importantly, initiatives such as the ones 
described above were lacking before the EU’s involvement with Montenegrin civil 
society. Interviewees agreed that such initiatives are the product of their cooperation with 
the EU.  
 
                                                
260 Author’s interview with Dr. Olivera Kumar, Acossiate Professor at the University of 
Montenegro, February 2014 
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2.2.3  CSO’s Strong Relationship with the EU 
The third and perhaps the most important characteristic of the NGOs in 
Montenegro that allowed civil society to exert influence on the creation and 
implementation of anti-corruption policies was its ability to provide the EU with 
feedback with respect to challenges in the process of fighting corruption. As a result of 
this feedback and because the EU understood its importance, the EU requested the 
inclusion of NGOs in the negotiation process, which in turn, resulted in more effective 
anti-corruption policies. 
 
The change in the structure of negotiation teams marked a significant difference 
with previous enlargements. The negotiating team in Montenegro was composed of six 
bodies: the College for Negotiations on Accession of Montenegro to the European Union, 
the State Delegation, the Negotiating Team, Working Groups for Preparation of 
Negotiations on Individual Negotiating Chapters, the Office of the Chief Negotiator, and 
the Secretariat of the Negotiating Team.261 Working groups for Chapter 23, Judiciary and 
Basic Rights, and Chapter 24, Justice, Freedom and Security, were the first to be 
established.  
 
The process of including civil society representatives in the Working Groups was 
not easy. The political situation in Montenegro consistently lacked political competition 
                                                
261 Government of Montenegro, 2012. Available at: 
http://www.mip.gov.me/en/images/stories/download/Predlog_Odluke_o_us- 
postavljanju_strukture_1.pdf 
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and the ruling party remained in power for over twenty years after the collapse of the 
Berlin Wall. In turn, though political officials publicly stated their support for the 
inclusion of civil society groups in the process of negotiations, they did not follow 
through. Upon pressure from both the EU and a domestic coalition of NGOs a decision to 
formalize the involvement of NGOs in the working groups of the negotiating team was 
reached in July 2012. However the decision was not explicit about the method of 
selection and appointment of CSOs, and suggests that CSOs could be included in as 
experts by the main negotiator. After the first meeting in Brussels, where some NGOs did 
not attend because they were dissatisfied with their unclear status, the EU applied 
pressure for full inclusion of NGOs in the working groups. Ambassador Drobnic, the 
representative of the EU in Montenegro, stated on the behalf of the EU Delegation in 
Montenegro: 
 
Let me underline that Montenegro is now entering a very 
demanding phase of its accession process, which requires 
continued and focused efforts to maintain consensus on 
European integration not only among all political actors, but 
also among the citizens who need to be fully informed. To 
that end, civil society has the key role in monitoring the 
accession negotiations and making the process transparent 
by informing the citizens through its activities.262 
 
As a result, in August 2012 the Secretariat of Montenegro’s EU membership 
negotiation team changed the Rules of Procedure and made NGOs representatives full 
members of working groups. The change also granted more rights to NGOs. Their role 
                                                
262 Speech of the Head of the EU Delegation in Montenegro Ambassador Mitja Drobnic 
on April 9th, 2013 for the 2nd meeting of the EU-MNE Civil Society Joint Consultative 
Committee, available at: http://www.delmne.ec.europa.eu/code/navigate.php?Id=2565 
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was increased from merely monitoring the process to participating in the decision-making 
-process of the working groups.263 In 2013, six CSOs were included in the working 
groups on Chapters 23 and 24. More importantly, the change in the Rules of Procedures 
indicated the ability of domestic non-state actors and the EU to cooperate in persuading 
the government of Montenegro to allow the participation of a large number of 
stakeholders in the process of creating anti-corruption institutions. 
 
Furthermore, the ability to receive feedback from domestic NGOs led to incentives 
provided by the EU that were immediately experienced by the population and furthered 
the process of mutual learning. As a result of visa liberalization in 2009, many 
Montenegrins were able to freely travel to the EU and experience first-hand the benefits 
of strong institutional arrangements that secured transparency and accountability. They 
were also able to observe the process of creating such institutions and to transfer this 
knowledge domestically. Most importantly, visa liberalization also furthered the context 
of mutual learning. Allowing free movement between member-states of the EU and 
Montenegro provided an environment where informational diffusion, contagion, and 
transference (Manners 2002) were present. Thus, visa liberalization was beneficial for the 
learning process for both the EU and Montenegro. In contrast, such visa liberalization in 
Bulgaria took place upon accession in 2007 and at the time of writing, Georgia was in the 
process of closing negotiations on this topic.  
 
                                                
263 Portal Analitika, 2012, http://portalanalitika.me/politika/vijesti/63090--lakoevi-uloga-
nvo-sektora-je-da-do- prinese-a-ne-da-kontrolie-pregovaraki-proces-.html 
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2.2.4  EU’s Impact on State -Society Relations in Montenegro 
The ability of civil society to reach out to citizens, to remain united in an anti-
corruption agenda, and to provide the EU with politically unbiased feedback altered the 
relationship between NGOs and the State.  
 
The common anti-corruption agenda, which united NGOs in Montenegro, led to the 
establishment of a common strategy with respect to applying pressure to the government. 
The strategy consisted of different acts by NGOs that cooperated with state authorities 
and NGOs that were aiming to expose corrupt officials. For instance, the Center for 
Monitoring and Research’s (CeMI) goal was to support the work of policy and law 
makers by guiding them through the process of addressing citizens’ grievances and EU 
requirements. CeMI understood that the lack of political opposition in Montenegro 
provided Djukanovic’s various coalitions over the years with power similar to the one 
Saakashvili had in Georgia. However, instead of playing the role of a political opposition, 
CeMI made a conscious decision to assist the government. Before and after each election 
that Djukanovic won, NGOs could have taken a different route and assumed the role of 
political opposition. Instead, they preferred to remain unengaged in political competition. 
This preference was shaped by their strong understanding of the role they needed to play 
in order for the Montenegrin transition to democracy to be successful and anti-corruption 
institutions to be consistently monitored, evaluated, and if need be, altered.  
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In other words, through the learning process, which arose from interaction with the 
EU, NGOs in Montenegro managed to avoid a large gap between civil society and the 
state, such as the one that existed in Georgia. One executive in CeMI clearly stated that:  
it is not the job of civil society to engage in politics and 
NGOs are not supposed to become political parties. We 
understand that Djukanovic does not have an opposition and 
we don’t want to become one and be accused of having a 
personal agenda against him.264   
 
This attitude changed the way NGOs, such as CeMI approached their interaction 
with the ruling coalitions and moved it in the direction of cooperation and assistance. The 
head of CeMI confirmed this attitude: “Most NGOs believe that establishing functioning 
anti-corruption institutions is in the government’s best interest and we are there to assist 
them and to provide a different but also important point of view.”265 Thus, NGOs were 
not always a threat to the government but instead were monitoring the government and 
cooperating with it, staying focused on anti-corruption, instead of political competition.    
  
At the same time, other NGOs, such as MANS, took a different approach to 
influencing the work of policy-makers. MANS’s sole role was to expose corrupt officials 
and to show that resources are available but political will is lacking. The strategy that 
MANS employed was an investigative one. Using citizens’ complaints the NGO 
conducted investigations, the results from which it sent to the prosecutor general, all the 
relevant public authorities, and the EU Delegation in Podgorica. This role allowed 
                                                
264 Author’s interview with Ana Selic, CeMI, October 2014] 
265 Auhtor’s interview with Zlatko Vujovic, CeMI, October 2014 
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MANS to identify specific instances of corruption and monitor the functioning of the 
entire anti-corruption system. In addition to exposing officials, MANS then was able to 
trace the process of anti-corruption reaction and to produce analysis with respect to where 
in the system transparency and accountability were lacking or where institutions didn't 
network.     
 
Most importantly, the relationship between the EU and domestic NGOs remained 
constant. NGOs, such as MANS, consistently sent their reports to the EU Delegation in 
Montenegro, thus providing the Delegation with information regarding the state of affairs 
of domestic anti-corruption arrangements. At the same time, NGOs cooperating with the 
government always sought the advice and the input of the EU delegation with respect to 
policies that they were attempting to push.  
 
In sum, the influence of NGOs was possible primarily because of their relationship 
with the EU Delegation. This relationship legitimized NGOs’ efforts and provided them 
with high credibility both among citizens and before the government. NGOs also 
understood that the process of Europeanization and in turn the creation, implementation, 
and enforcement of anti-corruption policies as part of it, needed to take a long time in 
order for norms to be internalized. The goal of this elongated process was to create a 
domestic context that was driven by cooperation and mutual respect for the work of 
government and civil society representatives. Finally, NGOs learned their domestic role 
and did not behave as political parties but remained in the realm of a conscious civil 
society that balanced between monitoring, opposing, and cooperating with governments. 
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2.3  Georgia’s Weak Civil Society and the EU’s Approval of Saakashvili’s 
Policies 
From the very beginning of the post-communist transition of Georgia, the EU took 
a different approach to interacting with domestic actors than it had in Bulgaria and 
Montenegro. In the immediate period before the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia, the 
EU was indeed engaged with domestic civil society and its development (Stefes 2006). 
However, this engagement was one that sought to develop civil society as a direct 
opposition to Shevardnadze’s regime, instead of developing it as a social force that could 
relay citizens’ grievances to the government, monitor the government, and also cooperate 
with it.  
 
Before the Rose Revolution, civil society in Georgia was stronger than in other 
countries from the region. This was evidenced by its ability to mobilize citizens to 
employ peaceful means in order to topple Shevardnadze’s regime. The Rose Revolution 
was a critical juncture not only in the democratic transition of Georgia, but also in the 
relationship that the EU had established with domestic civil society there. The change of 
the government, which resulted from the Rose Revolution, presented the EU and other 
international actors with a choice. In the context of a government that had clearly 
declared a pro-EU and pro-Western position, the EU could continue its work with NGOs 
or it could also behave as if the civil society sector was irrelevant to the fight against 
corruption and there was no benefit from sustaining and further developing it. Without 
claiming that the decision made by the EU was intentional, I showed in previous chapters 
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that the EU chose to abandon its efforts to cooperate with and develop civil society. As a 
result, in the year after the Rose Revolution, civil society in Georgia was disunited, 
incapable of pressuring the government, and lacked the capacity to enlighten the EU 
regarding the progress of domestic anti-corruption reforms. 
 
2.3.1  Interrupted Civil Society Development 
In the immediate aftermath of the events of 2003-2004, NGOs in Georgia lost 
power because most of their members supported Saakashvili’s government and many of 
them moved into the realm of government institutions. This transfer of people from civil 
society to state authorities left civil society weak, and in combination with the 
overwhelming domestic and international support for Saakashvili, the efforts of NGOs 
remained deprived of visibility. Neither domestically nor in the eyes of international 
entities, such as the EU and the OSCE, was civil society a priority.  As a result, the 
NGOs, which were still struggling to maintain the existence of a strong civil society, were 
facing resistance from both the government and other NGOs. They were also facing 
similar resistance when attempting to address the nondemocratic methods employed by 
Saakashvili in his famous anti-corruption reforms.266 In chapter four, I showed in detail 
the progressive disconnectedness of NGO networks that took place in Georgia after the 
Rose Revolution. This disconnected state of NGO networks in Georgia led to an unclear 
strategy with respect to participation in the decision-making  process. Interviews showed 
that NGOs were politically biased and the level of approval of Saakashvili’s party was 
                                                
266 Author’s interview with Georgian NGOs 
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the main divide in the NGO sector. With respect to anti-corruption policies, this divide 
hindered the introduction of meaningful transparency and accountability because it 
prevented civil society from acting as a liaison between the state and its citizens.  
 
2.3.2  Weak Connection with Citizens 
By 2013, the rapid atomization and politicization of civil society in Georgia that 
began in 2003 had created a situation in which citizens did not trust NGOs, and only a 
small percentage of Georgia’s citizens were willing to turn to civil society for advice or 
assistance. A study, solicited by USAID and performed by the East-West Management 
Institute, found that in 2011-2012 only 5% of the surveyed population was aware of what 
NGOs were doing and only 7% were capable of naming an NGO. Furthermore a striking 
portion of the population (25%) could not identify the difference between an NGO and 
political party.267 At the same time, Georgians still trusted their immediate circles, such 
as family and friends, more than formal institutions.268 Georgians were also more likely 
to turn to these circles for help and less likely to follow established public procedures. In 
other words, citizens in this country still exhibit norms conducive to corruption more so 
than internalization of norms of accountability and transparency. As one NGO 
representative put it: “Georgians don’t engage in corruption in their everyday lives 
                                                
267 EWMI - GPAC Civic Engagement 2011 public opinion survey 
268 ibid 
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because of fear of punishment and not because they believe that corruption is detrimental 
to the country and the citizens themselves.”269  
 
These statistics also pointed out the lack of grassroots NGOs in Georgia. As in 
Bulgaria, most Georgian NGOs in 2013 were think-tanks that did not engage with the 
population. To be fair, interviews suggested that to a large extent the lack of engagement 
of anti-corruption NGOs with the population was fear of retaliation from the 
Saakashvili’s repressive regime. Interviewees also expressed hope that the new 
government would allow more freedom to NGOs. This hope identified a certain level of 
awareness of the role of NGOs but it also admitted the inability of NGOs to incite 
change, as well as their complete dependence on state authorities.  
 
One of the few, and also the strongest anti-corruption NGOs, that reached out to 
citizens is the Georgia’s Young Lawyers Association (GYLA). The way they engaged the 
public was by providing services to people hurt by corruption and directing them to the 
appropriate authorities. Often GYLA also took on corruption complaints and managed the 
process of addressing them. While this kind of NGO activity did not bring change within 
the institutional arrangement of anti-corruption efforts, it increased the trust that citizens 
had in civil society organizations. Unfortunately, GYLA was the only civil society 
organization that was capable of interacting with citizens and even this interaction was 
service based rather than a mobilization to set the agenda. 
 
                                                
269 Author’s interview with Tamar Pataraia, CIPDD 
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2.3.3  A Lack of Trust between the EU and CSOs 
The interrupted relationship between the EU and Georgian civil society in 2003 
was not beneficial to the awareness that the EU built with respect to the domestic context 
in Georgia. The EU remained blinded by Saakashvili’s proclaimed commitment to anti-
corruption and by the success of his radical reforms. The EU failed to see the 
centralization of power hidden behind the elimination of petty corruption because it did 
not receive politically unbiased feedback from civil society. 
 
In 2009, the EU introduced the Civil Society Forum (CSF) through its ENP policy 
which marked a critical juncture in the interaction of the EU and domestic state and non-
state actors. The introduction of the CSF was partially driven by Saakashvili’s reaction to 
the mass protests immediately prior to the beginning of his second term in 2008. The 
decision to use the police force to disperse protesters drew EU’s attention to the lack of 
domestic mechanisms to provide checks and balances. Thus, the CSF represented a 
completely new attempt to engage civil society. However two problems hindered the 
success of the CSF. First, the working groups were spread across all the Caucuses 
countries and were trying to address different problems by employing similar tactics. For 
instance, from the very beginning of the 1990s corruption was very different in Georgia 
and Armenia. In Georgia corruption was decentralized while in Armenia the government 
had established a hierarchical structure in which rent extraction on each level was 
distributed among superior public officials (Stefes 2006). After the Rose Revolution in 
2003, Armenia’s corruption remained the same and Georgia moved to centralize power in 
the hands of a small elite circle around Saakashvili which had the opportunity to benefit 
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from rent seeking. This variation in the type of corruption required different approaches 
to address the problem. Yet the working groups on civil society and on corruption 
employed similar tactics in all countries.270  
 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, was the fact that through the Civil Society 
Forum the EU was attempting to build on a domestic civil society that was already 
dysfunctional. For instance, NGOs were already dependent on political parties and 
incapable of providing effective assistance to the government or of monitoring a 
government that lacked the political will to manage corruption. Sponsoring organizations 
like this only meant furthering the status quo in Georgia. 
 
2.3.4  The Hourglass Problem in State-Civil Society Relations 
The EU’s failure to react in a well-informed and coherent way with respect to 
engaging civil society in all critical junctures of Georgia’s post-Rose Revolution history 
was coupled with strong approval of Saakashvili’s reforms. The combination of these two 
essential trends of the EU’s policies toward Georgia resulted not only in weakening the 
EU’s leverage over the government but also in a state-society relationship that resembled 
an hourglass (Maravishvili 2011). The essence of this relationship was the fact that state 
and civil society were almost completely disconnected. Individual NGOs, such as the 
Liberty Institute, Transparency International and the Institute for Development of 
Freedom of Information were producing valuable studies concerning the progress of anti-
                                                
270 Civil Society Forum Report available at: http://eap-csf.eu/en/working-groups/wg1-
democracy-human-rights/ 
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corruption reforms. However, they were virtually deprived of the capability to use the 
acquired knowledge to persuade the government to alter its approach and to address 
corruption on all levels of the political and social life of the country.  
 
The change of the government in 2012-2013 marked another critical juncture in the 
post-communist history of Georgia. Georgia’s transition from a presidential to a 
parliamentary system lessened the power of the office of the president, providing the EU 
with an opportunity to identify the shortcomings of civil society and to reengage NGOs. 
It also provided an opportunity for the new government to establish a strong relationship 
with NGOs. In 2013, it was still too early to conclude what form the interaction between 
civil society organizations and the new government would take. However, it was clear 
that the third sector was weak and even if international actors and the new government 
were willing to engage NGOs, they first would have to work hard to rebuild them into a 
strong domestic actor. 
 
3.  Conclusion 
The way in which conditionality and socialization influenced each other varied by 
country. As a result, the three countries engaged in this study produced varying anti-
corruption institutions and managed corruption in different ways. The three countries 
began their post-communist transitions with weak civil societies (Ekiert and Foa 2012, 
Ekiert and Kubik 2001, Sardamov 2005). Such civil societies were not equipped to 
effectively contribute to anti-corruption policies by monitoring, opposing, and 
cooperating with the government. Civil society was too weak to organize around a 
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common anti-corruption agenda, nor was it able to mobilize support from citizens. This 
chapter demonstrated that in countries where the EU worked to establish a partnership 
with NGOs, it managed to iteratively educate civil society in its domestic and 
international role. Domestically, the EU learned how to cooperate with governments and 
how to mobilize citizens’ grievances in order to apply bottom-up pressure to the state. 
Internationally, where civil society established a partnership with the EU, it provided the 
EU with much needed feedback.   
 
I identified three factors that determined the variation in the EU’s relationship with 
domestic civil society: time, intensity, and type of involvement. The chapter showed that 
in Montenegro the EU became involved in civil society early in the transition of the 
country. Its involvement was intense and based on partnership. As a result, Montenegrin 
NGOs were empowered to provide feedback to the EU and to leverage EU’s 
conditionality to apply pressure to the government. At the same time, civil society 
worked with the EU Delegation to formulate conditions in a way that they address 
particular problems thus imbuing EU requirements with domestic ownership and 
legitimacy.  
 
The cases of Bulgaria and Georgia differed from Montenegro. In Bulgaria, the EU 
engaged civil society in a political dialogue late in the transitioning of the country. It 
cooperated with only some NGOs and on rare occasions. As a result the EU never gained 
a holistic understanding of the factors that caused and sustained corruption in Bulgaria 
such as unclear institutional responsibility and a disproportionately powerful prosecutor 
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general. Instead the EU focused on harmonization of the law and created new but not 
necessarily improved institutions.  
 290 
Chapter Six - Conclusions 
 
In this concluding chapter, I address the following questions: What have we learned 
about the ability of an international organization to impact domestic politics? Why is 
there cross-country variation in the level of compliance with EU-promoted anti-
corruption reforms?  When does compliance with these reforms translate into an effective 
and sustainable means of controlling corruption?  Is analysis of the interaction between 
civil society and the EU in the context of post-communist transition useful for studying 
major changes in the institutions securing the rule of law?  Why did the prospect of EU 
membership not yield the greatest compliance?  
 
I begin by summarizing the research question. I then briefly restate my findings and 
the main argument that the study made. In the subsequent section, I evaluate my 
theoretical approach and my evidence against other explanations offered for 
understanding the variation of compliance with EU-promoted anti-corruption reforms 
across post-communist countries. In this section, I address the two main debates in the 
literature on Europeanization and post-communist transitions. First, I evaluate my 
theoretical approach vis-à-vis arguments that propose that strong and credible conditions, 
incentives, and sanctions from international organizations will persuade domestic 
governments to comply with externally promoted reforms. Then I address the claims of 
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scholars who suggested that under certain conditions, socialization and shaming could 
eliminate corruption in post-communist countries. Second, I address the literature that 
positions domestic against international drivers of post-communist transitions and 
European integration.  
 
Finally, as every study, this one has its limitations. I dedicate the subsequent section 
of this chapter to elaborate on the limitations of my study, and to identify topics and 
questions that future work could examine. I conclude by presenting contributions made 
by this study to the general knowledge of post-communist transitions, democratization, 
establishing the rule of law, and the limits and opportunities of international organizations 
to influence domestic politics.  
 
1.  Puzzles and Arguments 
The main research questions this study examined was, Why did EU’s efforts to 
fight corruption produce varying results across countries? Why did Bulgaria, with the 
most attention and conditionality from the EU and already a member, fail to address 
corruption? And why did Georgia and Montenegro, which had no or very distant EU 
membership prospect, perform relatively better on measures of anti-corruption 
institutional reform as compared to Bulgaria? 
 
In the 1990s, post-communist countries found themselves on a difficult path to 
democracy and a market economy: these countries set out to model their governance 
systems after West European states and the USA. In the absence of the Soviet umbrella 
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that previously dictated the market and political rules, post-soviet counties were too weak 
to establish democratic systems and market economies on their own, and needed 
guidance in the process of transitioning.  
 
Around the same time, the EU quickly realized that while politically and 
economically unstable countries along its borders could destabilize the EU itself, and that 
accepting these countries into the EU could help stabilize them, and ultimately would be 
beneficial to the EU (Commission 2000a, Baldwin et al. 1997, Smith 1998). In addition 
to utility arguments, several studies emphasized the value dimension of enlargement, 
which focused on the EU as the international actor that was the most invested in the 
democratic transitions of post-communist countries. The EU committed to Eastern 
enlargement (European Council 2000) and made the creation of anti-corruption policies a 
priority for individual states. Given this priority, the EU emphasized a conditionality-
based approach, and expected this approach to provide the mechanisms necessary for 
persuading domestic actors to introduce effective and sustainable anti-corruption reforms. 
Yet, the outcomes in terms of resultant levels of corruption and the anti-corruption 
institutional arrangement varied by country (see Table 1.1). This study aimed to explain 
this variation and to shed light on the limits and the opportunities that the EU had in order 
to impact the creation of anti-corruption institutions.     
 
The main argument that I put forward in this study was that the EU had more 
leverage where it engaged civil society in a political dialogue independently of the 
context of membership conditionality. Where this engagement took place, the EU 
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received politically unbiased feedback and was presented with the opportunity to 
maximize the effectiveness of conditionality. At the same time, domestic civil society 
was continuously socialized in norms of transparency, accountability, and political 
participation, and with EU assistance was in a stronger position to pressure governments 
to enact anti-corruption reforms and focus on institutional change. 
 
To explain this variation, I deployed a theoretical framework that focused on the 
three-way interaction between international institutions, domestic state actors, and 
domestic non-state actors. Assessing the relationships that these three types of actors had 
with each other, I began from a constructivist perspective, which centered around 
whether or not mutual learning mediated by a process of interaction between the EU and 
domestic civil society took place. To be sure, while I used institutional analysis to 
determine the level and the type of corruption in each country, my analysis remained 
constructivist. The reason for this is to be found in the main argument that I put forward, 
namely that where continuous mutual learning between the EU and domestic civil society 
took place, the newly created anti-corruption institutions achieved a high degree of 
domestic ownership, and were capable of addressing corruption in a comprehensive 
manner. 
 
In order to test this argument, I introduced two propositions specifying the 
conditions under which the EU was more likely to secure domestic ownership for the 
reforms it proposed to different countries. First, my socialization proposition argued that 
the EU must engage in a political dialogue with non-state actors outside the context of 
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conditionality. Where present, this engagement made domestic state and non-state actors 
more likely to cooperate in the creation of anti-corruption policies, to implement 
functioning anti-corruption institutions, and to establish mechanisms for the enforcement 
of anti-corruption rules and laws. I argued that regardless of the structure of anti-
corruption institutions, domestic ownership of anti-corruption reforms was a necessary 
condition for the effectiveness of newly created anti-corruption mechanisms.  
 
Second, my conditionality proposition stated that EU conditionality could 
successfully achieve its goals only where the EU received politically unbiased feedback 
from domestic non-state actors. Where it did so, the EU was capable of altering its 
conditions, incentives, and sanctions so that they directly addressed specific issues of 
institutional deficiency and were not seen domestically as externally imposed. I have 
shown that where the EU had a domestic partner capable of communicating EU norms of 
transparency, accountability, and political participation to citizens, the shaming 
mechanisms employed by the EU were more likely to effectively pressure governments 
to introduce sustainable anti-corruption reforms.   
 
1.1  Review of the Propositions 
1.1.1  Socialization Proposition 
My socialization proposition argued that in order to secure compliance with anti-
corruption reforms suggested by the EU, the EU needed to convince domestic non-state 
actors of the appropriateness of norms underpinning these reforms, and to work toward 
type II internalization of such norms (Checkel 2002, 2005). Where it did so, the EU 
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altered domestic actors’ beliefs to accept and champion EU norms. Thus, domestic actors 
did not accept and act upon externally promoted anti-corruption reforms merely to 
deepen their relationship with the EU, as was the case of Bulgaria. Instead, domestic 
actors were motivated by their own understandings and deep internalization of norms of 
transparency and accountability which underpinned externally-promoted policies 
(Montenegro). In other words, domestic NGOs and policy-makers were guided by a logic 
of appropriateness instead of a logic of consequences (March and Olsen 1998).  
 
The EU’s engagement in political dialogue with domestic non-state actors varied 
by country. In Montenegro, where the EU was involved with NGOs even before the 
country received independence from Serbia in 2006, NGOs became capable of organizing 
themselves around an anti-corruption agenda, and acted in a synchronized manner in 
order to apply bottom-up pressure to the government (see chapter four). In contrast, in 
Bulgaria EU’s involvement with civil society came in late in the post-communist 
transition of the country, and in Georgia, the EU’s involvement with NGOs was 
interrupted after Saakashvili came to power in 2004. As a consequence, the ability of 
NGOs to act with unity in Georgia and Bulgaria remained low despite the existence of 
individually strong NGOs in both countries. In contrast to Bulgaria and Georgia, in 
Montenegro NGOs were united and acted in a synchronized manner. Some Montenegrin 
NGOs established themselves as partners of policy-making government bodies and took 
an approach based on cooperation with the government, while other NGOs contributed 
by engaging strictly in exposing corrupt government officials. In Bulgaria and Georgia, 
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NGOs were traditionally in opposition of the government, which created and sustained a 
culture of interaction between enemies rather than cooperating actors. 
 
1.1.2  Conditionality Proposition 
My conditionality proposition predicted that EU conditionality can only achieve its 
intended results when the EU received feedback necessary to alter conditions, sanctions, 
and incentives in a way that they address well specified issues of institutional deficiency, 
and conditions are not seen domestically as externally imposed. In Montenegro, the 
strong relationship between the EU Delegation and domestic NGOs allowed NGOs to 
provide such feedback. NGOs were consistently and in a coherent manner attracting the 
EU’s attention to discrepancies in the creation, and more importantly in the 
implementation, of anti-corruption reforms. 
 
In contrast to Bulgaria and Georgia, the feedback provided by Montenegrin NGOs 
to the EU allowed the EU to be more precise with respect to the reforms it suggested, and 
to grow more aware of the sustainability and the potential these reforms could have. In 
Bulgaria and Georgia, such feedback was not present, and the EU was consistently 
insisting on the same set of conditions that it put forward in the beginning of its applying 
of conditionality. Consequently in Bulgaria, the lack of feedback resulted in a quick 
process of harmonization of law and extremely low attention to implementation and 
applicability of the created institutions both on the part of the EU and on the part of 
domestic actors. In Georgia, the EU remained unclear about what precisely it meant when 
it required the country to eradicate corruption. Due to the absence of a relationship 
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between the EU and domestic NGOs in Georgia, the EU was blind to Saakashvili’s non-
democratic methods of eliminating petty corruption. In Georgia, after Saakashvili took 
power, the EU saw faster and stronger results than in any other post-communist country. 
Without a politically independent domestic actor to inform the EU of the potential 
negative impact of the methods employed on the democratic transition of the country, the 
EU failed to adequately address the incumbent’s gradual centralization of power in the 
hands of a small elite group.  
 
2.  Alternative Explanations 
In this section, I show the strength of my approach relative to other theories that 
explain why the EU had the necessary power to persuade some governments, but not 
others, to introduce, implement, and enforce sustainable anti-corruption reforms. The 
academic literature that examines the functioning of international institutions and their 
impact on domestic compliance with externally promoted reforms can be partitioned into 
two major debates. The first debate addresses the tools that the EU has at its disposal and 
juxtaposes EU’s conditionality and socialization. The second debate is focused on the 
actors that are the main drivers of post-communist transitions generally, and anti-
corruption reforms and the securing of the rule of law in particular.  This debate places 
domestic factors, such as political competition, the role of civil society, and the type of 
post-communist transition on the one hand against international actors, such as the EU, 
on the other.  
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My own approach bridges domestic and international actors’ impact on anti-
corruption reforms. It argues that variation in the interaction between domestic and 
international actors explains variation in the level of impact international organizations 
have on domestic politics.  
 
I also argue that the processes of conditionality and socialization created a domestic 
context which determined the level of domestic ownership that existed for anti-corruption 
reforms. In some countries, a bidirectional learning process allowed the EU to gain a 
better understanding of the domestic conditions that hindered the management of 
corruption. Where such learning took place, conditions were established and elaborated 
as a result of the mutual efforts of the EU and domestic actors and were not perceived as 
externally imposed.    
 
2.1  Conditionality versus Socialization  
2.1.1  Conditionality 
Scholars working from a rational choice perspective put forward an argument that 
favors conditionality as the most effective tool of the EU to persuade domestic actors to 
act in a certain way. In other words, in order to achieve their goals, conditions, incentives, 
and sanctions must be such that for domestic actors the benefits of complying with EU 
regulations outweigh the costs of non-compliance. I agree that domestic actors act after 
they perform a careful cost-benefit analysis, and I do not deny their rationality. However, 
my evidence suggests that conditionality had varying effects across countries. 
Montenegro complied with EU recommendations even before membership was on the 
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agenda, and Bulgaria traditionally failed to satisfy conditions. With the help of EU 
rewards, Georgia transformed corruption from decentralized and endemic before 2004 
(Stefes 2006) to centralized and in the hands of an elite group after the Rose Revolution. 
The evidence presented in this research suggested that domestic policy-makers’ rational 
analysis is bounded by their perceptions of what is costly and what is beneficial. 
Therefore, where the EU and domestic actors had different understandings of the 
meanings imbued in particular conditions, incentives, and sanctions, the EU’s leverage 
remained at best weak, and at worst it had counterproductive results.  
 
More specifically, the argument in favor of conditionality is that the size of 
rewards, the speed of rewards, the credibility of threats, and the determinacy of 
conditions are crucial for altering the cost-benefit analysis of domestic actors, and in turn 
their willingness to comply. However, the evidence presented in this study showed that 
the outcomes of conditionality were not always as might have been predicted by the size, 
determinacy, and credibility hypotheses. 
 
The size and speed hypothesis predicts that the likelihood of rule adoption 
increases with the size and speed of rewards (Kelley 2004, Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2005, Andonova 2005). For instance, in a study of air pollution policies in 
Poland, Andonova (2005) found that these policies were only altered in order to comply 
with EU regulations in the late 1990s, when the accession date approached. This 
argument put forward the expectation that countries receiving membership - the ultimate 
incentive - should have been the ones that comply with EU-promoted anti-corruption 
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policies the most. From the three countries examined in this study, Bulgaria was the only 
one that received membership and has been a member since 2007. I showed, however, 
that anti-corruption institutional arrangements in Bulgaria were the least capable of 
addressing and managing corruption, and that levels of corruption in Bulgaria remained 
high. Furthermore, I have shown that corruption in Bulgaria remained endemic even in 
2013, after the country had been a member of the EU for eight years.  
 
In Georgia, the size of rewards also seemed to have limited explanatory power. The 
country had no membership prospect. Thus, the size of the reward that Georgia could 
receive was significantly smaller than the reward already received by Bulgaria. Georgia 
was aiming at deepening the relationship with the EU by entering a preferential trade 
regime with the EU, and by achieving visa liberalization for the EU. The country, indeed, 
received the former reward in July 2013 when it signed the Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs).271  Yet, as I showed, Georgia virtually eliminated petty 
corruption, but it also strengthened grand corruption.  
 
In a slightly different manner, Vachudova (2008) argues that countries comply the 
most immediately prior to receiving membership. She finds that political parties followed 
the prescriptions of the EU before membership was granted, and that following EU 
accession parties tended to adopt more nationalist and culturally conservative positions.  
 
                                                
271 The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas is available at 
http://www.esf.be/new/esf-eu-trade-policy/eu-free-trade-agreements/eu-georgia-dcfta/ 
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With respect to anti-corruption reforms, then, this argument sets the expectation 
that in 2013, only a year after Montenegro began official membership negotiations with 
the EU, the country would exhibit the highest levels of compliance, and that Bulgaria 
would comply the least. Indeed, this was consistent with my findings. But, although this 
argument might explain the high level of compliance in Montenegro in 2013, it fails to 
address the country’s compliance prior to the beginning of negotiations in 2012. As 
chapter three showed, Montenegro was introducing institutions following EU 
prescriptions as far back as 2005. Furthermore, the argument does not explain why 
Montenegro was complying in the absence of a projected date of accession and even 
before membership conditionality peaked.   
 
The argument that the EU’s leverage decreases after membership is granted did not 
hold in the case of Bulgaria either. This argument predicts that levels of compliance in 
Bulgaria would increase immediately prior to 2007 and decrease immediately after. Yet, 
my evidence shows that in the period 2004-2006, Bulgaria was not driven by the fact that 
EU membership was approaching, and levels of corruption did not decrease. Instead, the 
country was in a process of negotiating the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism 
(CVM) and thus securing more conditionality from the EU. As I showed in chapter three, 
even after the introduction of the CVM, compliance was not secured and Bulgaria was 
sanctioned on two occasions, in 2008 and 2013.   
 
To be fair, Vachudova (2005) does not entirely dismiss the possibility that the EU 
influenced domestic affairs through channels that were different from strong membership 
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conditionality. She distinguishes between EU’s passive leverage before conditionality 
peaked, and their active leverage after the introduction of clear conditions in the context 
of accession. In her view, however, active leverage was uniquely successful in illiberal 
pattern states such as Bulgaria and Romania. This argument suggests that pre-accession 
conditionality in Bulgaria would have had a positive effect on anti-corruption institutions. 
Yet, I showed in chapter two that institution-building in Bulgaria was equally inefficient 
during EU membership-conditionality, and after it, when the CVM was introduced.   
 
My own theoretical approach argued that it was passive leverage that created the 
context that determined the level of success of active leverage. In Bulgaria, in the absence 
of strong engagement with non-state actors before 2001, the EU did not manage to 
diffuse norms of transparency, accountability, and participation in the NGO community. 
Thus, NGOs were not prepared to effectively monitor and cooperate with the government 
after 2001. Similarly, in Georgia NGOs were left without the EU’s support after 
Saakashvili took power, and as a consequence they opened space for the government to 
centralize power. In contrast, in Montenegro, the EU engaged non-state actors in political 
dialogue before membership was on the agenda, and as a result, NGOs were capable of 
assisting the EU with introducing the appropriate conditions during the period of the 
EU’s active leverage. 
 
I also showed that in the absence of political dialogue between the EU and 
domestic civil society, compliance with EU-promoted reforms did not necessarily 
translate into effective management of corruption. Only where the EU and domestic civil 
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society were learning from each other were the EU’s recommendations elaborated in a 
process of cooperation with domestic non-state actors, and the reforms gained domestic 
ownership and targeted well defined and specific problems. An extensive body of 
literature has differentiated between compliance with and the effectiveness of policies 
(Jacobson and Brown Weiss 1995, 1997). The definition of compliance provided by 
Young distinguishes compliance from effectiveness (Young 1979). According to this 
definition, a poorly designed policy may secure compliance but it is unclear whether the 
policy is effective with respect to addressing the underlying problem (Simmons 1998). 
For instance, Bulgaria was formally complying by introducing most of the legislative 
changes that the EU recommended. Yet levels of corruption did not decrease. Similarly to 
Bulgaria, Montenegro was complying with EU-promoted reforms. However, in contrast 
to Bulgaria, in Montenegro these reforms targeted specific problems of corruption and 
not the mere harmonization of law. 
 
My theoretical approach is equipped to explain the effectiveness of conditionality 
because it emphasizes not only the size and speed of rewards and the credibility of 
sanctions, but also whether or not domestic actors understood conditions and suggestions 
for reforms in the same way as the EU did. I claim that where conditions were the 
product of cooperation between the EU and domestic non-state actors (as was in the case 
of Montenegro), the EU was capable of securing a degree of domestic ownership for 
externally promoted reforms, and in turn was able to pressure the government into 
achieving effective reforms. In contrast, where the EU’s conditions were perceived as 
imposed by international entities, conditionality led to ad hoc and disconnected reforms 
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(as in Bulgaria) or unintentionally assisted the incumbent in centralizing power and 
creating conditions favorable to rent extraction on the part of a small elite group (as in 
Georgia). 
 
Examination of the type of conditionality, the extent to which conditions were 
addressing specific problems, and the variation in the success of conditionality on per 
country basis also made explicable the types of corruption prominent in each country. 
Thus, I showed that corruption in Georgia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria had very different 
characteristics, and that the size of the reward offered by the EU with respect to 
membership status had little to do with it.    
 
Scholars also identify the credibility of conditionality as the main explanatory 
variable for variation in compliance. The main argument that is consistently put forward 
is that the more credible the conditions, incentives, and sanctions were, the higher the 
possibility of rule adoption became. Dimitrova (2005), for instance, finds that in the 
Czech Republic the administrative reform suggested by the EU failed because the 
government did not perceive the threats of exclusion from the 2004 enlargement as 
credible. If this argument is viable, we should expect that Bulgaria would have complied 
the most of all three countries. Yet, evidence suggested otherwise. I showed that in 
Bulgaria the EU’s conditionality was credible, as evidenced by sanctioning on more than 
one occasion, and that conditionality continued even after accession, albeit in a different 
form through the CVM. In Montenegro, the credibility of rewards might be perceived as 
low because the country did not have a determined accession date, and the negotiation 
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process could be prolonged indefinitely. Consequently, Montenegro should not have been 
expected to comply more than Bulgaria. Yet, as I showed in chapter two, Montenegro’s 
anti-corruption reforms were significantly more steady and sustainable than those in 
Bulgaria. In Georgia, the credibility of rewards was high, but that did not prevent 
Saakashvili from using the EU’s legitimization of his actions in order to centralize power. 
 
Thus, credibility by itself does not say much about the outcomes of conditionality. I 
suggest that the process by which credibility was established provides a better 
explanation of the effects that conditionality has. While I agree that the credibility of 
conditionality factored in the decision made by domestic actors to comply with certain 
recommendations of the EU, I also show that credibility is a social construct, which is 
based on the presence or absence of shared understandings of domestic actors and 
international organizations. Evidence showed that in Montenegro, it was not credible 
conditionality that drove the country to comply. Rather, it was the process of interaction 
between civil society, the state, and the EU that imbued EU actions with meaning and 
credibility. More specifically, it was the mutual learning of the EU and domestic non-
state actors that provided a shared meaning of the conditions, incentives, and sanctions. 
In contrast, in Georgia the EU did not engage actors other than the government, and left it 
to Saakashvili and a small circle around him to foster the credibility of reforms among 
citizens. Even when in 2008 the government deployed the police against peaceful 
protesters and the EU threatened sanctions, it did not have enough leverage to change the 
incumbent.  
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In a slightly different manner, the clarity of conditions has been often used to 
explain variation in compliance. The clarity argument predicts that the specificity of 
conditions would increase credibility (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, Dimitrova 
2002, Grabbe 2004, 2005). However, I showed that the clarity of conditions, just as 
credibility, was secured through shared meanings which were formed during the process 
of interaction (Wendt 1994, Checkel 2005, Weaver 2006, Risse 2011). In this sense, in 
order to make conditions clear, both domestic actors and international institutions must 
have shared understandings of the meaning of the fight against corruption. As I showed 
in chapter three, Bulgarian and Georgian authorities rarely understood the message sent 
by the EU precisely because of a lack of shared understandings. In contrast, in 
Montenegro NGOs were equipped to translate EU’s messages to both the government 
authorities and the citizens.  
      
2.1.2  Socialization  
Scholars coming from a constructivist perspective argue that different levels of 
socialization explain the cross-country variation in compliance with EU-promoted 
reforms (Checkel 2001, 2005, Gheciu 2005a, 2005b, Sedelmeier 2006, Epstein 2008, 
Sedelmeier and Epstein 2011). The argument presented by these studies predicts that rule 
adoption is more likely if the EU convinces domestic actors of the appropriateness of the 
reforms, or when the ruling elite or other societal groups identify themselves with the 
community that establishes the rules (Checkel 2001, Johnston 2001).  
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I draw on these arguments and show that indeed, in Montenegro the process of 
social learning led to the inclusion of NGOs in the negotiation with the EU, and that a 
lack of social learning prevented Bulgarian and Georgian NGOs from influencing anti-
corruption policy making. Perhaps more importantly, social learning also furthered the 
understanding of the EU with respect to the domestic context which it was attempting to 
alter. In turn, the EU moved away from the one-approach-fits-all, and became more 
flexible in its recommendations and in the way it presented conditions to domestic actors. 
For instance, this type of mutual learning led to separating what used to be domestic and 
judicial affairs negotiation chapter in Bulgaria into two negotiation chapters in 
Montenegro and Croatia. Such learning by the EU also led to the altering of requirements 
for Chapter 24 of the negotiations in Montenegro, and to the consequent focus on the 
establishing of a track record of actual convictions and sentences, instead of mere 
harmonization of law.  
 
However, while following the socialization literature and claiming that the EU’s 
role was to serve as a teacher of norms for domestic actors, I also acknowledge that in 
some countries Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) were better informed and more 
convinced in the appropriateness of liberal democracy at the outset of the transitions than 
in others. When this was the case, the role of the EU as a socializing agent indeed should 
have been less significant.   
 
It has also been proven that the presence of large western democracy minded 
groups did not mean that these groups knew how to mobilize society and how to pressure 
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governments into particular actions. For instance, David Ost (2005) convincingly argues 
that though the Solidarity movement in Poland was motivated by revitalizing civil society 
and liberal democracy and by challenging the communist regime, it eventually pursued a 
liberal economic program and completely abandoned the economic interests of the 
working classes. Similarly, Rachel Epstein (2008) showed that the existence of 
communities of experts did not explain the acceptance of central bank independence by 
former monobanks, by parliaments, and by societies (p. 306). I am sympathetic to 
Epstein’s argument. However, my evidence shows that communities of experts that were 
truly democracy–minded could contribute to the sustainable introduction of anti-
corruption reforms under certain conditions: First, the EU’s involvement in the 
mobilization of such communities, and second the EU’s application of such communities’ 
knowledge to the domestic context.  
 
Moreover, my evidence shows that prior to the fall of the communist regimes, 
neither Montenegro, Bulgaria, or Georgia had movements resembling the Polish 
Solidarity. However, later in their transitions both Bulgaria and Georgia made an attempt 
to mobilize experts living abroad. The Saakashvili government consisted of people that 
had received their education in Western Europe or the US, were professionals in their 
areas, and were aware of what was considered good governance, transparency, and 
accountability. As Shevarnadze had said in the late 1990s, these were the people that 
“knew English and computers.”272 The fact that they were included in the government in 
2004 represented an attempt to bring home Georgians that were already convinced of the 
                                                
272 Author’s interview with Gia Nodia, CIPDD 
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appropriateness of the rules promoted by the EU and the West. Yet, even in this case, the 
lack of a civil society that was capable of relaying citizens’ grievances to the government 
and monitoring the government’s work left a gap in anti-corruption efforts, and ultimately 
led to transformation of corruption instead of its elimination.  
 
Similarly, in 2000, the government of the United Democratic Forces (UDF) made 
an unsuccessful attempt to form epistemic communities by bringing Bulgarian experts 
from abroad and tasking them with furthering the country’s integration with the EU. The 
government introduced the Bulgarian Easter – an initiative which was supposed to 
organize yearly meetings of Bulgarian expats. However, in 2001 the former tzar of 
Bulgaria - Simeon Sakskoburggotski – entered the Bulgarian political scene and broke 
the two-party system that existed until this moment. He formed the political party 
National Movement for Stability and Progress (known under the Bulgarian acronym 
NDSV), and consequently a government. Both the party and the government included 
participants from Bulgarian Easter. Both Milen Velchev,273 who became a Minister of 
Finance, and Nikolay Vassilev, who was appointed as a Deputy Prime Minister and a 
Minister of the Economy, were very active in the Bulgarian Easter initiative. In 2001, as 
far as NDSV was concerned, the Bulgarian Easter initiative had served its purpose and 
the connection between NDCV and the initiative was destroyed. The government ceased 
to respond to invitations from the initiative for common participation in public projects, 
and the initiative progressively became demotivated and its role slowly but steadily 
                                                
273 In 2003, Velchev was accused in the Yacht Scandal, where he was photographed with 
Ivan Todorov, one of the most successful drug traffickers in Bulgaria.   
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faded. In the period of 2001-2005, the initiative only made public some declarations, 
stating its discontent with public problems. There were no constructive propositions with 
respect to addressing these problems. The number of participants also declined. In 2004, 
the fifth meeting of the initiative gathered only around 350 participants, with 50 of them 
from abroad. In comparison, in the first meeting in 2000, approximately 600 
professionals participated, with more than half of them from abroad.  
 
The failure of the Bulgarian Easter initiative was to a large extent caused by the 
initiative’s complete lack of cooperation with international organizations. In the absence 
of EU legitimization and support for the Bulgarian Easter, the inability of Bulgarian 
experts to mobilize despite their alleged belief in Western norms became visible. The 
goal of the Bulgarian Easter was directly related to securing EU membership, which 
raised expectations that EU representatives would be at least minimally involved. Yet, 
there were no attempts at inviting EU representatives, nor were there attempts at making 
the EU aware of the initiative’s work. As a result, instead of the original goal of bringing 
in experts from outside of the country, the initiative supplied personnel for NDSV and 
secured the party’s victory in the 2001 parliamentary elections.  
  
Finally, the socialization literature suggests that the EU effectively uses naming and 
shaming tools in order to persuade governments into introducing reforms. Epstein (2008) 
argued that international organizations did not need to secure domestic internalization of 
norms in order to transfer rules from the EU. In her view, international organizations’ 
prescriptions become  
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acceptable not simply because domestic actors agree that the 
principles underpinning such policies are correct. They may 
not. If postcommunist states sign on to such policies, it is 
also to exploit international institutions’ definition of 
optimal policy in the service of constructing a Western 
identity that so many citizens of Central and Eastern Europe 
seek for themselves.274  
 
In other words, domestic actors did not need to believe in the appropriateness of 
norms underpinning EU-promoted policies. Instead, they needed to be shamed into them. 
I agree with the potential that naming and shaming tools have over domestic actors. 
However, my evidence suggested that the effects of naming and shaming varied across 
countries and that this variation was due to variation in the level of internalization of 
particular norms. As Pawson (2002) argues, “we need to discover the prevailing norms 
and values operating around the social problem and how formidably they gather in 
support of shaming sanctions.”275  
 
Despite material sanctions invoked through the CVM, in Bulgaria the CVM also 
served as a shaming mechanism. It effectively declared that the country was not ready to 
become a member in 2007, and that Bulgaria was far away from inclusion in the 
Schengen zone. Certainly, in order for shaming to be productive, certain scope conditions 
need to be in place. For instance, Epstein (2008) argues that uncertainty of domestic 
actors about how to make policies, when external promoters of ideas and norms are 
                                                
274 Epstein, R. (2008a), In Pursuit of Liberalism, John Hopkins University Press, p. 291 
275 Pawson R. (2002) Evidence and Policy and Naming and Shaming, Policy Studies, 23 
(3), p. 8 
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credible, and when domestic actors seek social approbation of international institutions, 
shaming is more likely to have its intended results. Krain (2012) finds that naming and 
shaming is successful when it represents a direct threat to the reputation, identity, 
international legitimacy, and domestic viability of the actors that are being shamed. In 
Bulgaria, at the beginning of membership negotiations, all these conditions were present. 
Yet, shaming the country into an inferior status relative to all other member states did not 
have the intended effect. As discussed in chapter two, reforms remained superficial and 
unproductive. In contrast, a strong campaign on the part of the EU shamed the 
Montenegrin government at their lack of cooperation with NGOs. As a result, NGOs 
became active participants in the negotiation process, and were openly provided 
information which allowed them to effectively monitor the government.  
 
The argument outlined in this study claimed that what matters for uncertainty, 
credibility, status, and a viable threat to the incumbent’s legitimacy was the existence of 
previous interactions between the EU and civil society. Where such interaction existed, 
and it was based on partnership and political dialogue, shaming was successful because 
international and domestic actors were imbuing ideas with the same meaning.  
 
2.2  Domestic Politics  
The second school of thought in explaining variation in compliance with 
international organizations argues that domestic factors are the primary drivers of 
compliance. Domestic factors that are offered to explain variation in compliance with 
international organizations range from political competition, the type of post-communist 
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transition, to the role of civil society. This school of thought claims that the outcome in 
terms of anti-corruption reforms is exogenous to the process of EU interaction with 
domestic actors. However, my evidence shows that this is not the case and in the next 
paragraphs I explain why. 
 
2.2.1  Political Competition  
Political competition has been often used to explain why some countries are more 
corrupt than others (Kitschelt et al 1999, Orenstein 2001, Vachudova 2005, Larreguy et 
al. 2015, Banerjee et al. 2011, Humphrey and Weinstein 2012). For instance, Furaz and 
Finan (2005) find that in Brazil second term mayors had significantly larger incidents of 
corruption because the two-term limit relieved them from pressure for reelection. In a 
study of nine post-communist countries, Grzymala-Busse argues that in the early phases 
of the democratic transitions the state represented “the most lucrative and readily 
wellspring of material resources,”276 and hence “an inevitable target of governing parties 
seeking material assets.”277 Therefore, she claims that in the absence of domestic and 
international actors to control parties in power, these parties needed to be faced with a 
credible risk of replacement. Political parties in power would “rather constrain 
themselves, and all subsequent governments, than allow their successors to have access to 
state resources.”278  
                                                
276 Grzymala-Busse, A. (2005)  Rebuilding  Leviathan: Party Competition and State 
Exploitation in Post-Communist Democracies, Ann Arbor: University of Mitchigan, p. 31 
277 ibid. 
278 ibid 
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However, my evidence suggests that the goal of reelection and the fear of losing 
power did not necessarily lead to effective reforms in the area of anti-corruption. In fact, 
as discussed in chapter four, Saakashvili’s government did not fear political competition. 
While it indeed strived for reelection, it chose to secure its next term in office by 
centralizing power and suppressing political opposition and civil society. Simultaneously, 
the government strategically eliminated petty corruption as a publicly visible mitigation 
of the issue to reduce its perceived severity.  From all governments in the examined 
period, Bulgarian politicians were the ones that traditionally had the most reason to fear a 
loss of power. In contrast to Georgia and Montenegro, which sustained the same party in 
power for most of the period after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, Bulgaria experienced 
twelve changes of government in the period between 1990-2013  (see Table 3.1). Yet, as 
shown in Chapter two, this political competition did not pressure governments into 
introducing viable reforms that would effectively manage corruption.    
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Bulgaria Montenegro Georgia 
1990 – non-party 
1991 – United Democratic 
Forces (UDF) 
1992 – Non-party 
1994 – Non-party 
1995 – Bulgarian Socialist Party 
(BSP) 
1997 – UDF 
2001 – National Movement 
Simeon II (NDSV) 
2005 – BSP 
2009 – Citizens for European 
Development of Bulgaria 
(GERB) 
2013 – non-party 
2013 – BSP 
2014 - GERB 
1991 –Democratic Party 
of Socialists (DPS) 
1998 – DPS  
2003 – DPS  
2006 – DPS  
2008 – DPS  
2010 – DPS  
1991 - Gamsakhurdia 
1995 – Shevardnadze 
2000 – Shevardnadze 
2003 - Burjanadze 
2004 - Saakashvili 
2008 – Saakashvili 
2013 -Margvelashvili 
Table 3.1 – Political Turnover by Country 
 
My own argument claims that political competition is not always a reliable 
explanation of variation in outcomes from anti-corruption reforms. Instead, the evidence 
presented here showed that anti-corruption reforms achieved their desired end when 
public debate and partnership between domestic state actors, domestic non-state actors, 
and international actors was present. Thus, in Montenegro, despite the consistent absence 
of political competition, anti-corruption reforms were slow but steady, while in Georgia, 
which similarly lacked political opposition, corruption was transformed rather than 
managed. In Montenegro, the lack of political competition was compensated for by 
participation of civil society in the decision-making process, NGOs cooperation with 
policy makers, and effective mechanisms of monitoring, which allowed for the creation, 
implementation, and enforcement of reform. In Bulgaria and Georgia, such participation 
of civil society was not present and, as the two case studies showed, corruption was not 
managed despite  the presence (Bulgaria) or absence (Georgia) of political competition. 
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In Georgia, I showed that the fight against corruption was entirely guided by 
Saakashvili’s administration and it served to solidify his power and destroy the little and 
weak opposition. There were two problems with respect to corruption and anti-corruption 
in 2013 in Georgia. First, it was the transformation of corruption that was advertised both 
domestically and abroad as a complete eradication of corruption. Second, and most 
important, it was the way EU unintentionally had facilitated such transformation.   
 
2.2.2  Civil Society 
Scholars that emphasize domestic political factors as the variable with the most 
potential to explain variation in anti-corruption outcomes also stress the ability of civil 
society to monitor governments and hold them accountable (Backer and Stigler 1974, 
Nagin et al. 2002). Shleifer and Vishny (1993) found that weak civil society added further 
to the institutionalization of oligarchic monopolies. According to Olken (2007), 
monitoring by external actors, such as NGOs, reduced corruption. In a randomized field 
experiment on reducing corruption in over 600 Indonesian village road projects, he found 
that “increasing the probability of external audits substantially reduced missing funds in 
the project.”279  
 
I agree that the civil society is a primary actor in the process of managing 
corruption and that monitoring is a necessary condition for holding government officials 
accountable. However, my evidence suggests that in order for civil society to secure 
                                                
279 Olken, B. (2007a) Corruption Perceptions vs. Corruption Reality, NBER Working 
Paper #12428 p. 243 
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transparency and accountability, specifically in the post-communist world, it must not 
limit its role to merely monitoring officials. It also needs to cooperate with ruling elites in 
creating and implementing anti-corruption policies (Mungiu-Pippidi 2013). In both 
Georgia and Bulgaria, NGOs shaped as think tanks produced detailed reports and 
possessed extensive knowledge with respect to the progress of anti-corruption reforms, 
yet their impact on these reforms remained low. For instance, I showed (see chapter four) 
that Montenegro’s NGOs differed from their counterparts in Bulgaria and Georgia, 
precisely in their ability to insert representatives in the decision-making  process, and 
thus influence this process. In Georgia, NGOs and the government had consistently been 
locked in to an “hourglass” type of relationship, and in Bulgaria civil society was 
disorganized and incapable of forming the necessary coalitions in order to apply bottom-
up pressure.  
 
Furthermore, when discussing the role of civil society, authors often remain critical 
of civil society in former communist countries, and point out that the civil society in these 
countries has been traditionally underdeveloped (Wedel 2015, Perez-Diaz 2014, Ganev 
2014, Ekiert and Foa 2012, Sardamov 2005). For instance, Kabakchieva et al. (2011) 
found that in Bulgaria civil society was not equipped to apply bottom-up pressure to 
governments due to both a lack of administrative capacity and knowledge. Muskhelishvili 
(2011) made a similar argument with respect to the “hourglass” situation in which civil 
society and government authorities found themselves in Georgia. While this literature 
establishes firmly the gap between society and the state domestically, it leaves the 
relationship between domestic civil society and international entities, such as the EU, 
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under researched. Some of the existing literature on transnational advocacy networks 
(TANs) addresses the problem, but it is for the most part focused on the interaction of 
NGOs or advocacy groups from different countries (Keck and Sikkink 1996, 1998, 
Mekata 2000, Donnelly 2002). Some have attempted to analyze the interaction of 
domestic NGOs and international organizations (Burgerman 1998, Börzel and Pamuk 
2010, 2011, 2013, Dimitrova and Buzogany 2013, Turkina and Kostakakis 2014). 
However, most often these studies examine the impact that international organizations 
have on domestic NGOs and underrepresent the influence that NGOs have on 
international institutions.    
 
My theoretical focus addresses the under researched role of NGOs, namely the role 
of providing information back to international entities, and the education of international 
actors on the domestic context. I agree that in a process of interaction, the EU could 
legitimize NGOs domestically, but I also emphasize that NGOs could provide feedback 
to the EU. Civil society was susceptible to external influence throughout the process of 
its formation after the fall of the communist regimes in each country. In comparison to 
the old members of the EU, the fall of the Berlin Wall found all former Eastern bloc 
countries with weak civil society (Howard 2003), and one that proved in some countries 
incapable of consolidation after an initial flurry of activity in the late 1980s and the 
beginning of the 1990s (Mungiu-Pippidi 2006). I showed that where the EU engaged 
NGOs in political dialogue, not only NGOs became capable of working as a coherent 
actor with a clearly defined anti-corruption agenda, but also the EU became capable of 
adjusting its conditions, incentives, and sanctions.  
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Finally, authors have questioned the applicability of the western concept of civil 
society in the post-communist world. I began this study with the assumption that civil 
society in the post-communist world must take on a specific shape in order to further the 
Europeanization process of transitioning countries. The concept of civil society that I 
entertained here was very much influenced by the concept that underpins Western civil 
society, and that had its origins in the work of John Locke and Adam Smith. I justify my 
approach with the Europeanization focus of the study, and the fact that this study has 
been primarily engaged in understanding the role of international organizations, such as 
the EU, in managing corruption in the post-communist world, and less with the general 
topic of corruption in transitioning societies. Therefore, I have used the EU’s 
understanding of civil society as a starting point of the study.  
 
Indeed, scholars have been long examining the possibility that transitioning 
societies and specifically post-communist countries were developing a different kind of 
civil society, one that operated in a manner that is not comparable with its Western 
counterpart. For instance, Sardamov (2005) explains in great detail that in contrast to 
civil society in the Western world, post-communist civil society does not have organic 
origins. As a consequence, NGOs in the post-communist world may in fact sustain the 
crisis of institutions during the post-communist transitions of the countries from the 
Eastern Bloc, instead of correcting it. This conceptualization of civil society as a 
community primarily based on kinship ties, instead of social group, may be indeed 
valuable and certainly worth studying. In this aspect, my research sheds light on the 
 320 
limits and opportunities of the EU to influence the shaping of domestic non-state actors 
and on the tools that are effective with respect to this process. 
 
3.  Extending the Argument 
 
As with many studies, the limitations of this work raise many questions. The 
following section addresses the limitations of the study, and suggests some question 
derived by these limitations that could extend the argument.    
 
3.1  How Equipped is a Social Network Analysis (SNA) to Address the Issue? 
While SNA is a tool designed to evaluate the extent to which actors in networks are 
interconnected, there are various ways of coding data which may show varying results. In 
order to establish the level of networking of civil society in the three countries, I have 
used social network analysis. By using density of the network metrics over time, I 
established the extent to which NGOs cooperate with each other, and therefore the extent 
to which civil society is unified. Critics of Network Analysis have pointed out the 
importance of coding data in order to establish the influence of certain nodes. For 
instance, I have chosen to code the inter-NGO relationships and relationships between 
NGOs and the EU as unidirectional relations. This means that the analyzed data does not 
distinguish the initiator of an interaction. The network density measure sheds light on the 
network of NGOs in each country in each period. It attempts to show the level of 
interaction of NGOs as a property of the whole network, instead of as a property of a 
single node in the network. In this sense, directionality is not essential, though, if 
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included, it may lead to interesting trends within each network. However, when the EU 
was included in the SNA, the goal was to show the influence of a single node - namely 
the EU. In this case, considering the initiator of each interaction may reveal how 
proactive  the EU was in seeking political dialogue with domestic non-state actors. While 
I have accounted for the EU initiative in the qualitative analysis, the theory presented 
here will benefit from a future study, which includes directionality of EU relations.  
 
Finally, comparability of centrality within SNA is a controversial subject with a 
large body of research showing that centrality is not comparable across networks because 
of the changing number of nodes in networks (Wasserman and Faust, 2006). I have coped 
with this by employing ranking of nodes based on their centrality. Scholars are currently 
developing a temporal network model (Krivitsky et al. 2012), which could serve as an 
additional testing of my findings in future research.  
 
The sample was also inconclusive with respect to data from Montenegro. A change 
in the procedure by which NGOs register was made in 2012, which rendered previous 
data regarding NGOs’ work unavailable. The unavailability of such data made the 
comparison over time and across space incomplete. Further research is necessary in order 
to compile an exhaustive list of NGOs that worked in the area of anti-corruption and 
good governance in Montenegro in the period of 2000-2013 and to test the theory in the 
presence of this information.  
 
3.2  Is the Study Replicable in Other Countries?  
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The selection of cases for this study was based on two independent variables - 
namely variation in interaction between the EU and domestic civil society, and variation 
in membership status. I have argued that where the EU engaged non-state actors in 
political dialogue prior to the point at which conditionality peaked, it managed to imbue 
norms of transparency and accountability with meaning shared by domestic actors.  
 
This study attempted to generalize about the influence of the EU on managing 
levels of corruption in all post-communist countries. Yet, it did so solely based on a 
comparison of countries that had similar legacies from their pre-communist period. Some 
scholars have argued that in some countries, such as the ones that were granted 
membership in the 2004 EU enlargement, norms of transparency and accountability were 
already present, for these countries were the subject of historical influence that was 
championing EU norms and values. For instance, scholars (Dimitrova-Grazjl 2005) 
argued that some post-communist countries, such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic, were culturally predisposed to accept EU norms and rules by the virtue of their 
historical influence by the Habsburg Empire. In contrast, Bulgaria, Romania, and the 
former Yugoslav republics’ cultural legacies were inherently incompatible with Western 
norms of transparency and accountability because of these countries long influence by the 
Ottoman Empire. Others have made the argument that corruption is a culturally loaded 
idea, and what constitutes corruption in the Western world and in the old members of the 
EU is not the same as what constitutes corruption in other countries (Uromboyev et al. 
2013). The argument that I put forward in this study is based on the premises that culture 
changes, albeit slowly, and shows the mechanisms by which the EU could contribute to 
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such change. Yet, it will benefit from including in the study a country that has different 
cultural legacies than the states researched in this study, such as Poland, or Croatia.  
 
On a similar note, Georgia has been traditionally considered to be a leader amongst 
the post-Soviet republics. To test the argument that the EU role in shaping civil society is 
crucial for the establishment of anti-corruption institutions that indeed manage 
corruption, and in light of the recent refusal of some countries to continue on the path to 
EU integration, Armenia becomes an interesting case. Preliminary research showed that 
the EU did not engage with civil society in Armenia  (Gillespie and Youngs 2002). 
Among agencies that were engaged with civil society development and good governance 
promotion, the Open Society Institute’s Assistance Foundation Armenia (OSIAF - 
Armenia) was a leader. My theory would then predict that Armenia is not performing 
well in the fight against corruption because civil society was not capable of applying 
bottom up pressure to the government, and could not leverage the EU in order to 
contribute to anti-corruption reforms. Indeed, data shows that Armenia is still one of the 
most corrupt countries from the former Soviet Bloc. Transparency International puts the 
country in 94th place out of 175 surveyed countries. This makes it the sixth most corrupt 
country from all the post-communist states.  
 
3.3  Is the Study Replicable on Other Issues? 
I have shown that it is difficult for NGOs and international actors such as the EU to 
address corruption in the post-communist world because of the hidden and illegal nature 
of the phenomenon. Given this, critics may question the replicability of the study on other 
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issues. For instance, it is expected that shaming a country into addressing grand 
corruption that is hidden and difficult to establish in the first place is harder than shaming 
a country into addressing easily identifiable policies that are not environmentally 
friendly. Indeed, Dimitrova and Buzogany (2013) argued that the domestic environmental 
NGOs in Bulgaria learned how to successfully employ the leverage of international actors 
in order to persuade governments into introducing policies that protect the environment. 
In this sense, the theory would benefit from testing it on issues that are less specific than 
corruption, such as environmental, or migration and refugee policies.  
 
In light of historical legacies, issues such as minorities and environmental 
protection indeed breed a demand for altering culture in the post-communist world. In 
terms of the rapid industrialization in all post-communist countries in the beginning of 
the communist regime, some countries lost most of their strong agriculture. With the 
exception of Albania, where in 1981 about 60% of the population was still living in rural 
communities and therefore was occupied in the agricultural sector, most countries took a 
sharp turn toward industrialization. For instance, Czechoslovakia’s agricultural output in 
1960 and 1965 was below this in 1936 (Staar 1984) and by 1975 the net loss of workers 
in the agricultural sector was 224,000.280 Similarly, Staar (1978) found that in Hungary in 
the period 1950-1954, the production of the bread grain was less than it had been in 1911-
1913, when the population was 25% smaller. In his words, “Statistics reveal that no 
                                                
280 Data from the Statistical Survey of Czechoslovakia 1976 p. 16 
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government approach can so mismanage agricultural production than one based on the 
communist ideology.”281  
 
While indeed difficult (Rothchild and Wingfield 2007) decreasing agriculture’s 
significance, coupled with rapid industrialization also changed the demographics in 
Eastern Europe and made urban living more appealing to the population. As a result by 
1989 on average in the post-communist countries 56% of the population lived in urban 
settings in (Beissinger and Kotkin 2014). A revival of agriculture after the collapse of the 
Berlin Wall thus demanded not only structural change, but also cultural change. The 
efforts of the EU here were primarily in the area of agricultural subsidies through the 
PHARE and TASCIS programs. However, such funds did not bring about the cultural 
change necessary for the population to move out of the cities and to return to villages in 
order to engage in the agricultural sector. My theory posits that in order for successful 
development of sustainable agriculture to take place, a cultural change is necessary.  
 
Similarly, minority issues were overwhelming in all countries in Eastern Europe 
after the end of the communist regime. For instance, the integration of the Roma 
minorities was problematic in both Hungary and Bulgaria. Preliminary research supports 
the findings made by these study, and showed that indeed where the EU worked with 
civil society it had more leverage over the national government. The Decade of Roma 
Inclusion initiative represented the collaborative effort of twelve countries from Central 
                                                
281 Staar, R (1978) Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, Stanford University, Hoover 
Institution Press, p. 142 
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and South East Europe,282 aiming to further the social and socio-economic integration of 
Roma in the region. The initiative ran between 2005 and 2015 and it was managed on a 
country presidency rotation principle, with the EU among the major founding 
international partners. A brief look at the participants in the projects under the initiative 
show that the Czech Republic included almost 30% more NGOs than Bulgaria did and 
integrated the Roma to a significantly higher degree, with respect to lifestyle, education, 
and participation in the political process. As a result, in Bulgaria average income of 
Roma is 74% less than that of the total population, and in the Czech Republic this 
percentage is 40% 283 . In Bulgaria, the percent of Roma that report experiencing 
discrimination (75%) is again higher than the number in the Czech Republic (60%).  
 
3.4  Are all International Organizations the Same? 
Despite the EU’s strong involvement in the post-communist transitions of the 
countries from Eastern Europe, it was not the only international organization (IO) that 
contributed. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the 
Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), and the World Bank all had their fair share 
of guiding Eastern European countries on their way to democracy and a market economy. 
This study did not engage with of these IOs, as they were out of scope of the goal of the 
study, which was focused on deepening our general understanding of Europeanization. 
                                                
282 Countries participating in the Decade were Albania, Bosnia i Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, 
and Spain. 
283 Decade of Roma Inclusion Report 2015 available at: 
http://www.romadecade.org/cms/upload/file/9810_file1_roma-inclusion-index-2015-s.pdf 
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However, testing the theory that IOs have the most leverage over domestic governments 
where they engage non-state actors in a political dialogue on IOs other than the EU 
would contribute to the generalizability of the study. This further research could deepen 
our understanding of how international organizations work, and how applicable 
conditionality is when the incentives are smaller than EU-membership.  
 
On a similar note, I have argued that the EU learned from Montenegrin CSOs about 
the precise problems that drove corruption domestically, and what conditions could be 
satisfied, and to what end. While this was a major part of my argument, and I showed that 
the EU indeed learned, I did not discuss whether or not this learning process has the 
potential to make a doctrinal change in its behavior in future enlargements. The reason 
for this is because a general change in the EU was out of the scope of this research, which 
set out to discover the conditions under which the EU has the most influence. Future 
research should focus on the conditions under which the EU learns and under which its 
culture of interaction with potential members and non-members changes. 
 
Finally, I have noticed certain discrepancies between the perceptions of EU 
representatives in the countries, and EU representatives in Brussels. At this stage, I would 
expect that it is EU representatives in the countries that learn and transfer this knowledge 
to the EU representatives from DG Enlargement and DG Judicial Affairs because they are 
the ones that interact directly with domestic CSOs. Yet, further research discussing the 
conditions under which transfer of knowledge takes place and the potential results from 
such transfer with respect to EU’s interaction with countries is necessary.  
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4.  Implications of the Study 
 
In addition to offering empirical analysis, this study aspires to make a theoretical 
contribution.  It contributes to the literature discussing the power and limits of 
international organizations, and, more specifically, to the literature on Europeanization, 
the literature of civil society, and the literature on post-communist transition. The study 
also makes a methodological contribution to the study of corruption.  
 
This study contributes to the literature on the limits and opportunities of 
international organizations to secure domestic compliance for their policies. My evidence 
shows that socialization and conditionality are best understood when discussed as 
symbiotic processes. I conceptualize the process of socialization as a political dialogue 
which takes place through constant interaction between domestic actors and the EU. I 
have shown that in some instances this interaction is indeed bi-directional, while in other 
cases it resembles a unidirectional dictation of norms and rules from one actor to another. 
My evidence shows that socialization secures compliance with EU regulations only when 
the parties in the process communicate ideological positions on the same issue in a 
continuous, iterative, and interactive manner (Heater 1974, Almond and Verba 1963, 
Dawson et al. 1977). In Montenegro, such process took place, while in Bulgaria and 
Georgia, the EU was dictating rules and was not learning from domestic actors.  
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I also argue that the reason for the success of socialization when it is bi-directional 
is to be found in the opportunity that it presents to the EU to alter the process of 
conditionality. To be fair, the EU’s relationship with all post-communist countries is 
based on conditionality. However, incentives, sanctions, their credibility and size, as well 
as the nature of conditions vary according to the relationship that EU has with domestic 
actors. Evidence showed that this variation was based on the extent to which the EU 
involved domestic civil society in continuous political dialogue from the very beginning 
of the transitions. In some cases, such as Bulgaria and Georgia, the climate created by the 
interaction of the EU with domestic non-state actors limited the types of incentives and 
sanctions that would be effective. In Montenegro, domestic non-state actors indeed 
learned from the EU, but they also managed to provide information to the EU, which in 
turn caused the EU to alter conditions, incentives, and sanctions. For instance, shaming 
mechanisms never worked in Bulgaria and Georgia, but were significantly more 
successful in Montenegro. Similarly, material sanctions in Bulgaria did not persuade 
governments to change their approach to anti-corruption reforms, despite these 
governments’ political orientations. 
   
This study also contributes to the general knowledge of the formation of post-
communist civil society and its role in the democratic transitions that took place after the 
collapse of the communist regime. Abundant literature on civil society in the post-
communist world has well developed the subject. However, such studies often focus on 
gathering empirical data and establishing the state of civil society. These studies are for 
the most part focused on the ability of civil society to channel demands (Mercer, 2002), 
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civil society’s participation (Boulding 2010, 2012, Brown et al. 2008a, 2008b), or the 
administrative capacity of civil society (Bukenya 2013, Brass 2012a, 2012b, Tsai 2011).  
 
Scholars rarely examined the process by which post-communist civil society is 
shaped. Even studies that have examined the formation of civil society in Western 
Societies and contrasted it to this process in the post-communist world have focused on 
the difference between organic and non-organic civil society. Rarely have these studies 
emphasized the specific influence that international organizations have on the formation 
of the third sector in young and unconsolidated democracies. Recently, some authors 
have begun to develop theories regarding the relationship between domestic civil society 
and international organizations. Turkina and Kostakakis (2015), for example, specifically 
focus on the process by which domestic NGOs learn norms from international 
organizations, such as the EU. I agree with their findings, but I also contribute to the 
literature by emphasizing the role of civil society as a teacher in addition to that of a 
student. In this study, I have developed the idea that under conditions of present political 
dialogue and cooperation with the EU, domestic NGOs provide international 
organizations with information, and thus teach them about domestic context and the way 
this context evolves.  
 
Finally, this study makes a methodological contribution to the study of corruption. 
In general, scholars and policy makers alike use various anti-corruption indices in order 
to determine levels and types of corruption. However, these indices only purport to show 
perceptions of corruption. For instance, Transparency International’s Corruption 
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Perception Index (CPI) showed in 2011 that Georgia has immensely decreased 
corruption. It also showed that this progress has been steady since 2005. However, my 
evidence showed that Georgia did not decrease corruption as much as the CPI suggested. 
Instead, the country transformed corruption from endemic to centralized in a powerful 
political elite that was organized around Saakashvili. Thus, what the CPI registers is a 
change in the popular perception of corruption in the country, which is a low fidelity 
proxy for actual change in levels of corruption. The reforms that Saakashvili started in 
2005 abated petty corruption, and as a result decreased the salience of the issue of 
corruption in Georgia. In doing this, grand corruption was removed from the spotlight 
because by its very nature, petty corruption is typically more topical. This allowed 
Saakashvili to mask the severity of high level corruption through a public attack on petty 
corruption. The problem of measuring perception instead of real change is one that 
reflects on domestic and international policies attempting to secure transparency, 
accountability, and the rule of law. Therefore, existing indices prove to be insufficient for 
a comprehensive understanding of the problem of corruption.  
 
This study offers a more suitable approach to studying corruption. I have shown 
that instead of measuring perception, one is better equipped to understand the 
phenomenon if one examines the institutional and legal framework that governs anti-
corruption policies. I justified this approach by relying on the fact that the rule of law is 
only possible if mediated by an appropriate institutional set up. Where institutions create 
additional red tape, or introduce confusion among citizens with respect to institutional 
responsibilities, priorities, and rights, an environment is created where corruption can 
 332 
thrive. This approach explains not only levels of corruption, but it also sheds light on the 
type of corruption in each country. Analyzing anti-corruption institutions and the state of 
the judiciary as proxy to the type of corruption allowed me to point out significant 
differences between Georgia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro, which are not evident using 
indices alone. 
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Appendix A: List of Interviews 
 
 
Bulgaria 2013-2014 
 
1. Senior Fellow, Security Program, Center for the Study of Democracy, Sofia, October 
2013,  
 
2. Senior Analyst and Program Director, Center for the Study of Democracy, Sofia, 
October 2013 
 
3. Senior Official, European Institute, Sofia, January 2014 
 
4. Former Deputy Minister of Economy, Sofia, November 2013 
 
5. Member of the Managing Board of the European Institute, Sofia, September 2013 
 
6. Chief Negotiator with the European Union on Bulgaria's EU Accession (2000-2001), 
Sofia, September 2013 
 
7. Member (1) of the Bulgarian Negotiation Team, Sofia, November 2013 
 
8. Member (2) of the Bulgarian Negotiation Team, Sofia, January 2014 
 
9. Member (3) of the Bulgarian Negotiation Team, Sofia, September 2013 
 
10. Member of the Managing Board of Professionals for Good Governance Foundation, 
Sofia, February 2014 
 
11. Lecturer at the European Integration Program at Sofia University, Sofia, January 
2014 
 
12. Former deputy minister of Industry, Sofia, January 2014 
 
13. Senior Official atLabor Podkrepa, Sofia, September 2014 
 
14. Consultant, Bulgarian Center for Not-for-Profit Law, Sofia, July 2014 
 
15. Founder of Anti-Corruption Map, NGO, Sofia, January 2014 
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16. Inspector at the Anti-corruption Inspectorate in the Ministry of Education, Sofia, 
January 2014 
 
17. Inspector at the Anti-corruption Inspectorate in the Ministry of Healthcare, Sofia, 
January 2014 
 
18. Coordinator at Directorate “International programs, activities, and projects” at the 
Ministry of Healthcare, Sofia, January 2014 
 
19. Senior Official, Center for Prevention and Countering Corruption and Organized 
Crime, Sofia, January 2014 
 
20. Analyst, Center for Prevention and Countering Corruption and Organized Crime, 
February 2014 
 
21. Mid-level official, Center for Prevention and Countering Corruption and Organized 
Crime, Sofia, December 2013 
 
22. Senior Official and Member of the Board of Directors of Multiprofile Hospital for 
Active Treatment and Emergency Medicine /MHATEM/ "N.I.Pirogov", Sofia, May 2014 
 
23. Cardio surgeon, First Multiprofile Hospital, Sofia, May 2014  
 
24. Senior Official at the EU Commission Representation in Bulgaria, written 
communication, Sofia, February 2014 
 
25. Team Leader – Communication, Partnerships and Networks, EU Directorate-General 
for Communication Representation in Bulgaria, Sofia, August 2013 
 
26. Representative from the Center for Liberal Studies, Sofia, August 2013 
 
27.  Member of the European Parliament from EPP Group, Sofia, September 2013 
 
28. Journalist from Kapital newspaper, Sofia, September 2013 
 
29.  Senior Official at TV Europe in Bulgaria, Sofia, September 2013 
 
30. Senior Official at the Legal Department at the Commission for Prevention and 
Ascertainment of Conflict of Interest, Sofia, December 2013 
 
31. Former Head of the National health insurance fund, Sofia, September 2013 
 
32. Current Head of the National health insurance fund, Sofia, September 2013 
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33. Coordinator at the National health insurance fund, Sofia, September 2013 
 
 
Georgia 2013-2014 
 
1. Senior Offical  the Economic Policy Research Center, Tbilisi, October 2014 
 
2. Program Manager, Transparency International Georgia, Tbilisi, March 2014 
 
3. Senior Official, Transparency International Georgia, Tbilisi, March 2014 
 
4. Project Manager, Georgia’s Young Lawyers Association, Tbilisi, October2014 
 
5. Senior Official, Georgia’s Young Lawyers Association, Tbilisi, October 2014 
 
6. Senior Official, Institute for Development of Freedom of Information, Tbilisi, October 
2014 
 
7. Mid-level Official, Institute for Development of Freedom of Information, Tbilisi, 
October 2014 
 
8. Senior Official at the European and Euro-Atlantic Cooperation Program at the 
Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, Tbilisi, October 2014 
 
9. Lecturer in Political Science and European Integration at the Ilia State University, 
Tbilisi, March 2014 
 
10. Former Minister of Education and Science, Tbilisi, March 2014 
 
11. Georgian Academic and Political Analyst, Associate Profession at Tbilisi State 
University 
 
12. Senior Official at the Analytical Unit of the Ministry of Justice, Georgia, Tbilisi, 
February 2014 
 
13. Senior Official at the Civil Service Reform and Development Department, Civil 
Service Bureau Of Georgia, Tbilisi, April 2014 
 
14. Project Manager for Democratization and Civil Society, Delegation of the European 
Union to Georgia, Tbilisi, April 2014 
 
15. EU Integration Field Manager, Open Society Georgia Foundation, Tbilisi, March 
2014 
 
16. Program Management Specialist, Senior Health Systems and Financing Advisor 
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Office of Health and Social Development, USAID/Caucasus, Tbilisi, April 2014 
 
17. Senior Official, The Caucasus Research Resource Centers, Tbilisi, April 2014 
 
18. Founder, Media Development Fund, Tbilisi, March 2014 
 
19. Director of EU Studies, Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies 
(GFSIS), March 2014 
 
20. Consultant, Association of Young Economists of Georgia (AYEG), Tbilisi, April 
2014 
 
21. Co-founder of "Georgia's Reform Associates" (GRASS) NGO, Tbilisi, March 2014 
 
22. Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Georgia, Tbilisi, March 2014 
 
23. Project Manager for the Justice and Rule of Law, Delegation of the European Union 
to Georgia, Tbilisi, March 2014 
 
24. Public Outreach Coordinator, East-West Management Institute, Policy, Advocacy, 
and Civil Society Development in Georgia (G-PAC), Tbilisi, February 2014 
 
25. Member of at the Georgian Dream Coalition, Tbilisi, October 2014 
 
26. Minister of Labor, Health, and Social Affairs of Georgia, Tbilisi, October 2014 
 
27. Senior Official of Euro-Atlantic Integration at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Tbilisi, 
September 2014 
 
28.  Former analyst at the Ministry of Justice, Tbilisi, September 2014 
 
29. Senior Researcher at the Center for Social Research, Tbilisi, September 2014 
 
 
 
  Montenegro 2013-2014 
 
1. Senior Official, program director of investigation center, MANS NGO, Podgorica, 
November 2013 
 
2. Senior Official, Center for Civil Education NGO, Podgorica, November 2013 
 
3. Democracy Program Coordinator, Center for Civil Education, Podgorica, November 
2013 
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4. Senior Official, Center for Development of NGOs (CRNVO), Podgorica, November 
2013 
 
5. Research coordinator, Institute Alternativa NGO, Podgorica, May 2014 
 
6. Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Montenegro, Podgorica, May 
2014 
 
7. Associate Professor of Economy, University of Montenegro, Podgorica, May 2014 
 
8. Senior Official at the Policy Research Department at Center for Monitoring and 
Research, NGO, Podgorica, May 2014 
 
9. Senior Official at the Governing Board of Center for Monitoring and Research, NGO, 
Podgorica, May 2014 
 
10. Senior Official at the Commission for Prevention of Conflict of Interest, Podgorica, 
May 2014 
 
12. Advisor in the Directorate for Anti-Corruption Initiative, Podgorica, May 2014 
 
13. PR Service and NGO communication officer, Directorate for Anti-Corruption 
Initiative, Podgorica, May 2014 
 
14. Senior Advisor in the Directorate for Anti-Corruption Initiative, Podgorica, 
November 2013 
 
15. Coordinator for Repression Corruption Part in Chapter 23, Podgorica, May 2014 
 
16. Administrative Assistant, World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe 
Montenegro Country Office, Podgorica, May 2014 
 
17. Former Minister and Deputy Prime Minister for European integration of 
Montenegrin, Podgorica, May 2014 
 
18. Senior Adviser, Department for International Cooperation and EU Integrations, 
Ministry of Health, Podgorica, May 2014 
 
19. Senior Official at the Cooperation with NGOs Directorate, Ministry of Health, 
Podgorica, May 2014 
 
20. Senior Advisor for Twinning Project Support the implementation of the anti-
corruption strategy and action plan, Sector: Justice and Home Affairs, Podgorica, May 
2014 
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21. Coordinator for Twinning Project Police Reform, Sector: Justice and Home Afairs, 
Podgorica, May 2014 
 
22. Senior Official at the Political Affairs Advisor for Chapters 23 and 24 of the 
Negotiation Process, Delegation of the European Union to Montenegro, Podgorica, 
November 2013 
 
23. Mid-level offcial at the Civil Society, EU Delegation to Montenegro, Podgorica, 
November 2013 
 
25. Mid-level Official at EU Delegation to Montenegro, Podgorica, November 2013 
 
26. Member of the Negotiation Team for Montenegro’s accession to the EU, Podgorica, 
November 2013 
 
 
Belgium 2014 
 
1. Adviser for the Western Balkans at DG Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations, 
EU, Brussels, February 2014 
 
2. Deputy Managing Director for Europe and Central Asia, European External Action 
Service, Brussels, February 2014 
